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THE WORK OF THE LOUISIANA LEGISLATURE
FOR THE 1978 REGULAR SESSION
A Student Symposium*
INTRODUCTION
The 1978 regular session of the Louisiana legislature will
be remembered by those who participated in it as one of the
dullest to take place in modem times. In retrospect, it will
probably be recognized as the session which saw the passage of
a new equal management regime superseding the old com-
munity property system. However, what the session lacked in
emotion and drive was made up in volume,I and among the 797
* The authors of the Legislative Symposium are as follows: Steven A. Glaviano:
Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Civil Procedure; James Marshall Jones, Jr.: State
and Local Taxation, State and Local Government; Anne T. Lastilla: Matrimonial
Regimes, Persons; Constance R. LeSage: Environmental Law, Health Legislation;
John A. Mouton III: Administrative Law and Procedure, State and Local Government,
Expropriation; Emily M. Phillips: Property, Corporations, Security Devices, Financial
Institutions, Sales.
1. DISPOSITION OF LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENTS
1978 REGULAR SESSIONa
Passed Signed Vetoed
House Passed Died in by by
of Both Confer- Gov- Gov-
Introducedd Origin Houses *ence ernor ernor
House Bills 1587 586 546 4 541 5f
House Joint
Resolutionsb 10 1 1 N/A N/A
Senate Bills 930 416 264 1 256 8
Senate Joint
Resolutionsb 19 1 0
House
Resolutionsc 37 26e N/A N/A
House
Concurrent
Resolutionsc 245 172 N/A N/A
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acts of the session are a number of important changes in the
law of which practitioners should be aware.
In addition to the substantive changes in the law, the pro-
cedure involved in the passage or defeat of each piece of legisla-
tion should be understood and considered. The processes of
introduction, committee referral, hearing, final passage and
executive approval to which a bill is subjected are of ancient
origin2 and have been incorporated in varying forms by vir-
tually every deliberative body in'the world. In Louisiana, the
procedure by which a bill becomes a law has a constitutional
foundation, and thus any bill's deviation from the constitution-
ally compelled routine raises a serious question as to the valid-
ity of the resulting law.'
Senate
Resolutionsc 12 lie NiA N/A
Senate
Concurrent
Resolutionsc 155 118 NiA N/A
a) Data summarized in this table is taken from disposition tables compiled by the
Louisiana Legislative Council and published in Resume, 1978 Louisiana Legislature,
ii-v.
b) Joint Resolutions are instruments which propose amendments to the constitution.
They follow the same process as bills [LA. CONST. art. III, § 15(A)]. They are also
included in the total bill counts for both houses.
c) Resolutions do not require the signature of the governor but are forwarded to him
for informational purposes.
d) Introductions include all bills and resolutions including bills and resolutions re-
ported by substitute.
e) Approval of simple resolutions by house of origin constitutes final adoption.
f) All vetoes sustained either in session or by declaration of no necessity for a veto
session as provided in LA. CONST. art. II, § 18(C).
2. While no exhaustive study of parliamentary forms will be attempted here, a
comparison of article III of the 1974 constitution with the legislative provisions of prior
Louisiana Constitutions is of great utility in tracing the "received" nature of these
provisions. Comparison is invited with those of the English Parliament as early as the
sixteenth century.
3. The procedural requirements for the passage of laws are found primarily in
article III of the 1974 constitution. A discussion of some aspects of substantive limita-
tion can be found in the amicus curiae brief filed with the Louisiana Supreme Court
in McKenzie v. Edwards, 361 So. 2d 880 (La. 1978), and in the section on Louisiana
Constitutional Law which will appear as part of the forthcoming symposium on the
work of the Louisiana appellate courts for the 1977-1978 term. Since the effective date
of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, the issue of invalidity on procedural grounds has
not been raised in any reported case. However, Terrebonne Parish Police Jury v. Bd.
of Corm'rs, 306 So. 2d 707 (La. 1975), decided under the provisions of the 1921
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The 1974 constitution continued many of the prior prac-
tices, including the requirement of a specific time for the termi-
nation of the introduction of bills.4 As envisioned by the dele-
gates who drafted the new constitution, there would be a recess
at the end of the introductory period during which members of
the legislature would return to their constituents to evaluate
introduced legislation.5 Expiring after the 1976 regular session,6
this rule was of only temporary constitutional stature, but the
practice has been continued by rule since that time.'
In order to avoid the constitutional limitation on the time
for the introduction of bills, many bills are introduced by title
only. 8 A title-only bill does not contain the text of the proposed
law, but instead includes only a title briefly describing the
subject matter of the proposal and an enacting clause.' Once
the bill has been introduced within the fifteen day period, any
text consistent with the title can be added later in the session.
The potential impact of such bills is at best uncertain and at
worst devastating. In the past, titles have been introduced
which indicated nothing other than the broadest subject mat-
ter of the potential legislation.'" This practice frequently vio-
constitution, does address this issue. See also Hargrave, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term - Constitutional Law, 36 LA. L. Ray. 533, 546-
47 (1976).
4. LA. CONST. art. I, § 2(A). Bills must be introduced within the first fifteen
days of the session.
5. A compromise between those who favored split sessions and those who op-
posed them resulted in the adoption of LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 7, which provided for a
recess of eight days "immediately after the first fifteen calendar days of the session."
This procedure has been continued since 1976 with the slight modification that the
recess occurs after the sixteenth calendar day, which allows those bills that were not
introduced until the last day for introduction to be referred to committee.
6. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 7.
7. See note 5, supra.
8. Deidre Cruse, a reporter for the State Times capital news bureau, calculated
that twelve percent of the bills introduced during the first fifteen days of the session
were introduced by title only. Baton Rouge State Times, July 6, 1978, § A, at 3. The
1978 House indicated its disapproval of the title-only procedure by passing House
Resolution No. 13, which prohibits the introduction of title-only bills in the House.
9. IA. CoNsT. art. 1H, § 15(A), requires that "every bill shall contain a brief title
indicative of its object." LA. CONST. art. I1, § 14, requires that every act contain the
following: "Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana." See also Hargrave, supra
note 3, at 546-47.
10. The most flagrant example of such an abuse of the process was a bill provid-
ing in its entirety, "An Act to amend Title 33 relative to taxation," followed by an
enacting clause.
1978]
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lates the requirement that every bill "contain a brief title indic-
ative of its object."" In addition, it does not appear to be con-
sistent with either the letter or the spirit of the constitutional
requirement that bills intended to have the' effect of law shall
not be "introduced or received by either house after midnight
of the fifteenth calendar day [of the session] . ... "
The use of title-only bills cannot be justified by the antici-
pated need for new legislation after the introductory period.
The constitutional scheme already provides an extraordinary
procedure by which bills may be introduced after the fifteenth
day of the session with the consent of two-thirds of the elected
members of each house.'" The vehicle used for acquiring this
consent is a consent resolution.' 4 The use of title-only bills is
an unjustified attempt to circumvent the constitutional
method of introducing legislation after the first fifteen days of
the session.
During the last session there was an attempt by joint rule
of both houses to abolish the use of title-only bills, but the
resolution was defeated in the Senate committee.'" The strong-
est argument against its adoption was that this new prohibition
could be avoided simply by repeating the existing law after the
enacting clause as the body of the proposed bill and then later
amending the bill to fashion the change intended by the spon-
sor. This argument, however, begs the question since it does
not address the central issue of whether the allowance of title-
only bills is a sound constitutional practice. Further, on a
practical level, it would be difficult to achieve the same objec-
tive by using this alternative procedure without violating the
constitutional mandate that all amendments must be
11. LA. CONST. art. III, § 15(A). For the significance of titles and what they must
contain, see Hargrave, supra note 3, at 546-47.
12. LA. CONST. art. III, § 2(A).
13. Id.
14. Joint Rule No. 5, RULES OF ORDER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1978).
The adoption of the consent resolution as the vehicle for obtaining consent facilitates
the process of introducing new matter in that bills are introduced "pursuant to the
authority of (H. or S.) C. R. _." This system allows easy and accurate tracing of
the legislative record to determine if the required "favorable record vote of two-thirds
of the elected members" has been complied with.
15. La. H.R. Con. Res. No. 7, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978). This concurrent resolution
was considered by the Committee on Senate and Governmental Affairs. The House did
prohibit the use of title-only bills in the House. See note 8, supra.
[Vol. 39
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"germane to the bill as introduced."' For example, under the
existing system a title-only bill might recite as its title "An Act
to Provide for the Taxation of Natural Resources." However,
in using the proposed scheme of repeating existing law and
later amending it, the title would probably be narrower and the
desired flexibility would be limited because only amendments
that were "germane" to the bill as introduced, and conse-
quently "germane" to the existing law, would be constitu-
tional. 7
The underlying policy of the constitutional provisions re-
quiring an "indicative" title and prohibiting non-germane
amendments is derived from the notion of public interest in the
legislative process."8 In one sense, the notion is naive in that
Louisiana citizens in the 1970's generally do not interest them-
selves in the legislative process as a matter of civic duty. How-
ever, the policy is logical and consistent with the reality of the
present political structure. By limiting the time for the intro-
duction of bills to a short period at the beginning of the session,
the parameters of the session are defined for the legislators and
for those groups and individuals who have an interest in partic-
ular legislation."9 There is additional utility in allowing issues
to ripen during the course of the session in some logical pattern
rather than to spring full grown from the mind of a single
individual or group at some point in media res. The limited
introductory period thus advances the policy of openness in the
16. LA. CONST. art. El, § 15(C).
17. While "germaneness" is usually decided as a legislative matter if raised by
a member of the Legislature upon the offering of an amendment, this determination
would not necessarily preclude later judicial determination of the issue. However, such
a determination would appear unlikely if the courts were to apply the test of Guidry
v. Roberts, 335 So. 2d 438, 446 (La. 1976), which governs questions of separation of
powers.
18. See V RECoRDs OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTrruiONAL CONVENTION OF 1973: CON-
VENTION TRANsciums 234-312 (1977).
19. Numerous discussions with legislators, legislative personnel, lobbyists and
reporters support the conclusion that each session has its own psychology. Sessions are
referred to by the overriding issues which dominate them. For example, the 1976
Regular Session was the "Right to Work Session." By knowing what issues must be
addressed, the leadership of the two houses can exercise considerable administrative
and psychological control in disposing of those issues. The provisions of the constitu-
tion encourage the self-contained nature of each session by requiring that bills must
be introduced during the session and that all bills not finally passed are withdrawn at
the end of the session. LA. CONST. art. M, §§ I(B), 15(A).
1978]
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legislative process and encourages thoughtful debate on the
issues.
The delegates who drafted the constitution were aware
that some issues would not be apparent during the early days
of a session and wisely provided a vehicle for the introduction
of bills after the first fifteen days.20 Utilization of that tool is
not uncommon, and it allows legislators the option of determin-
ing if the subject matter of the session should be expanded to
encompass the additional proposed legislation."
A. Edward Hardin
20. LA. CONST. art. HIl, § 2(A).
21. 65 House Bills and 40 Senate Bills were introduced pursuant to consent
resolutions in the 1978 Regular Session.
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PRIVATE LAW
PERSONS
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT
Purposes and Scope
Much of the law of persons enacted in the 1978 regular
session deals with the well-being of minors, especially with
respect to alteration in and additions to the law relating to
adoption and child custody.' In approving the most significant
of these measures, Act 513,1 Louisiana joined seventeen other
states which have enacted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion Act. 3
The Act begins with a statement of its general purposes as
a guide to future construction;4 these purposes clearly reflect
1. The 1978 legislative session resulted in other changes in the law of persons,
which will not be discussed in this symposium article: Act 73 (reduces from 18 to 16
the age after which a minor emancipated by marriage can administer his immovable
property without court supervision); Act 159 (expands the definition of an adoption
agency); Act 248 (permits the state to authorize necessary medical treatment when the
state is the person with custody of a child); Act 362 (repeals Civil Code article 1488,
which limits donations to adulterine and incestuous children); Act 450 (clarifies the
requirement for court authorization for access to sealed adoption records and provides
for use of a curator ad hoc to assist courts in maintaining the confidentiality of re-
cords); Act 455 (permits a name change of a minor without the signature of his non-
custodial parent under certain circumstances); Act 457 (reduces from 30 years to 10
years the period of absence which will give rise to a presumption of death and absolute
possession of an absentee's estate by his heirs); Act 552 (requires the State Bureau of
Criminal Identification to furnish records to the Department of Health and Human
Resources in connection with the investigation of prospective foster or adoptive par-
ents); Act 693 (permits award of attorney's fees when a court makes a judgment
executory in an action for past due alimony or child support); Act 714 (reduces from
21 to 18 years the age at which a single person can adopt a child or a person over 17);
Act 753 (provides for issuance of a birth certificate to a foreign-born child adopted in
Louisiana).
2. 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, adding LA. R.S. 13:1700-24. The Act became effective
October 1, 1978.
3. These states are Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED, Directory of Acts
and Tables of Adopting Jurisdictions (1978).
4. LA. R.S. 13:1700(A), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1. Subsection B states
that "[tlhis Act shall be construed to promote the general purposes stated in this
Section." LA. R.S. 13:1700(B), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
1978]
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two significant concerns-one humane and the other institu-
tional. The dominant thread is concern for the best interest of
the child.' The policies which promote this goal reflect the
underlying assumption that this interest is threatened by the
shifting of children from state to state for jurisdictional pur-
poses (particularly through abductions and unilateral remov-
als); by continuing controversy and relitigation over custody
decrees; and by courts rendering custody decrees in states
which have little or no connection with the child.' Legislation
designed to avert these hazards to children has the salutary
concomitant effect of promoting judicial efficiency and cooper-
ation among courts, a goal also explicitly embraced in the pol-
icy section.7
The scope of the Act is established by its definitions of a
custody determination and a custody proceeding:
"custody determination" means a court decision and
court orders and instructions providing for the custody of
a child, including visitation rights; it does not include a
decision relating to child support or any other monetary
obligation of any person;8 "custody proceeding" includes
proceedings in which a custody determination is one of
several issues, such as an action for divorce or separation,
and includes child neglect and dependency proceedings
5. This is also the policy espoused in Louisiana statutes and cases. See, e.g., LA.
CIv. CODE art. 157; State ex. rel. Girtmen v. Ricketson, 221 La. 691, 60 So. 2d 88 (1952);
Hudson v. Hudson, 295 So. 2d 92 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 295 So. 2d 446
(La. 1974); In re Cole, 265 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); Hebert v. Hebert, 255
So. 2d 630 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
6. LA. R.S. 13:1700(A)(1), (3), (4), (5), and (6), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513,
§ 1.
7. LA. R.S. 13:1700(A)(2), (7), and (8), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1. The
Act further states that its purpose is "to make uniform the law of those states which
enact it." LA. R.S. 13:1700(A)(9), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
8. LA. R.S. 13:1701(2), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
9. LA. R.S. 13:1701(3), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1. The meaning of
child neglect and dependency proceedings in this definition is unclear. To the extent
that proceedings brought for neglect or abandonment by the Department of Public
Welfare may be included in this reference, Act 513 should be considered as superseded
by Act 172 of the 1978 regular session, which adopts a Code of Juvenile Procedure. The
priority of Act 172 is apparent for two reasons:
1) It is the more specific enactment with respect to child custody proceedings
of a public law nature; and
2) The stated purposes of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act make
[Vol. 39
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The Commissioners' comments' to the Uniform Act indicate
that the definition of custody proceedings is to be understood
broadly, consequently including habeas corpus actions, guardi-
anship petitions, and other proceedings available under general
state law to determine custody." Thus, the provisions of Act
513 may affect not only the district courts' jurisdiction under
the Code of Civil Procedure, 2 but also the juvenile courts' juris-
diction. 3
clear that it was originally proposed to address problems involved in custody
contests between private parties. Reference to neglect or abandonment proceed-
ings should therefore be construed as including only proceedings brought by a
private custody contestant against another person having custody (or custody
claimant) on the basis of neglect or abandonment.
10. These comments were adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, which approved the Uniform Act in 1968. 9 UNIFORM LAWS
ANNOTATED 99 (1968).
11. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 99, 105, 109 (1968).
12. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 10(5) grants jurisdiction over the legal custody of a
minor to courts which are "otherwise competent under the laws of this state" if the
minor is domiciled in, or is in, the state.
13. LA. R.S. 13:1570 (Supp. 1975) grants to the juvenile courts exclusive original
jurisdiction, "except as otherwise provided herein," over proceedings concerning any
minor domiciled in or present in the state
whose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and support of such
child neglects or refuses, when able to do so, to provide proper or necessary
support, education as required by law, or medical, surgical or other care neces-
sary for his well-being; or who is abandoned by his parent or other custodian;
or who is otherwise without proper care, custody, or support; or who is a live
born human being, as defined in R.S. 13:1569(16)(e), who survives and is not
killed in an abortion attempt.
The Code of Juvenile Procedure, adopted in Act 172 of the 1978 regular session, be-
comes effective on January 1, 1979. It indicates that a court exercising juvenile jurisdic-
tion will have exclusive original jurisdiction over children in need of care. LA. CODE
Juv. P. art. 15(c), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 172, § 1. A child in need of care is one
(a) Whose parent inflicts, attempts to inflict, or, as a result of inadequate
supervision, allows the infliction or attempted infliction of physical injury or
sexual abuse upon the child which seriously endangers the physical, mental or
emotional health of the child;
(b) Whose physical, mental or emotional condition is substantially threatened
or impaired as a result of the refusal or neglect of his parent to supply the child
with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, counseling or education, or
as a result of the parent's neglect or imposition of cruel punishment; or
(c) Who is without necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education,
or supervision because of abandonment by, or the disappearance or prolonged
absence of, his parent, or because of any other reason.
LA. CODE Juv. P. art. 13(14), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 172, § 1.
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Bases for Jurisdiction
Revised Statutes 13:170211 defines various ways in which
a state may acquire jurisdiction for a custody determination
and generally disavows reliance on physical presence of the
child within the state as a single sufficient criterion for exercis-
ing custody jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in a child custody deter-
mination is granted to the child's home state, which is defined
as the state in which he has lived with his parents, a parent,
or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive
months immediately preceding the time involved.'" The home
state retains jurisdiction for up to six months after the child
has left the state if (1) a parent or person acting as parent
continues to reside there and (2) the child's departure was
through removal or retention by a person claiming custody "or
for other reasons."' 6
A second basis of jurisdiction focuses on the "best interest
of the child"; two standards must be met to find that the forum
furthers such interest. The child and his parents (or at least one
contestant) must have a significant connection with the state,
and there must be available in the state substantial evidence
14. IA. R.S. 13:1702, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
15. L . R.S. 13:1701(5), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1. A person acting
as a parent is one who has physical custody of a child and who has either been awarded
custody by a court or claims a right of custody. LA. R.S. 13:1701(9), added by 1978
La. Acts, No. 513, § 1. The home state of a child less than six months old is that state
in which he has lived from birth with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent.
Periods of temporary absence of any of the named persons are counted as part of the
six month period. LA. R.S. 13:1701(5), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1. The latter
provision seems designed to prevent highly technical arguments that a period of six
months is not satisfied when, for example, a parent's business involves frequent out-
of-state travel or the child or parent has spent some time visiting or vacationing
elsewhere. Once a child's (or parent's) absence can no longer be reasonably termed
temporary and six months has elapsed, Louisiana would presumably lose home state
jurisdiction. This might occur, for example, if the child were sent out of state to live
with relatives or left in Louisiana while the parent moved out of state. In such instances
there might be no state with home state jurisdiction, because of the separation of the
child from a parent or person acting as parent; the relatives keeping the child would
not be "acting as parents," since they would not have custody or be claiming a right
of custody. Either the former home state or the new residence of the child (if it is he
and not the parent who leaves) would probably have jurisdiction under the second
criterion of the best interest of the child. See note 17, infra, and accompanying text.
16. LA. R.S. 13:1702(A)(1), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1. The meaning
of "for other reasons" is not explained in the comments. Literally read, it seems to
mean any absence of the child would meet the requirements of this provision.
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concerning the child's present or future care, protection, train-
ing, and personal relationships. 7
The last two jurisdictional grounds will presumably be
invoked infrequently."8 One requires physical presence of the
child within the state and permits the state to exercise jurisdic-
tion if the child has been abandoned or if there is an emergency
need to protect the child because he has been subjected to
or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise
neglected or dependent.' 9 As the comments indicate, this
provision reaffirms the parens patriae doctrine. 0 However, it
grants jurisdiction only under circumstances of abandonment
or emergency. Absent these circumstances, child neglect or
other juvenile court custody determinations must meet the
standards of one of the other jurisdictional bases.'
Finally, there is "best available forum" jurisdiction when
it appears that no other state meets requirements
"substantially in accordance" with the other three jurisdic-
tional grounds or when another state has declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the basis that Louisiana is the more appropriate
forum. 22 In either event, it must additionally be shown that it
is in the child's best interest for the Louisiana court to assume
jurisdiction.?
The section on jurisdiction also attempts to establish the
weight to be given in the jurisdictional determination to physi-
cal presence of the child or of the child and a contestant. It
states that except under the emergency and best available
forum provisions, physical presence "is not alone sufficient" to
confer jurisdiction .2  By excepting the emergency and best
17. LA. R.S. 13:1702(A)(2), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1. The comments
warn that it is the interest of the child, not that of the feuding parties, which is
relevant. The section contemplates maximum, rather than minimum, contact of the
child with the state. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 99, 108 (1968).
18. The comments indicate that home state and best interest of the child are the
two main bases of jurisdiction. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 99, 107 (1968).
19. LA. R.S. 13:1702(A)(3), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
20. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 99, 108 (1968). Parens patriae is the doctrine that
the state is the protector of all citizens who are unable to protect themselves.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1641 (3d ed. 1969).
21. The effects on juvenile jurisdiction of this restriction must be considered in
connection with the newly enacted Code of Juvenile Procedure. See note 9, supra.
22. LA. R.S. 13:1702(A)(4), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
23. LA. R.S. 13:1702(A)(4)(ii), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
24. LA. R.S. 13:1702(B), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
19781
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available forum bases, the Act appears to imply that in those
instances presence alone is sufficient. However, if this were
true, those two provisions would be deprived of any force and
would, in effect, be replaced by a single jurisdictional
ground-physical presence of the child. Since reliance on this
sole criterion created the problems which this act is attempting
to remedy, the result would be a complete vitiation of its policy
imperatives; thus, it is inconceivable that the section will be
given such a literal meaning. A question remains, however, in
determining the import of this reference to physical presence
with respect to the last ground for jurisdiction. The best avail-
able forum jurisdiction provision does not explicitly require
physical presence of the child or any party, although it is cer-
tainly possible that this factor will influence the abstention
decision of another state's court. It may also bear upon whether
a Louisiana court decides that exercising jurisdiction would
serve the best interest of the child. This language should not
be read as injecting into the best available forum jurisdiction
a physical presence requirement; that factor can be given ap-
propriate weight within the standards already imposed for this
type of jurisdiction.
The final sentence of this section perhaps eliminates the
danger of adoption of such an implied requirement with its
unequivocal statement that "physical presence of the child,
while desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to deter-
mine his custody.""5 However, this directly contradicts the re-
quirement that the exercise of jurisdiction in instances of aban-
donment or emergency be premised on physical presence of the
child within the state.
Limitations on Exercise of Jurisdiction
A finding of jurisdiction upon any of the bases in section
1702 does not necessarily permit its exercise by a state court.
Section 1705 requires the court to look to the existence of ongo-
ing proceedings in another state;21 section 1706 introduces a
forum non conveniens notion into the determination;27 section
25. LA. R.S. 13:1702(C), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
26. LA. R.S. 13:1705, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
27. LA. R.S. 13:1706, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
[Vol. 39
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1707 enacts a clean hands doctrine with respect to the' conduct
of the parties;"8 and section 1713 restricts the jurisdictional
power to modify an out-of-state decree. 9
When a custody proceeding is pending in another state
exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this
act, Louisiana courts are prohibited from exercising jurisdic-
tion. There is one exception to this prohibition. The Louisiana
court may entertain the proceeding when the other state's pro-
ceeding is stayed because of a finding that Louisiana is the
more appropriate forum, or "for other reasons."30 In order to
ensure its knowledge of other custody proceedings, a court is
required, before hearing the petition, to examine the pleadings
and other information given by the parties under oath' and to
refer to the child custody registry (established elsewhere in the
Act) .31 If through this investigation or otherwise, the court has
reason to believe that proceedings may be pending elsewhere,
it must direct an inquiry to that state court administrator or
another appropriate official.3 3 The Act also provides a course of
action, based mainly on communication between the two
courts, should the Louisiana court learn of other state proceed-
ings after taking jurisdiction.3 4
Section 1706 grants a state court the discretion to decline
jurisdiction on a forum non conveniens basis, on either its own
motion, that of a party, or that of a curator ad hoc or other
representative of the child. 31 It may exercise this discretion any
28. LA. R.S. 13:1707, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
29. LA. R.S. 13:1713, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
30. LA. R.S. 13:1705(A), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
31. LA. R.S. 13:1708, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
32. LA. R.S. 13:1715, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1. This section requires
the clerk of each district or family court to maintain a registry in which he shall enter
the following:
(1) Certified copies of custody decrees of other states received for filing;
(2) Communications as to the pendency of custody proceedings in other
states;
(3) Communications concerning a finding of inconvenient forum by a
court of another state; and
(4) Other communications or documents concerning custody proceedings
in another state which may affect the jurisdiction of a court of this state or the
disposition to be made by it in a custody proceeding.
33. LA. R.S. 13:1705(B), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
34. LA. R.S. 13:1705(C), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
35. LA. R.S. 13:1706(B), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
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time before making a decree if it finds that it is an inconvenient
forum and that a court of another state is a more appropriate
one.
3
In determining its inconvenience as a forum, the court may
rely on communication with and information provided by the
other state, and it must consider whether the interest of the
child is served by resort to another forum.37 Subsection C lists
factors appropriate for assessing the interest of the child, sev-
eral of which substantially duplicate the considerations encom-
passed in the various jurisdictional bases in section 1702. 31 The
court may also look to any agreement of the parties with re-
spect to another forum, if it is as appropriate, and to whether
the exercise of its own jurisdiction would contravene any of the
purposes listed in section 1700.31
Once a court finds that it is an inconvenient forum and
that there is another more appropriate one, it may either dis-
miss the proceedings outright or stay them on the condition of
their prompt commencement in another named state or upon
any other "just and proper" condition.'" It must then inform
the more appropriate forum of its action." When jurisdiction
is declined on this basis, the court may assess against the party
who commenced the proceedings, the costs of the proceedings
in this state and necessary travel and other expenses, including
attorneys' fees, incurred by other parties or their witnesses.
Since the purpose of this penalty is to deter frivolous filings,42
it may only be imposed "[i]f it appears to the court that it is
clearly an inappropriate forum."43
Under section 1707, the court may decline to exercise juris-
diction in an initial custody proceeding when the petitioner has
36. LA. R.S. 13:1706(A), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
37. A. R.S. 13:1706(C), (D), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
38. The factors which overlap with the jurisdictional grounds are: (1) whether
another state is or recently was the child's home state, (2) whether another state has
a closer connection with the child and his family or with the child and one or more of
the contestants and (3) whether substantial evidence concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily available
in another state.
39. LA. R.S. 13:1706(C)(4), (5), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
40. LA. R.S. 13:1706(E), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
41. LA. R.S. 13:1706(H), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
42. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 99, 115 (1968).
43. LA. R.S. 13:1706(G), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
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wrongfully taken the child from another state or behaved in a
similarly reprehensible manner, "if this is [a] just and proper
[action by the court] under the circumstances."44 The com-
ments clarify that
"[w]rongfully" taking under this subsection does not
mean that a "right" has been violated-both husband and
wife as a rule have a right to custody until a court determi-
nation is made-but that one party's conduct is so objec-
tionable that a court in the exercise of its inherent equity
powers cannot in good conscience permit that party access
to its jurisdiction."
The comments mention one circumstance in which it would not
be just and proper to decline jurisdiction by noting that this
section should not be applied to punish a parent at the expense
of a child's well-being." When a petitioner who has improperly
obtained or retained custody is seeking modification of another
state's decree, the court has no discretion and must refuse ju-
risdiction, unless the interest of the child requires the exercise
of jurisdiction." It is clear that improperly obtaining or retain-
ing custody does not include withholding a child because of
illness or injury; the use of the word "improperly" requires the
court to evaluate any special circumstances justifying the peti-
tioner's conduct." To stengthen the deterrence function of this
section, the court is authorized to charge the petitioner, where
appropriate, with the necessary travel and other expenses of
the other parties and witnesses, including attorneys' fees."
A final restriction on the exercise of jurisdiction must be
noted. Even where one of the jurisdictional bases favors a pro-
ceeding in a Louisiana court, our courts may not exercise juris-
44. LA. R.S. 13:1707(A), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
45. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 99, 116 (1968).
46. Id.
47. LA. R.S. 13:1707(B), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1. Presumably the
interests of the child require the exercise of jurisdiction only under extreme circumn-
stances. Thus, this statutory rule is in accord with the supreme court rule with respect
to juvenile court jurisdiction that "barring an emergency situation," the state does not
have sufficient interest in children who are not Louisiana domiciliaries and have been
brought here against the will of their out-of-state custodial parent "to warrant intru-
sion into ... a custody dispute." In re King, 310 So. 2d 614, 617 (La. 1975).
48. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 99, 116 (1968).
49. LA. R.S. 13:1707(C), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
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diction to modify another state's decree unless it appears that
the court which rendered the decree no longer has jurisdiction
under prerequisites substantially in accordance with the Act or
has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree. 0 The
Act thus recognizes a concept of continuing jurisdiction in the
court that initially renders a decree; the jurisdiction continues,
however, only if there are jurisdictional grounds meeting the
standards of this act-i.e., something beyond the fact that the
court exercised its power in the same matter on some prior
occasion.'
Enforcement of Other States' Decrees
To further support a widespread use of the jurisdictional
criteria included in the Act, Louisiana courts are charged with
recognizing and enforcing the out-of-state decrees of courts ex-
ercising jurisdiction under statutes substantially in conformity
with this one or under factual circumstances meeting its juris-
dictional standards."2 According to the Commissioners' com-
50. LA. R.S. 13:1713, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
51. Until recently, some Louisiana courts would hear a custody matter, even
though the child was neither domiciled in nor present in the state, if the court had
previously rendered a separation or divorce decree with respect to the custody contest-
ants. The rule in the Third and Fourth Circuits'was that a court which rendered a
separation or divorce judgment retained jurisdiction over all matters incidental to the
separation or divorce, including custody. Lynn v. Lynn, 316 So. 2d 445 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1975); Pattison v. Pattison, 208 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968). The First and
Second Circuits required that there be either domicile or physical presence before
taking jurisdiction of a custody matter. Stewart v. Stewart, 233 So. 2d 305 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1970); Nowlin v. McGee, 180 So. 2d 72 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965). The Louisiana
Supreme Court resolved the conflict between the circuits with Odom v. Odom, 345 So.
2d 1154 (La. 1977), holding that absent compelling reasons a Louisiana court could not
exercise jurisdiction over a custody matter where the child was neither domiciled in
nor present in the state, even though that court had rendered the prior separation or
divorce decree. The court felt that
Louisiana's responsibility for the welfare of such a child is remote, and its
interest is, at most, vicarious and conditional because of the presence in the
state of the parent who does not have custody. The state where the child is
domiciled (or located) has a much more immediate interest and responsibility
for, and ability to regulate conditions affecting, the welfare of the child. There
are no compelling reasons for Louisiana courts to attempt to exercise
"continuing jurisdiction" over the status of the absent children in this case.
(What we say here has no reference to a case in which the parent obligated to
support the child is in Louisiana and the child and its custodian are absentees.)
Odom v. Odom, 345 So. 2d 1154, 1155 (La. 1977).
52. I A. R.S. 13:1712, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
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ments, the out-of-state courts must have also complied strictly
with the notice provisions of the Act 53 before recognition and
enforcement of their decrees is required. 4 The obligation to
enforce a previous decree ends once there is a subsequent modi-
fication decree which meets the standards of the Act.5 For
informational purposes, a certified copy of the decree of an-
other state may be filed in the office of the clerk of any district
or family court in the state. Presumably these custody de-
crees, like other foreign judgments, must be made executory
through an ordinary proceeding in a Louisiana court. 7
Notice and Hearing
The Act guarantees notice and an opportunity to be heard
to all contestants, to any parent whose parental rights have not
been terminated, and to any person who has physical custody
of the child,5" and requires that the notice be served, mailed,
delivered, or published at least ten days before the hearing. 9
Any person who is outside the state is to be notified in a man-
ner reasonably calculated to give actual notice and various
methods of notification are provided in section 1704.10 Addi-
tionally, if the court learns that a person not a party has physi-
cal custody of the child, then that person must be joined and
duly notified of the pendency of the proceedings and his join-
der.'
53. See text at notes 58-59, infra.
54. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 99, 110 (1968).
55. LA. R.S. 13:1712, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
56. LA. R.S. 13:1714(A), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
57. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2541 (1960).
58. LA. R.S. 13:1703, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
59. LA. R.S. 13:1704(B), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
60. LA. R.S. 13:1704(A), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
61. LA. R.S. 13:1709, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1. The comments to
this section explain that the requirement of joinder is to prevent a relitigation of the
custody to benefit a third person rather than the child. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED
99, 118 (1968). The persons reached by this section would presumably be considered
necessary parties under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 642, which provides:
"Necessary parties to an action are those whose interests in the subject matter are
separable and would not be directly affected by the judgment if they were not before
the court, but whose joinder would be necessary for a complete adjudication of the
controversy." Complete adjudication of a child's custody requires the joinder of all
persons claiming or actually having custody; however, such parties, if not joined, would
not be affected by the decree. LA. R.S. 13:1711, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
See text at note 62, infra.
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Binding Force of Decree
The binding force and res judicata effect of the custody
decree are explained in section 1711.2 The decree binds those
parties served in this state, those notified in compliance with
the out-of-state notice provisions, and those who have submit-
ted to the court's jurisdiction, if these parties have been given
an opportunity to be heard. For these persons the decree is
conclusive as to all factual and legal issues decided and as to
the custody determination unless and until modified pursuant
to law.
Comparison to Prior Provisions
The principal effect of Act 513 is to both broaden and limit
the exercise of custody jurisdiction under Code of Civil Proce-
dure article 10(5). That article permits a court "otherwise com-
petent under the laws of this state" to make a custody determi-
nation if the child "is domiciled in, or is in, this state."" The
minimal requirement of physical presence has provided great
opportunity for abuse and has led to the sort of child-snatching
episodes "4 to which the Uniform Act is particularly addressed. "5
62. LA. R.S. 13:1711, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 513, § 1.
63. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 10(5).
64. In Smith v. Ford, 288 So. 2d 71 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974), for example, a New
Orleans resident mother took her children from their North Carolina school without
the knowledge of their father, with whom they were living. She then filed a custody
proceeding in New Orleans. The Fourth Circuit in this case refused to take jurisdiction,
ruling that "only when some acute exigency obliges the state to intervene for the...
child's welfare" should the court take jurisdiction based on "brief physical presence."
Id. at 73. The policy ground for this decision was evident in the statement that
"Imlost certainly such jurisdiction cannot be construed or suffered to invite the
spiriting away of children from their long-established home by a seldom-seen parent."
Id. Smith was overruled, however, in the next year when the Fourth Circuit held that:
"Itihere is no restriction on the court's jurisdiction regardless of what method was
utilized to obtain the presence of the minor in this state." Rafferty v. Rafferty, 313
So. 2d 356, 357 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975). The Commissioner's comments note a judicial
trend toward "permitting custody claimants to sue in the courts of almost any state,
no matter how fleeting the contact of the child and family was with the particular
state." 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 99, 100 (1968).
65. The comments to the Uniform Act refer to such parental tactics as "self-
help" and "seize and run." They note that:
It is well known that those who lose a court battle over custody are often unwill-
ing to accept the judgment of the court. They will remove the child in an
unguarded moment or fail to return him after a visit and will seek their luck in
the court of a distant state where they hope to find-and often do find-a more
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Under the new statutes neither domicile nor physical presence
alone supports the exercise of jurisdiction. It is necessary to
prove that the jurisdiction exists under the home state, best
interest of the child, emergency or abandonment, or best avail-
able forum basis. While both domicile and physical presence
are relevant considerations, neither is sufficient in itself to
meet the requirements of any of these types of jurisdiction.
Furthermore, with the exception of the abandonment/
emergency basis, jurisdiction can be exercised without a
finding of either domicile or physical presence of the child.
Home state jurisdiction seems to require either domicile or
former domicile; for best interest of the child or best available
forum jurisdiction, both domicile and physical presence are
considerations to be weighed, but neither is determinative.
The broadening and narrowing effects of Act 513 are also
applicable to continuing jurisdiction. The state supreme court
recently held that the earlier exercise of a court's custody juris-
diction to render a decree does not alone support jurisdiction
for modification of the decree; absent compelling circumstan-
ces, the requirements of domicile or physical presence must
still be met.6" Thus, if a parent moves out-of-state with the
child after a Louisiana custody determination, the other parent
cannot automatically seek a modification in a Louisiana court.
This rule is somewhat altered by the Act, since continuing
jurisdiction would be supportable, even without domicile or
physical presence, if the requirements of one of the newly en-
acted jurisdictional bases, such as the home state or the best
interest of the child basis, were met.
The Act also affects divorce and separation proceedings in
which a custody determination is sought. It would clearly be
possible for the Louisiana court to have jurisdiction over the
divorce or separation action" but lack jurisdiction over the
sympathetic ear for their plea of custody. The party deprived of the child may
then resort to similar tactics to recover the child and this "game" may continue
for years, with the child thrown back and forth from state to state, never coming
to rest in one single home and in one community.
9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 99 (1968).
66. Odom v. Odom, 345 So. 2d 1154 (La. 1977).
67. Louisiana courts have jurisdiction over divorce and separation actions when
one or both of the spouses are domiciled in the state and, except as otherwise provided
by law, the grounds therefore were committed or occurred in this state, or while the
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child's custody." This result might occur, for example, when
one spouse has left the state with the child more than six
months before the proceeding, or when jurisdiction in the di-
vorce or separation suit is based on the returning spouse provi-
sion of the Civil Code. 9
Juvenile court jurisdiction'" is also both restricted and
broadened by .the Uniform Act. Formerly such jurisdiction
could be exercised if the child was either present in or domi-
ciled in the state." The new law permits a broader jurisdiction
to the extent that the home state, best interest of the child, and
best available forum bases do not require either domicile or
physical presence.7" However, the abandonment or emergency
ground for jurisdiction is the new provision most directly rele-
vant to juvenile proceedings, and that ground is potentially
more restrictive than the prior law. Since it requires physical
presense in abandonment proceedings, the new law, unlike the
earlier provisions, will not permit jurisdiction based on aban-
donment to determine custody of a child domiciled in but ab-
sent from the state. Presumably such a circumstance is rather
unusual, however, and the state where the abandoned child is
found would be an adequate forum (presuming its authority to
exercise jurisdiction). Jurisdiction over child neglect cases is
matrimonial domicile was in this state. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 10(7). Civil Code article
142 makes an exception for a "returning spouse":
A separation from bed and board or a divorce may be obtained in this state for
any cause allowed by the laws of this state even if the cause occurred elsewhere
while either or both of the spouses were domiciled elsewhere, provided the per-
son obtaining the separation from bed and board or the divorce was domiciled
in this state prior to the time the cause of action accrued and is domiciled in
this state at the time the action is filed.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 142.
68. The Commissioner's comments note that "[sihort-term presence in the
state is not enough even though there may be an intent to stay longer, perhaps an
intent to establish a technical 'domicile' for divorce or other purposes." 9 UNIFORM
LAWS ANNOTATED 99, 108 (1968). Similarly, "[tihe submission of the parties to a
forum, perhaps for purposes of divorce, is not sufficient without additional factors
establishing closer ties with the state. Divorce jurisdiction does not necessarily include
custody jurisdiction." Id.
69. LA. CIv. CODE art. 142.
70. LA. R.S. 13:1570(A)(1) (Supp. 1975); LA. CODE OF JUV. P. arts. 13(14)(c) and
13(15), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 172, § 1. For the language of the pertinent portions
of these statutes, see note 13, supra.
71. LA. R.S. 13:1570 (Supp. 1975).
72. See text at notes 63-66, supra.
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more significantly narrowed. As with abandonment, the Uni-
form Act permits jurisdiction only over children who are pres-
ent in the state; it additionally requires that there be an emer-
gency condition. Thus, the Act will not permit a non-custodial
parent to seek a new decree based on the neglect of the cus-
todial parent in another state without proving an emergency.
The actual restrictive impact of the rather narrow abandon-
ment /emergency jurisdictional basis may be somewhat miti-
gated since abandonment and neglect proceedings can be
brought in Louisiana whenever the criteria of the home state,
best interest of the child, or best available forum jurisdictions
are met.7"
Probably any impact of Act 513 on the juvenile jurisdiction
of courts will be limited to instances where private parties are
seeking to resolve their private custody dispute in a juvenile
proceeding. The strictly public law exercise of juvenile juris-
diction should be governed entirely by the newly enacted Code
of Juvenile Procedure.7"
ADOPTION
Adoption by Grandparents
Several enactments of the 1978 session effect changes in or
additions to the law of adoption. Act 10171 eases the require-
ments for a grandparent to adopt a grandchild born out of
wedlock, by permitting a final decree after the first hearing in
such a private, related adoption. Normally a private adoption
is a two-hearing process,76 but the law permits a final decree to
be rendered after one hearing in three instances where the peti-
tioner is related to the adoptive child or one of his parents: (1)
when the petitioner is the spouse of the child's legitimate par-
ent; (2) when the petitioner is the parent of the child who was
born out of wedlock; and (3) when the petitioners are a married
couple seeking jointly to adopt a child born out of wedlock to
one of them.77
73. See text at note 21, supra.
74. See note 9, supra.
75. 1978 La. Acts, No. 101, amending LA. R.S. 9:434 (Supp. 1977).
76. LA. R.S. 9:432 (Supp. 1977).
77. LA. R.S. 9:434 (Supp. 1977).
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Extending the one-hearing process to grandparents is con-
sistent with the prior exceptions to the two-hearing process,
but it is not clear why the change was made in favor of only
those grandparents adopting illegitimate grandchildren. While
the birth of an illegitimate grandchild may be a fairly obvious
occasion for grandparental adoption, it is not the only one.
There are circumstances, including separation or divorce of the
parents and simultaneous death of the parents, in which the
adoption of legitimate grandchildren is a plausible course of
action."
There does not appear to be a strong policy basis for differ-
entiating between grandparents on the basis of the legitimacy
of the grandchildren they seek to adopt. Perhaps it was felt that
delays should be shortened in the case of illegitimate grand-
children in order to minimize their period of illegitimacy. This
may be one of the reasons why a single-hearing procedure is
permitted in the case of a parent (or parent and spouse) seeking
to adopt his illegitimate child. No such justification is present,
however, in the situation where the spouse of the legitimate
parent seeks to adopt a child. The more general basis for all of
the single-hearing private adoptions seems to be the existence
of a close relationship between the persons involved, with the
corollary considerations that the prospective home may al-
ready be familiar to the adoptive child, that the environment
may have already proven suitable, and that problems that
might arise in adoptions between strangers are less likely to
occur. These reasons, however, seem equally applicable to a
grandparent adopting a legitimate grandchild, and the single-
hearing process should be extended to these grandparents as
well.
Subsidized Adoption
Another significant adoption measure, Act 734,79 author-
izes the Office of Family Services of the Department of Health
and Human Resources to develop and implement a program for
78. The statutes show some recognition of this by giving grandparents the same
capacity as the spouse of the legitimate parent to adopt a child or children without
consent of the other parent under certain circumstances. LA. R.S. 9:422.1 (Supp. 1962).
79. 1978 La. Acts, No. 734, adding LA. R.S. 46:1790-93.
[Vol. 39
1978] LEGISLATIVE SYMPOSIUM
subsidizing the adoption of children with special needs.' The
Office is empowered to make payments to the adoptive parents
on behalf of such a child placed for adoption through an agency
if two conditions (in addition to the special needs of the child)
are met: (1) if the office has attempted unsuccessfully to place
the child and (2) if the "adoptive family is capable of providing
the permanent family relationships needed by the child in all
respects other than financial, and the needs of the child are
beyond the economic ability and resources of the family."'"
This program is clearly based on a desire to further the
best interest of the child, the policy which underlies all of the
child custody and adoption provisions. Children who cannot be
placed in an adoptive home are usually reared by the state in
an institutional setting or in foster homes by contract;" this
80. The Act refers to a child who "because of physical or mental condition, race,
age, membership in a sibling group, or other serious impediments or special needs, is
considered a child that is difficult to place for adoption." LA. R.S. 46:1790(B)(1),
added by'1978 La. Acts, No. 734, § 1. The listing is clearly illustrative, rather than
exclusive, with the general criterion for eligibility being some characteristic which
makes the child difficult to place. The Act is similar to, but not as broad as, the Model
State Subsidized Adoption Act and Regulations produced by a convention of more
than 1500 persons in the fields of law, medicine, and civil rights. That act makes
subsidized adoption available in situations where a child is (1) 'currently in the care of
a prospective adoptive foster family with whom he has developed a positive emotional
bond; or (2) unlikely to be a candidate for adoption because of physical or mental
disability, emotional disturbance, sibling relationship, racial or ethnic factors, or any
combination thereof. Forty jurisdictions have adopted some kind of subsidized adop-
tion statute: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
'New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Vir-
ginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. The Implementation of Subsidized Adoption Pro-
grams: A Preliminary Survey, 15 J. FAM. L. 732, 737 n.16 (1976).
81. LA. R.S. 46:1790(B), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 734, § 1. Eligibility for
subsidy payments must be determined and approved prior to completion of the adop-
tion proceeding; continued eligibility is determined annually thereafter. Eligibility of
Louisiana residents as adoptive parents does not end with an out-of-state move. LA.
R.S. 46:1792, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 734, § 1. Payments are to vary according to
need, but may not exceed 80% of the cost of providing foster care. They may include,
but are not limited to, maintenance costs, medical and surgical expenses, and other
costs incidental to the care, training, and education of the child, including special
medical costs connected with a physical or mental condition existing prior to the initial
judgment of adoption. Payments terminate when the child reaches age 18. LA. R.S.
46:1791, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 734, § 1.
82. LA. R.S. 46:52(8) (1950) charges the Department of Public Welfare with:
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program attempts to overcome the inherent disadvantage
which children with special needs suffer with respect to place-
ment and to increase their chances of growing up in a family
environment. The cost to the state of subsidizing the adoptive
parents is at least theoretically less than the cost of continued
state custody of the child.13
Grandparental Visitation of Adopted Grandchild
Act 45811 attempts to fill a gap in the laws relating to the
visitation rights of grandparents. It amends Revised Statutes
9:572 to add a provision that "in the event of an adoption, the
natural parents of a deceased party to a marriage dissolved by
death may have limited visitation rights to the minor child or
children of the marriage dissolved by death."" Civil Code arti-
cle 214 is also amended to incorporate this provision by refer-
ence as an exception to the general termination of the rights of
blood relatives in cases of adoption."
licensing and supervising all parish, municipal, and private agencies, institutions, and
individuals caring for children; contracting with private individuals to hold their
homes open for and to care for children in need of temporary or long-term foster care;
and providing such other services for children as may be authorized by law.
83. A recent survey indicates that subsidized adoption programs are cost-
effective. Every state responding to the survey reported a savings over the cost of foster
care, with the amount of savings ranging from 18.7% to over 60%. The Implementation
of Subsidized Adoption Programs: A Preliminary Survey, 15 J. FAM. L. 732, 763, 766
(1976).
84. 1978 La. Acts, No. 458, amending LA. Civ. CODE art. 214, and LA. R.S. 9:572
(Supp. 1975). The former LA. R.S. 9:572 becomes LA. R.S. 9:572(A) and paragraph (B)
is added.
85. LA. R.S. 9:572(B), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 458, § 1. The reference to a
marriage "dissolved by death" means that this paragraph would literally apply to
parents of a child who had been judicially separated and subsequently died, whether
or not there had been any reconciliation. It was probably not the legislature's intent
to include this situation, since section 572 generally distinguishes between parents of
children who have been separated or divorced and parents of children whose marriage
is dissolved by death.
86. LA. CIV. CODE art 214. The article now reads as follows:
The adopted person is considered for all purposes as the legitimate child
and forced heir of the adoptive parent or parents, including the right of the
adopted person or his lawful descendants to inherit from the adoptive parent or
parents or the relatives of the latter by blood or by adoption, and the right of
the adoptive parent or parents or the relatives of the latter by blood or by
adoption to inherit from the person adopted or his lawful descendants, in the
same manner and to the same extent as if the person adopted were in fact the
legitimate child of the adoptive parent or parents.
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The need for legally cognizable grandparental visitation
rights was first addressed in 1970 by an amendment to Civil
Code article 157,87 which deals with the award of child custody
incident to separation or divorce. The amendment gives the
parent of a deceased party to a marriage dissolved by divorce
or the subject of a judicial separation the right to seek reasona-
ble visitation rights to the minor child or children of the mar-
riage. The court has the discretion to grant such rights if it
finds such a grant would be in the best interest of the child or
children. Similarly, section 572 was added to title nine in 1972
to permit such visitation rights for the parents of a deceased
party to a marriage, without reference to divorce or separation
from bed and board.
Both statutes were explicitly limited to situations where
the parent of the grandchildren was dead; apparently it was
assumed that while that parent was alive he would provide his
parents with opportunities for contact with their grandchil-
dren. In 1975, however, the legislature amended section 572 to
provide that the parents of a noncustodial parent in a separa-
tion or divorce have a right to reasonable visitation even during
the lifetime of their child.8 A finding by the court that such
visitation rights would be in the best interest of the child con-
tinued to be a requisite to granting them. 89
An apparent gap in these provisions was illustrated in
Smith v. Trosclair.0 In that decision it was held that section
572 was not irreconcilable with Civil Code article 214, which
generally terminates the rights and obligations of the blood
If the adoptive parent is married to a blood parent of the adopted person,
the relationship of that blood parent and his blood relatives to the adopted
person shall remain unaltered and unaffected by the adoption. Otherwise, upon
adoption: the blood parent or parents and all other blood relatives of the
adopted person, except as provided by R.S. 9:572(B), are relieved of all of their
legal duties and divested of all of their legal rights with regard to the adopted
person, including the right of inheritance from the adopted person and his lawful
descendants; and the adopted person and his lawful descendants are relieved
of all their legal duties and divested of all of their legal rights with regard to
the blood parent or parents and other blood relatives, except the right of inheri-
tance from them.
87. 1970 La. Acts, No. 436, § 1.
88. 1975 La. Acts, No. 614, § 1.
89. LA. R.S. 9:572 (Supp. 1975).
90. 321 So. 2d 514 (La. 1975).
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relatives of an adopted child with the adoption.' The court
therefore ruled that the maternal grandmother's visitation
rights were cut off when the widowed husband of her daughter
remarried and the new wife adopted the grandchild.2 The leg-
islature evidently hoped to avoid this harsh result through the
passage of Act 458.
While the Act clearly addresses adoption by a stepparent
when the widowed parent remarries, it is not limited by its
terms to this situation. It would thus extend to the presumably
rare situation in which a widowed parent gives up his child or
children for adoption.
The Act specifically limits its application to circumstances
where the adoption occurs after the death of the parent whose
parents seek visitation rights. For an adoption to occur before
the death of the parent, it would be necessary for that parent
to have relinquished all rights to his child. 3 Furthermore, at
the time of adoption the rights and duties of all blood relatives
would be generally terminated." Under such circumstances, it
would be strange, and perhaps disquieting to the child, for the
grandparents suddenly to acquire visitation rights through the
fortuity of the untimely death of their child. The proviso of Act
458 that it apply only to adoptions after the parent's death
avoids such an anomalous result.
The visitation rights granted under this latest enactment
are "limited visitation rights," 11 while those accorded in Civil
Code article 157 and section 572(A) are "reasonable visitation
rights."" Consistently with these laws, the grandparents under
section 572(B) must prove that visitation rights are in the best
interest of the child or children. 7 In the adoption situation
addressed by this section, they must also prove that they have
been unreasonably denied visitation." The reason for this addi-
tional requirement is not clear. The intent may have been to
91. Id. at 515.
92. Id.
93. LA. R.S. 9:422 (Supp. 1975), 9:422.1 (Supp. 1962), 9:429 (Supp. 1960).
94. LA. Civ. CODE art. 214.
95. LA. R.S. 9:572(B), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 458, § 1.
96. LA. CIv. CODE art. 157 and LA. R.S. 9:572(A), as amended by 1978 La. Acts,
No. 458, § 1.
97. LA. R.S. 9:572(B), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 458, § 1.
98. Id.
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leave the court the option of denying visitation rights in certain
circumstances on the basis that it would be reasonable to follow
the general policy of Civil Code article 214 in severing all the
rights of blood relations with respect to the adopted child. This
policy, however, is most appropriate when the blood parent
himself has given up his rights to the child. In the situation
encompassed in the new section, the blood parent has not relin-
quished his rights; nor has the marriage with the other parent
ended prior to that parent's death. There should be less likeli-
hood of acrimony between the grandparents and a surviving
spouse with a new mate (the adoptive parent) than there would
be between the grandparents and a former spouse who had
been judicially separated or divorced from their child. Yet, in
the separation or divorce situation no showing of an unreasona-
ble denial of rights (with its attendant implication that there
could be a reasonable denial) is required. Of course, it is possi-
ble to envision some circumstances where a denial of visitation
rights would be reasonable-for example, mental instability of
the grandparent. Such situations can be adequately handled
by the court, however, in determining whether visitation rights
are in the best interest of the child or children.
The most serious problem with the Act is its description
of the grandparents as "the natural parents of a deceased party
to a marriage dissolved by death."" The meaning of "natural"
in this context is unclear, though its use shows an intent to
limit the reach of this statute to only certain grandparents.
"Natural parent" is used in the Civil Code to describe the
parent of an illegitimate child.' ® If this is the intended mean-
ing, then the visitation rights accorded by Act 458 are not
available to legitimate parents with respect to their grandchil-
dren and the rule of Smith v. Trosclair'0 1 remains largely intact.
Such a discriminaton in favor of an illegitimate relationship
would be rather unusual and is unlikely to have been the legis-
lative intent.
Perhaps "natural parent" in this context means biological
parent-as a purposeful distinction from adoptive parent. If
this is the intent, "blood parent" should have been used in
99. Id. (Emphasis added.)
100. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 200, 202, 210.
101. 321 So. 2d 514 (La. 1975). See text at note 85, supra.
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order to be consistent with the phrasing of the adoption laws'02
and to avoid possible misinterpretation. If blood parent is the
intended meaning, the underlying policy of the distinction is
nevertheless inscrutable. A harsh and unnecessary distinction
is made between blood parents whose children have offspring
and adoptive parents whose children have offspring. It is un-
justly discriminatory to deny the latter the visitation privileges
accorded to the former; there is no reason to assume that the
emotional ties to one's children and grandchildren are less sig-
nificant because of the absence of blood ties. (Rather, it might
be argued that biological parenthood is often less seriously con-
sidered and sometimes less fully intended and less joyfully
sought than adoptive parenthood.) Furthermore, it is clearly
the policy of Civil Code article 214 that adoptive parents have
full parental rights and obligations with respect to their
adopted child and his offspring. 03 The discrimination evidently
enacted in Act 458 introduces a bizarre deviation from that
policy.
102. LA. CIv. CODE art. 214.
103. Id.
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MATRIMONIAL REGIMES*
One of the most far-reaching enactments of the 1978 regu-
lar session of the Louisiana legislature is Act 627,1 which pro-
vides for a new matrimonial regimes law. Of major significance
is the Act's abolition of the current head and master manage-
ment scheme2 for the community of gains and the substitution
of what is popularly labelled "Equal Management."' The
* This symposium article is largely limited to an explanation of the new matri-
monial regimes legislation and a comparison of that law to the provisions presently in
effect. A more detailed analysis of the effects of the new law can be found in the
Symposium on Louisiana's Revised Matrimonial Regimes Law, in Issue 2 of Volume
39, LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW. That symposium consists of the following articles: Back-
ground of Matrimonial Regimes Revision; The Retroactivity Provisions of Louisiana's
Equal Management Law: Interpretation and Constitutionality; "Management" of
Community Assets under Act 627; Louisiana's New Matrimonial Regime Law: Some
Aspects of the Effect on Real Estate Practice; Act 627: A Comparison with Washington
Community Property Law; A Critique of the Equal Management Act of 1978; Interim
Study Year.
1. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, adding LA. R.S. 9:2831-56, 9:1517, amending LA. Civ.
CODE arts. 1790-91, LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1960), and repealing LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2325-
437, 131, 1751, 2446, LA. R.S.9:2801 (Supp. 1976), 9:2802 (Supp. 1976), 9:2803 (1950),
9:2804 (Supp. 1976), 9:2821-22 (1950). Act 627 was proposed as House Bill 1569 by Mr.
Simoneaux, and represented the efforts of a joint legislative committee and its advisory
committee, both of which were created by Senate Concurrent Resolution 54 of 1977.
That resolution authorized and directed the legislative committee to propose in the
1978 legislative session a new matrimonial regimes law incorporating the equal man-
agement principle. The Act will not go into effect until September, 1979 and January,
1980 so the prior law is still in effect and its provisions are referred to as the present
provisions. See notes 176-81, infra, and accompanying text.
2. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2404 establishes the husband as head and master, while
certain later-enacted limitations on the husband's management power are contained
in LA. Civ. CODE art. 2334. The constitutionality of article 2404 was challenged in
Corpus Christi Parish Credit Union v. Martin, 358 So. 2d 295 (La. 1978). The district
court found article 2404 unconstitutional but the supreme court reversed, finding it
unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue. See text at note 117, infra. A strong
three-man dissent called the majority view an "oversimplification" of the issue, which
failed to address the "gender-based discrimination squarely posed ...by the wife's
pleadings and evidence." 358 So. 2d at 299. The dissent went on to surmise that "in
view of [thel probability of legislative attention to the problem, the majority wished
to avoid disruption in dealing with community-held property which might result from
a present judicial declaration of the obvious unconstitutionality of the present provi-
sions." Id.
3. LA. R.S. 9:2842-47, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1. The management
provisions actually enact an equal management scheme modified by requirements of
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change in management scheme is accompanied by an elimina-
tion of the interspousal incapacity to contract4 and a considera-
ble reduction of the scope of interspousal immunity to suit.5
The general rewriting of the community property law also ad-
dresses various inequities imposed by the Civil Code or its
jurisprudential gloss, some of which disadvantage the husband
in a community regime.6 The entire act represents an attempt
to equalize the property rights and responsibilities of spouses.
The Act describes statutorily for the first time the function
of a matrimonial regime - "to regulate the ownership and
management of the assets and liabilities of married persons,
and in relation to property, their rights and obligations with
respect to each other and to third persons." 7 The definition was
perhaps included as a framework for understanding the scope
and purpose of a marital property arrangement, whether estab-
joint management (or action through concurrence of the spouses) and of sole manage-
ment, in specific instances. Actually, the community assets left to the management of
either spouse acting alone are relatively few and often of lesser importance than those
relegated to joint or sole management. Management is certainly equal, however, be-
cause neither spouse is arbitrarily preferred in the management of any community
property, even with reference to the joint and sole management provisions.
4. LA. R.S. 9:2834, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1, and LA. CIv. CODE art.
1790, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 3.
5. LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1960), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 4. The
present version of section 291 permits a wife not judicially separated from her husband
to sue him on four grounds only: a separation of property; restitution and enjoyment
of her paraphernal property; separation from bed and board; and divorce. The courts
have consistently placed the same restrictions on the husband's power to sue his wife.
Seeling v. Seeling, 133 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961). The amended version
continues authorization to sue in these specified instances and further permits hus-
band and wife to sue each other in four additional circumstances-each of the addi-
tions being required by other substantive changes enacted by Act 627. Three of these
authorized suits relate to enforcement of the management provisions. Each spouse may
sue to recover loss sustained as a result of fraud or bad faith in the administration of
the community property by the other spouse. A cause of action in such a case is granted
by LA. R.S. 9:2846, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1. Each spouse may also sue to
avoid an unauthorized alienation, encumbrance, or lease of community property by,
the other, since the Act establishes that such transactions are voidable. LA. R.S.
9:2846, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1. Because concurrence requirements may
sometimes operate to the detriment of family interests, a spouse may sue for judicial
authorization to act without the consent of the other under certain circumstances. LA.
R.S. 9:2847, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1. Finally, the removal of the inter-
spousal incapacity to contract results in authorization for suits between the spouses
to enforce conventional obligations.
6. See, e.g., text at notes 1, 52, 62 infra.
7. LA. R.S. 9:2831, added by 1978 La. Acts. No. 627, § 1.
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lished by contract or provided by law. Additionally, the Act,
by providing for a direct effect upon third persons, goes beyond
the current understanding of the nature of a matrimonial
regime.8 This provision rejects the premise that matrimonial
regimes regulate property rights only between the spouses-a
premise which clearly follows from the view that a matrimonial
regime is a purely conventional property arrangement.
This new law closely parallels present Civil Code articles
2325,1 2332,10 and 2399" in stipulating that the regime provided
by law will have effect in the absence of an express matrimonial
regime contract and will further supplement any express con-
tract to the extent that the legal regime's provisions are not
excluded, limited, or modified by the contract." The section
states precisely that such provisions will "retain their effect as
imposed by law,' 3 and the drafters' commentary indicates
that this statement is intended to reject the tacit contract
theory of the legal regime.' 4 A probable reason for rejecting this
theory is the unrealistic nature of its basic assumption." It is
8. See Pascal, Updating Louisiana's Community of Gains, 49 TUL. L. REv. 555,
556 (1975).
9. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2325 states: "In relation to property, the law only regulates
the conjugal association, in default of particular agreements, which the parties are at
liberty to stipulate as they please, provided they be not contrary to good morals, and
under the modifications hereafter prescribed."
10. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2332 states: "The partnership, or community of aquets
Iacquetsl or gains, needs not to be stipulated; it exists by operation of law, in all cases
where there is no stipulation to the contrary. But the parties may modify or limit it;
'they may even agree that it shall not exist."
11. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2399 states: "Every marriage contracted in this State,
superinduces of right partnership or community of acquets or gains, if there be no
stipulation to the contrary."
12. LA. R.S. 9:2832-33, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
13. LA. R.S. 9:2833, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1 (emphasis added).
14. LA. R.S. 9:2833, comment added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1. Section 10
of Act 627, declaring that "the source notes, comments and special notes contained in
this Chapter reflect the intent of the legislature," is an apparent attempt to bind the
judiciary's interpretation of the new law.
15. According to the tacit contract theory, spouses who enter a marriage without
making a marital contract have tacitly contracted the community of gains provided
by the Civil Code. The underlying assumption that the prospective spouses know of
their ability to draw a contract, know that this capacity is limited to the prenuptial
period, and are aware of the provisions of the regime provided by law is rather unrealis-
tic. One effort to address the practical effects of this theory is LA. R.S. 9:264 (Supp.
1975), which requires the state officer issuing a marriage license to deliver to each
prospective spouse a printed summary of the current matrimonial regimes law that
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indulging in fiction to conclude that couples who marry with-
out a prior marital contract intend by their omission to subject
themselves to the legal matrimonial regime. Also, the rejection
of the tacit contract theory may help the new legislation with-
stand constitutional attack. The new regime is to affect all
married couples, including those married before its effective
date, who do not have an express marriage contract."6 If a le-
gally imposed regime (either that in the present law or that
enacted by Act 627) were viewed as a tacit contract, then the
substitution of a new regime would at least arguably impair
that contract.
CONTRACTUAL POWER
The scope of the spouses' authority to contract a regime is
broad, but not unlimited. As under the present law, 7 they may
not renounce or alter the established order of succession or
prohibit legally permissible gratuitous dispositions.'" A new
restriction prohibits a couple from renouncing or altering the
marital portion.'" Marriage contracts will also be subject to the
general prohibitions of Civil Code article 11-that "individuals
can not by their conventions, derogate from the force of laws
made for the preservation of public order or good morals." 0
emphasizes the presumption of a tacit acceptance of the legal regime and the inability
to contract after marriage. The tacit contract theory was invoked by a federal district
court to uphold the community property management scheme against an equal protec-
tion challenge in Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 430 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. La. 1977). See Note,
Matrimonial Regime Reform-A Constitutional Necessity, 38 LA. L. REv. 642 (1977).
The theory was less convincing to the three-man dissent in Corpus Christi Parish
Credit Union, which found the head and master provision violative of the equal protec-
tion clause of the United States Constitution.
16. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 9.
17. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2326. Additionally, article 2325 requires that the stipula-
tions of a marriage contract not be contrary to good morals, and article 2327 forbids a
contract which derogates from "the rights resulting from the power of the husband...
as the head of the family, . . . from the rights granted to the surviving husband or
wife by the title: Of Father and Child and by the title: Of Minors, of their Tutorship
and Emancipation. . . . [or] from the prohibited dispositions of this code." LA. Civ.
CODE art. 2327.
18. LA. R.S. 9:2833, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1. A slightly amended
version of Civil Code article 2382, which presently provides for the marital portion (and
is repealed by Act 627), is enacted in LA. R.S. 9:1517, added by 1978 La. Acts, No.
627, § 2.
19. LA. R.S. 9:2833, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
20. LA. Civ. CODE art. 11.
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The formalities required of a matrimonial regime contract
remain unchanged, 2' but a major substantive reform in the
power to contract is introduced-it is no longer restricted to
the antenuptial period. A couple may contractually establish
or modify a regime or terminate an established one at any time
"before or during marriage. 22 Effect of the contract on third
persons depends upon prior filing for registry in the mortgage
records of the parish of the matrimonial domicile and the par-
ish where immovable property is located. 23 Present law only
requires recordation of marriage contracts which would affect
21. LA. R.S. 9:2834, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1, requires that the
contract be entered into by an act passed before a notary and two witnesses. The same
requirement is currently in force under LA. Civ. CODE art. 2328.
22. LA. R.S. 9:2834, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1. See LA. Ctv. CODE art.
2329, which restricts alteration of the marriage contract to the antenuptial period,
except for married couples moving to Louisiana, who are allowed one year after their
move to make a valid marriage contract. The power to modify the marriage contract
was a particularly controversial portion of the Act, even among proponents of the equal
management concept. Amendments were offered in both the House of Representatives
and the Senate to restrict the power of altering a marriage contract to the antenuptial
period. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
STATE OF LOUISIANA, 4th Reg. Sess. at 43 (June 21, 1978); OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, 4th Reg. Sess. at 73, 75 (July
5, 1978). Curiously, these efforts were not accompanied by amendments to leave the
general interspousal incapacity to contract in its present form. Thus, even had the
amending efforts succeeded, the amendment of Civil Code article 1790 by Act 627
would still have left the spouses with full contractual power during the marriage. They
would have been free to substantially alter their property arrangements by individual
contracts which did not expressly initiate or alter a matrimonial regime.
Concern over the ability to alter the marriage contract stemmed from the legisla-
tors' fear of the possible adverse consequences for creditors and for forced heirs, partic-
ularly in instances of second marriages. Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, July 6, 1978,
§A, at 1. The concerns were not well-founded, however. Creditors are adequately
protected by the present remedies provided by law-the declaration in simulation and
the revocatory action. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1984, 2480. Forced heirs are likewise not
disadvantaged by the contractual capacity granted by the new legislation. They too
are protected by the declaration in simulation if a parent attempts a simulated sale,
for example, to a new spouse. If an actual sale takes place, the consideration given will
replace the conveyed property in the estate of the parent. With respect to gratuitous
dispositions between spouses, there is no change from the present law except a removal
of the ban on reciprocal donations in the same act. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1751, repealed
by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 5. A forced heir will continue to have an action to reduce
any donation which impinges on his legitime. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1517, 1518. Continued
concern over the power to modify the marriage contract is reflected by the fact that
the legislature explicitly commended it to further study, prior to the effective dates of
Act 627, in House Concurrent Resolution 232. See text at note 179, infra.
23. LA. R.S. 9:2834, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
immovable property and limits the recordation requirement to
the parish where the immovable property is located."
Minors may enter into a marriage contract with the writ-
ten permission of either the father and mother, the parent with
legal, custody, or the tutor of the person. " Presently, according
to the recent interpretation by the supreme court of Civil Code
articles 23306 and 97,7 an unemancipated minor can enter into
a marriage contract only with the consent of either both par-
ents, the survivor if one is dead, or the tutor if both are dead. '
The provision for permission of the parent with custody is thus
new, as is the clarification of "tutor" to mean tutor of the
person as distinguished from tutor of the property. The new law
is also a change in that it evidently applies to all minors, not
to just unemancipated minors. 9
It should also be noted that Act 627 amends Civil Code
article 1790 to delete the general interspousal incapacity to
contract20 Since all lawful contracts will thus be permitted
24. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2265, 2266.
25. LA. R.S. 9:2835, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
26. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2330 statei: "The minor, who is capable of contracting
matrimony, may give his consent to any agreements which this contract is susceptible
of; and the agreements entered into and the donations he has made by the same, are
valid, provided that, if he be not emancipated, he has been assisted in the agreement
by those persons whose consent is necessary to his marriage."
27. LA. Civ. CODE art. 97 states:
The minor of either sex, who has attained the competent age to marry, must
have received the consent of his father and mother or of the survivor of them;
and if they are both dead, the consent of his tutor.
He must furnish proof of this consent to the officer to whom he applies for
permission to marry.
28. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 323 So. 2d 120 (La. 1975).
29. Act 73 of the 1978 regular session of the Louisiana legislature amends Civil
Code article 382 to give a minor emancipated by marriage full administrative power
over his immovable property at an earlier age. It provides that the authority exercised
over immovables by a tutor or undertutor, or by an administrator of the minor's
property, will extend beyond marriage only to age sixteen-the article had previously
extended this authority to age eighteen. The new matrimonial regime law, however,
by not differentiating between emancipated and unemancipated minors, will require
parental consent (or that of the other specified responsible adult) for adoption or
change of a marriage contract by a minor sixteen years of age or older. This restriction
clearly conflicts with the policy of Act 73 to give married minors sixteen or older full
power over their property. However, the conflict may have little practical effect since
the minor could accomplish by individual contracts with his spouse whatever changes
might have been incorporated in a marriage contract. See note 30, infra, and accompa-
nying text.
30. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1790, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 3, reads as
follows:
19781 LEGISLATIVE SYMPOSIUM
between husband and wife, it would have been possible for the
spouses to significantly affect their property arrangements
after marriage even without express authority to enter into or
modify a matrimonial regime contract during marriage.
CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
The new classification of property as community or sepa-
rate generally follows the pattern established by Civil Code
articles 2402 3 and 2334.32 However, the new legislation at-
Besides the general incapacity which persons of certain descriptions are under,
there are others applicable only to certain contracts, either in relation to the
parties, such as tutor and ward, whose contracts with each other are forbidden;
or in relation to the subject of the contract such as purchases, by the administra-
tor, of any part of the estate which is committed to his charge. These take place
only in the cases specially provided by law, under different titles of this Code.
The present version of article 1790 establishes a complete contractual disability
between husband and wife by listing them as parties incapable of contracting with
each other. Limited exceptions to the disability are found in Civil Code article 2446
(permitting certain sales) and article 1746 (permitting donations). Article 2446 is re-
pealed by Act 627 so that, consistently with a broad contractual capacity, all sales
between husband and wife will be permitted in the future. Article 1746 is not repealed
so it continues to limit the donations between husband and wife to those which "he or
she may give to a stranger." The prohibition against mutual or reciprocal donations
by one and the same acts, found in article 1751, is repealed in Act 627. See note 22,
supra.
31. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2402 states:
This partnership or community consists of the profits of all the effects of which
the husband has the administration and enjoyment, either of right or in fact, of
the produce of the reciprocal industry and labor of both husband and wife, and
of the estate which they may acquire during the marriage, either by donations
made jointly to them both, or by purchase, or in any other similar way, even
although the purchase be only in the name of one of the two and not of both,
because in that case the period of time when the purchase is made is alone
attended to, and not the person who made the purchase. But damages resulting
from personal injuries to the wife shall not form part of this community, but
shall always be and remain the separate property of the wife and recoverable
by herself alone; "provided where the injuries sustained by the wife result in her
death, the right to recover damages shall be as now provided for by existing
laws."
32. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2334 states:
The property of married persons is divided into separate and common
property.
Separate property is that which either party brings into the marriage, or
acquires during the marriage with separate funds, or by inheritance, or by dona-
tion made to him or her particularly. The earnings of the wife when living
separate and apart from her husband although not separated by judgment of
court, her earnings when carrying on a business, trade, occupation or industry
separate from her husband, actions for damages resulting from offenses and
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tempts to clarify ambiguities in those articles, codify certain
jurisprudence, and eliminate disparities in the treatment of
husband and wife. Under the new provision, things acquired
during the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of
either spouse will be community property. 33 The intent no
doubt is to include all that is classified under the present law
as community property by virtue of its being "the produce of
the reciprocal industry and labor of both husband and wife." ' 3
The new phrasing not only has a more modern tone, but is also
somewhat broader. While "effort, skill or industry of either
spouse" probably means the same as "reciprocal industry and
labor," "things acquired . . . through" these activities literally
encompasses more than "the produce" of them. The new lan-
guage however, will probably not place anything more in the
community of gains than is presently included, since things
presently acquired with the produce of the labor and industry
of the spouses become community property due to real sub-
rogation."
quasi offenses and the property purchased with all funds thus derived, are her
separate property.
Actions for damages resulting from offenses and quasi offenses suffered by
the husband, living separate and apart from his wife, by reason of fault on her
part, sufficient for separation or divorce shall be his separate property.
Common property is that which is acquired by the husband and wife during
marriage, in any manner different from that above declared. But when the title
to community property stands in the name of the wife, it cannot be leased,
mortgaged or sold by the husband without the wife's written authority or con-
sent.
Where the title to immovable property stands in the names of both the
husband and wife, it may not be leased, mortgaged or sold by the husband
without the wife's written authority or consent.
Where the title to community immovable property declared to be the family
home stands in the name of the husband alone it may not be leased, mortgaged
or sold without the wife's written authority or consent.
The limitation on the husband described in the two immediately preceding
paragraphs shall not apply where the wife has made a declaration by authentic
act that her authority or consent are not required for such lease, sale or mortgage
and has filed such declaration in the mortgage and conveyance records of the
parish in which the property is situated.
The declaration may be general as to all such property or it may specify
property to which it shall or shall not apply. If the declaration so provides, it
may apply generally to property which may be acquired in the future, but a
contrary declaration of withdrawal of her authority or consent by the wife may
be made and recorded.
33. LA. R.S. 9:2838, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
34. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2402.
35. See 1 A.YIANNOPOULOS. PROPERTY § 79 in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 234-
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The legislation classifies as community property both
those things acquired with community assets3 and those things
acquired with community and separate assets if the com-
munity investment is not inconsequential.3 7 These express
categories are not part of the present code articles, but they
achieve results similar to those which occur under the present
scheme. Civil Code article 2402 includes within community
property "the estate which [the spouses] may acquire during
the marriage . . . by purchase, or in any ... similar way"38
without reference to the character of the assets used to make
the acquisition. Consequently, the courts have found all prop-
erty acquired with community or mixed assets to be com-
munity property unless, in the latter case, the community por-
tion of the assets is inconsequential.3 9 Clearly those things ac-
quired with community assets alone are community property
through real subrogation. Including in community property
most things acquired with mixed assets reflects a policy deci-
sion in favor of community property. The new law stipulates
that reimbursement shall be due from the community assets to
the separate estate. 0 Similarly, present jurisprudence permits
the same reimbursement when the amount of separate invest-
ment can be proved."
Under the new legislation, things donated or bequeathed
to the spouses jointly enter the community;"2 Civil Code article
2402 presently has the same effect, although it refers only to
things donated to the spouses jointly. 3 The present phrasing
discloses no intent to exclude donations mortis causa; the addi-
tion of the word "bequeathed" is simply a clearer expression
of the present provision.
The new classification of the fruits and revenues of sepa-
38 (1966). The omnibus clause of Civil Code article 2334 would also bring about this
effect.
36. LA. R.S. 9:2838, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
37. Id.
38. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2402.
39. Succession of Land, 212 La. 103, 31 So. 2d 609 (1947); Succession of Russo,
246 So. 2d 26 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 258 La. 760, 247 So. 2d 861 (1971).
40. LA. R.S. 9:2838, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
41. See, e.g., Succession of Videau, 197 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 250 La. 920, 199 So. 2d 922 (1967).
42. LA. R.S. 9:2838, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
43. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2402.
1978]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
rate property is a significant change from present law and is
also an equalization of the treatment of husband and wife.
Presently, the "profits" of the husband's separate property are
always community property," while the "profits" of the wife's
separate property are likewise community property if the hus-
band administers her paraphernalia. 5 The wife has the option,
however, of making and recording a notarial reservation of the
administration and the fruits of her separate property," and
once such a declaration of paraphernality is made, the fruits
of the wife's separate property are separate.47 The new regime
grants to the husband the same option of making a notarial
reservation. 8 The use of the words "fruits and revenues" is also
a clarification and codification of jurisprudence. "Profits" in
Civil Code article 2402 is a mistranslation of the French word-
ing of the article, and the courts early substituted the word
"fruits" in their decisions dealing with this article.49 The word
"revenues" appears to be intentionally broad and may include
any income generated from property, such as proceeds from
timber operations or the sale of mineral rights. Certainly it
should be read as including civil fruits, which are defined by
Civil Code article 551 to be "revenues derived from a thing by
operation of law or by reason of a juridical act, such as rentals,
interest, and certain corporate distributions."' "
Damages awarded for loss or injury to a community asset
are also to be community property.5' Although no specific sec-
tion presently provides for this, the same result is obtained
through real subrogation. Again, the new legislation adds clar-
ity.
44. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2402; Milling v. Collector of Revenue, 220 La. 773, 57 So.
2d 679 (1952).
45.. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2402, 2386. If the husband administers the wife's separate
property as her agent, however, she is still deemed to have the administration of her
separate property, and the fruits remain separate. Trorlicht v. Collector of Revenue,
25 So. 2d 547 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946).
46. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2386.
47. See Pascal, supra note 8, at 572.
48. LA. R.S. 9:2839(5), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
49. United States v. Harang, 165 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1947); Succession of Webre,
49 La. Ann. 1491, 1494, 22 So. 390, 392 (1897); Succession of Rugg, 339 So. 2d 519 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 897 (La. 1977).
50. LA. CIv. CODE art. 551.
51. LA. R.S. 9:2838, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
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Presently Civil Code article 2334 does deal with "actions
for damages resulting from offenses and quasi offenses" against
each spouse. The wife's damages are always her separate prop-
erty, but the husband's recovery i4 community property unless
the tort occurs at a time when he is living separate and apart
from his wife "by reason of fault on her part, sufficient for
separation or divorce."5 Article 2402 also provides that dam-
ages resulting from personal injuries to the wife shall not form
part of the community, "but shall always be and remain the
separate property of the wife." 53 The inequity of these provi-
sions is corrected in the new legislation, which provides that
recovery for a tort against the person of either spouse consti-
tutes that spouse's separate property.54 Any portion of the re-
covery, however, which compensates for expenses incurred dur-
ing the regime because of the injury, or which compensates for
the loss of community earnings, is community property. 5 This
is consistent with the categorization as community of those
damages compensating for the loss of a community asset. The
portion of the tort award that represents future earnings pres-
ents a special problem in classification-a determination of
what part of those earnings is community property is only pos-
sible if the community has been dissolved. Thus, the new legis-
lation provides that the portion of an award attributable to loss
of community earnings will be determined, as between the
spouses, upon dissolution of the regime.
52. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2334.
53. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2402.
54. LA. R.S. 9:2840, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
55. Id. This is true presently with respect to a wife's personal injury award. See,
e.g., Charles v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 331 So. 2d 216 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d 431 (La. 1976); Warren v. Yellow Cab Co. of Shreveport,
136 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
56. LA. R.S. 9:2840, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1. If the community is
dissolved by the death of the injured spouse, all of the recovery for loss of earnings is
community property. The Advisory Committee (see text at note 178, infra) will propose
amended wording for this portion of section 2840 to read as follows:
If the community regime is subsequently dissolved, other than by the death of
the injured spouse, the portion of the recovery or award attributable to loss of
earnings that would have accrued after dissolution of the community regime
shall then be determined to be the separate property of the injured spouse.
A discussion of several recent decisions is necessary to clarify the present method
of allocating the portion of a tort recovery attributable to a husband's lost earnings. It
is possible that these cases will influence the interpretation of the new provisions. In
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the 1971 case of Chambers v. Chambers, 259 La. 246, 249 So. 2d 896 (1971), the state
supreme court seemed to approve the appellate court's holding that the portion of a
husband's personal injury award for a tort occurring during the community regime
which compensates him for damages accruing after the dissolution of the community
is the husband's separate property. However, because of the length of time between
the injury and trial and consequent proof problems in determining which elements
entered into settlement negotiations and comprised the lump sum award, the court
upheld the trial court's award of one-half of the settlement recovery to the wife. A per
curiam opinion on rehearing created further confusion by stating that "the majority
intended to hold that the time the husband's cause of action arises determines the
community or separate nature of the cause of action and the community or separate
nature of the funds obtained when the suits on the cause of action were settled." Id.
at 277, 249 So. 2d at 907.
Clarification came in 1975 with West v. Ortego, 325 So. 2d 242 (La. 1975), a
workmen's compensation case. The state supreme court first determined that a work-
men's compensation claim "is more likely than not founded upon an offense or quasi-
offense" and thus subject to any provisions of law dealing with recovery for offenses
and quasi offenses. Id. at 244. The court then concluded that there was a hiatus in the
law with respect to a husband's damages from an injury occurring during the com-
munity regime, when those damages are received after termination of the community
and as compensation for post-dissolution wages and losses. In the absence of positive
law addressing the precise question, the court resorted to equity to hold that "where a
husband's settlement monies, acquired after dissolution of the community, but based
upon a pre-dissolution, accident-related cause of action, compensate for both pre-
dissolution and post-dissolution losses, that portion of the settlement which compen-
sates for post-dissolution losses falls into the separate estate of the husband." Id. at
248, 249.
The new legislation both codifies and goes beyond the West result. Because a
workmen's compensation award is considered to be a replacement for earnings, the
West court did not have to address allocation of general damages. Furthermore, that
court was only deciding how to allocate a recovery occurring after termination of the
marriage. Act 627 refers to the recovery for a tort committed against the spouse during
the existence of the community regime, which should make the time when the recovery
for such tort is actually received irrelevant. LA. R.S. 9:2840, added by 1978 La. Acts,
No. 627, § 1. Additionally, the residual character of the recovery is separate under the
new provisions, with only those portions compensating for community expenses or for
lost community earnings falling into the community. Thus, neither spouse shares in
the other's recovery for such damages as pain, suffering, and disability. This result is
consistent with the underlying policy of tort recovery and eliminates the bizarre effect
of present provisions whereby a wife may profit from her husband's suffering and
physical impairment.
In Broussard v. Broussard, 340 So. 2d 1309 (La. 1976), the husband had recovered
a personal injury award during his marriage for damages from a premarital accident.
In an action to partition the community property after divorce, his wife claimed a part
of this recovery. The court of appeal held that she was entitled to one-half of that
portion of the award which compensated for loss of earning capacity during the period
of the marriage. 326 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd, 340 So. 2d 1309 (La. 1976).
The supreme court admitted the logic of this extension of West, but held that the
situation was clearly covered by the statutes which classify all property brought into
the marriage as separate, LA. Civ. CODE art. 2334, and which label a cause of action as
property, LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 426. It therefore reversed and held the entire personal
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Inclusion of an omnibus provision 7 similar to that in pres-
ent Civil Code article 23348 resolves unforeseen classification
problems in favor of the community. The new language is
somewhat broader than the old, since it refers to "all things not
classified as separate property by other provisions" rather than
merely property "acquired by the husband and wife during
marriage" in any manner other than those declared in article
2334.
Both present law and the new legislation also include a
community presumption,59 but the two provisions are signifi-
cantly different in one respect. Civil Code article 2405 states
that property possessed by the spouses at the dissolution of the
marriage is presumed to be community property; the courts go
injury award to be Mr. Broussard's separate property. Although the Broussard court
could not make a West type of allocation of lost earnings because it found no hiatus
in the law to justify such judicial improvisation, Justice Dennis commented that the
West solution for a premarital tort should perhaps be considered in revising the Civil
Code. Broussard v. Broussard, 340 So. 2d 1309, 1312 (La. 1976). The new legislation,
however, does not enact such a solution. With respect to personal injury awards, it
specifically addresses only those recovered for a tort occurring during the community
regime.
In Hall v. Hall, 349 So. 2d 1349 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977), the Fourth Circuit was
faced with a situation explicitly left open by West-the classification of a husband's
tort award received during the marriage for an injury occurring during the marriage.
The wife filed for divorce ten days after her husband received his $400,000 settlement
check and sought in her divorce suit a declaratory judgment stipulating that the
proceeds of the settlement entered the community of acquets and gains. The trial court
had applied the West rationale and allocated to the community only that part of the
award which compensated for pre-dissolution losses. However, the appellate court was
unable to ignore the clear and positive directive of the law, which stated that anything
acquired during the marriage in any manner different from that described in article
2334 would be community property. The West court had been able to avoid this
distasteful result only because the husband's recovery, although for injuries occurring
during the marriage, was acquired after the marriage terminated. The unfortunate
result in Hall is avoided in the new provisions, since the tort recovery of both spouses,
for torts committed during the existence of the community, is their separate property,
except to the extent that it compensates for community expenses or community earn-
ings.
57. LA. R.S. 9:2838(8), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1, classifies as com-
munity property "all other things not classified as separate property by other provi-
sions of this Part."
58. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2334 states in part: "Common property is that which is
acquired by the husband and wife during marriage, in any manner different from that
above declared."
59. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2405; LA. R.S. 9:2838, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627,
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further by applying a community presumption to any property
acquired during the existence of the community regime. 0 The
new community presumption will have an even broader reach,
however, since it applies to all property possessed by either
spouse during the community regime-regardless of the time
of acquisition." This will include even separate property ac-
quired before the establishment of the regime, and if the char-
acter of any property is contested, the spouse claiming separate
ownership of the property will have the burden of proving its
separate character.
Act 627 adopts the policy of the present law favoring the
community and strengthens it through broader language. The
community presumption has some potential for unfairness,
however-a potential which is dramatically illustrated by a
line of jurisprudence which conclusively characterizes as com-
munity property a husband's purchases of immovable property
during the existence of the community, unless the act of ac-
quisition includes a double declaration that the purchase is
made with his separate funds and that he intended to acquire
a separate asset.2 In response to this harsh rule the new com-
munity presumption is made a clearly rebuttable one; both
spouses have the right to prove the separate character of any
property. 3 The comment to this portion of the bill amplifies
the redactors' intent to abrogate the double declaration re-
quirement: "Neither spouse is barred from presenting evidence
of the separate character of property because of failure to in-
clude a statement in the act of purchase that the property is
being purchased with separate funds for the purchasing
spouse's separate estate." 4
Separate property is defined by Act 627 as including things
60. See, e.g., Succession of Milton,. 278 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973);
Succession of Elrod v. Elrod, 218 So. 2d 83 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); Succession of
Marshall, 174 So. 2d 234 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 247 La. 1035, 175 So. 2d
647 (1965); Vining v. Beatty, 161 So. 2d 298 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
61. LA. R.S. 9:2838, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
62. See Slayton v. King, 214 La. 89, 36 So. 2d 648 (1948), and cases cited therein.
The courts continue to apply this doctrine, Barnett v. Barnett, 339 So. 2d 495 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 1127 (La. 1977), though sometimes with some
reluctance. See, e.g., Phillips v. Nereaux, 357 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
63. LA. R.S. 9:2838, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
64. LA. R.S. 9:2838, comment, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
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belonging to the spouses prior to the community regime and
things acquired with separate assets, including those acquired
in exchange for separate assets."' These classifications repre-
sent no change in the law-Civil Code article 2334 includes
essentially the same provisions, except that it does not deal
with things acquired through exchange." Real subrogation,
however, operates under the present statutes to place property
acquired through the exchange of separate property in the
spouse's separate estate.
Things acquired by a spouse through inheritance, dona-
tion, or bequest continue to be separate property. 7 Under the
new act, the addition of the word "bequest" is a change in
expression but not in effect, since "donation" includes within
its meaning donations mortis causa.
Things acquired with separate and community assets
when the amount of community investment is inconsequential
are separate property. 8 As with the complementary statement
in the classification of community property, this is essentially
a codification of jurisprudence. The Act provides for reim-
bursement to the community of its investment, a result
reached under present law through Civil Code article 2408.9
The Act provides that the fruits and revenues of a spouse's
separate property which accrue after the making and filing for
recordation of a notarial act of reservation are separate prop-
erty. Prior to such filing, fruits and revenues of separate prop-
erty enter the community of gains.70 This is a change in the law
with respect to the husband only, since the wife is presently
able to file such a declaration.7'
65. LA. R.S. 9:2839(1), (2), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
66. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2334.
67. LA. R.S. 9:2839(4), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1; LA. CIV. CODE art.
2334.
68. LA. R.S. 9:2839(3), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
69. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2408 states:
When the separate property of either the husband or wife has been increased
or improved during the marriage, the other spouse, or his or her heirs, shall be
entitled to the reward of one half of the value of the increase or ameliorations,
if it be proved that the increase or ameliorations be the results of the common
labor, expenses, or industry; but there shall be no reward due, if it be proved
that the increase is due only to the ordinary course of things, to the rise in the
value of property, or to the chances of trade.
70. LA. R.S. 9:2839(5), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
71. See notes 46-48, supra, and accompanying text.
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Finally, an entirely new provision classifies as separate
property damages awarded to a spouse for loss sustained as
result of fraud or bad faith in the administration of community
property by the other spouse." The provision is necessary since
a substantive right to sue for such damages, granted elsewhere
in the Act," creates a type of property which has not previously
existed. Without a special provision this new type of property
would be classified as community property under the omnibus
clause."
The new statutes delete one further advantage currently
given the wife in the classification of property. Presently her
earnings are separate property when she is living physically
separate from her husband;"5 a husband's earnings during such
a separation continue to enter the community."6 This advan-
tage is not inappropriate when the husband manages the com-
munity, because the physically separated wife can not other-
wise legally retain and spend her own earnings. Under an equal
management scheme the necessity for this disparate treatment
of husband and wife is absent, although it might be desirable
to classify the earnings of both spouses during physical separa-
tion as separate property." However, since Act 627 does not
72. LA. R.S. 9:2839(6), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
73. LA. R.S. 9:2846, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1, and LA. R.S. 9:291
(Supp. 1960), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 4.
74. See notes 57-58, supra, and accompanying text.
75. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2334 states in part: "The earnings of the Wife when living
separate and apart from her husband although not separated by judgment of court,
[and] her earnings, when carrying on a business, trade, occupation or industry sepa-
rate from her husband . . . are her separate property." Though the language seems to
indicate that a wife's earnings are separate property when she is living with her hus-
band but engaged in a separate business, trade, occupation, or industry, the court
rejected this interpretation in an early decision. Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148
So. 37 (1933).
76. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2334 contains no language similar to that quoted in note
75, supra, with respect to the husband; his earnings under such circumstances enter
the community by operation of that article's statement that: "Common property is
that which is acquired by the husband and wife during marriage, in any manner
different from that above declared." LA. CIv. CODE art. 2334.
77. See Burger v. Burger, 357 So. 2d 1178 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978), where the
court stated in dictum:
[Plerhaps by "extensive interpretation" in the Civil Law tradition . ..the
principle of the 1912 amendment of [Civil Code article] 2334 is that the spouse
(despite that article's word "wife") who no longer shares a community life
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address this situation, both spouses' earnings will enter the
community and be subject to equal management even after
physical separation. 8
CLASSIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS
The new statutes also classify the obligations of the
spouses as either separate or for their common interests."9 Such
classification has significance between the spouses for purposes
of reimbursement; its significance extends to third persons only
upon dissolution of the regime, and only if there is an express
and unconditional acceptance of the community by either
spouse."0 The Civil Code presently classifies debts only by time,
so that those incurred during the marriage, by the husband or
by the wife with the husband's authority, are community
debts, and those incurred by a spouse prior to marriage are
separate debts of that spouse.8" The new legislation incorpo-
rates the classification of a spouse's pre-marital debts as sepa-
rate, though it necessarily modifies the present language to
include debts incurred antecedent to the establishment of a
community regime but after the inception of the marriage.2 It
also categorizes as separate debts those resulting from an inten-
tional tort of a spouse and those incurred for the separate estate
of one spouse to the extent that they do not inure to the benefit
of the community or family."3 All other obligations incurred by
either spouse during the community regime "are presumed to
have been incurred for the common interests of the spouses."' 4
should not be obliged to divide his or her earnings with the other spouse. By
extensive interpretation [Civil Code article 2334's] explicit provision for the
wife could apply to the husband as well, making his earnings while living sepa-
rate and apart, although not judicially separated, his separate property just as
the wife's are hers.
357 So. 2d at 1181.
The court evidently felt that such an interpretation could only be made by the supreme
court, however, and did not hold the husband's earnings during a physical separation
to be separate property.
78. LA. R.S. 9:2838(8), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
79. LA. R.S. 9:2852(G), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
80. See note 92, infra, and accompanying text.
81. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2403.
82. LA. R.S. 9:2852(G), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1, reads in part:
"separate obligations include obligations incurred prior to the establishment of the
community regime."
83. LA. R.S. 9:2852(G), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
84. Id.
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The law also stipulates that "alimentary obligations imposed
by law on a spouse shall be deemed to have been incurred
during the existence of the community regime for the common
interests of the spouses,""5 thus codifying the rule established
in Connell v. Connell."
The new statutes do not refer specifically to "community
obligations," possibly to avoid any implication that the com-
munity should be viewed as an entity responsible for debts.
Instead the Act categorizes obligations as either separate or
incurred for the common interests of the spouses.
SHARING OF ASSETS AND OBLIGATIONS
Each spouse in a community regime under the new law
will own an undivided one-half interest in the community as-
sets, 7 but the legislative comments negate any consequent
implication that spouses are to be treated legally like other co-
owners who may force a partition at will.8 The language of this
particular provision is essentially that of Civil Code article
2398,11 as enacted in 1976, with the reference to the husband's
management powers appropriately deleted.
The new scheme makes each spouse responsible for the
debts he incurs, whether the obligation is for his separate bene-
fit or for the common interests of the spouses. 0 Payment, how-
ever, may be made from community assets, with reimburse-
ment due to the other spouse, upon dissolution, for one-half of
85. Id.
86. Connell v. Connell, 331 So. 2d 4 (La. 1976), held per curiam that a husband's
obligation to support his first family is an obligation existing during the second mar-
riage and not an antenuptial debt to be acquitted from his separate property.
87. LA. R.S. 9:2838, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
88. LA. R.S. 9:2838, comment, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.'
89. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2398 states: "Each spouse owns a present undivided one-
half share in the community property subject to the management of the community
by the husband in accordance with the rights and restrictions provided by law." This
article was enacted in response to language in a supreme court decision describing the
wife's interest in community property as an imperfect ownership. Creech v. Capitol
Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973). The court in Creech stated:
"[Tihe wife's interest in the community is imperfect ownership without use
.... As to third persons, her patrimony then consists of her separate property
in perfect ownership and the imperfect ownership without use of one-half of the
community. ... Id. at 510.
90. LA. R.S. 9:2841, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
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the community property used to pay a separate debt.' A
spouse does not become personally liable for obligations in-
curred by the other for their common interests unless he ac-
cepts the dissolved community expressly and uncondition-
ally." The provisions with respect to obligations are a signifi-
cant change from present law with respect to access to com-
munity property by the separate creditors of the spouses. Pres-
ently, all of a husband's antenuptial debts may be satisfied
from community property," while a wife's antenuptial debts
may be satisfied from community property only to the extent
of her earnings.94 The new law permits antenuptial and other
separate debts of either spouse to be satisfied in their entirety
from community property.
COMMINGLING AND REIMBURSEMENT
Normally the contractual or legal community regime will
co-exist with the separate estates of the individual spouses.
The new legislation accomodates the practical difficulties in-
herent in this typical situation in a manner similar to the pres-
ent Civil Code and jurisprudential solutions,95 by providing for
reimbursement between the community property and the sepa-
rate property of the spouses. When property bought with sepa-
rate and community assets is classified as separate because the
community investment is inconsequential, reimbursement is
due to the community from the separate estate. 6 Likewise,
when community property is used to satisfy a spouse's separate'
91. LA. R.S. 9:2841 and 9:2852(E), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
92. LA. R.S. 9:2850, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
93. Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973).
94. This has been true only since the 1975 enactment of the Louisiana Equal
Credit Opportunity Law, LA. R.S. 9:3581 et seq. (Supp. 1975). Prior to that time no
antenuptial debts of the wife could be satisfied from community property. Flogny v.
Hatch, 12 Mart. (O.S.) 82 (La. 1822); Greenleeze v. Penny, 1 La. 241 (1830).
95. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2408, and cases cited in note 41, supra.
96. LA. R.S. 9:2839(3), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1. Some of the reim-
bursement provisions are placed in LA. R.S. 9:2852, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627,
§ 1, which deals with the community under administration; the advisory committee
will propose that these be placed in a separate section to be entitled, "Community
property used to satisfy separate obligations and vice versa; reimbursement; definition
of obligations incurred for the common interest." Minutes, Meeting of the Joint Legis-
lative Subcomm. Considering a Revision of Louisiana's Community Property Laws
(Sept. 6, 1978).
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debt, or is applied to or appropriated to the use of the separate
property of one spouse, that spouse's separate estate must
reimburse the other for one-half of the amount used, upon dis-
solution of the community." Measuring reimbursement liabil-
ity by "the amount used" is a change in the law, since reim-
bursement is currently based on enhanced value rather than
amount of investment."8 Even under the new law, however, if
the separate property of one spouse increases in value due to
the uncompensated labor or industry of either spouse, the own-
ing spouse owes to the other one-half the value of the increase."
Similar adjustments are to be made when community
property has benefited in some way through the use of either
spouse's separate estate. If an obligation for the common inter-
est of the spouses is satisfied from one spouse's separate prop-
erty, that spouse is entitled to retrieve one-half of the amount
expended if there are community assets available at dissolution
to make the reimbursement. 10 The same reimbursement oc-
curs, if community property is available at dissolution, when-
ever the separate property of one spouse has been applied to
or appropriated to the use of the community.' 0 ' Even if there
are no community assets available, a spouse shall make reim-
bursement for one-half the value of any obligations satisfied
from the separate property of the other that were incurred for
the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage or for the
support, maintenance, and education of the children, in keep-
ing with the economic condition of the community regime."'"
97. LA. R.S. 9:2852(E), 9:2853, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
98. Abraham v. Abraham, 230 La. 78, 87 So. 2d 735 (1956); Funderburk v. Fun-
derburk, 214 La. 717, 38 So. 2d 502 (1949); Succession of Goll, 156 La. 910, 101 So.
263 (1924).
99. LA. R.S. 9:2854, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1. This is the same
formula that is provided by the present law.
100. LA. R.S. 9:2852(F), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
101. Li . R.S. 9:2853, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
102. LA. R.S. 9:2852(F), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1. Thus the legisla-
tion applies two different standards of reimbursement when separate property is used
for the common interests of the spouses. There is always a right to reimbursement if
community property is available for such a purpose. A spouse can collect from the
other's separate property, however, for reimbursements respecting only particularly
favored obligations-the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage or the sup-
port, maintenance, and education of the children. Such obligations must also have
been in keeping with the economic condition of the community regime. Thus, the line
seems to be drawn between obligations which are necessary and reasonable for the
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MANAGEMENT
Head and Master
Presently, the husband is the "head and master" of the
community of gains under Civil Code article 2404.1"" This desig-
nation is considered to be one of the provisions of the legal
community which cannot be contractually altered; thus, the
wife cannot be made head of the community, nor can a contract
stipulate a joint or equal management scheme (although there
are some transactions involving certain community property
which a husband cannot enter without his wife's consent.)" 4
The basis of this restriction is Civil Code article 2327, which
prohibits a marital contract which would derogate from the
"rights resulting from the power of the husband . . . which
belong to the husband as head of the family.""" Consequently,
the husband is the sole manager of the community property,
and the wife has no management powers except through
him-i.e., through an express or implied mandate. The courts
generally presume that the husband has authorized his wife to
contract in his name for ordinary family expenses and for the
education of the children.'
benefit of the marriage and the family and those which are "for the interests of the
spouses" in only a more peripheral way. With respect to the latter type of obligation,
it was not deemed appropriate to burden the spouse who did not incur the obligation
with a possible life-long personal liability to the other spouse, who had taken the
managerial initiative (perhaps unwisely and unnecessarily) in incurring the obligation.
103. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2404 states:
The husband is the head and master of the partnership or community of
gains; he administers its effects, disposes of the revenues which they produce,
and may alienate them by an onerous title, without the consent and permission
of his wife.
He can make no conveyance inter vivos, by a gratuitous title, of the immov-
ables of the community, nor of the whole, or of a quota of the movables, unless
it be for the establishment of the children of the marriage. A gratuitous title
within the contemplation of this article embraces all titles wherein there is no
direct, material advantage to the donor.
Nevertheless he may dispose of the movable effects by a gratuitous and
particular title, to the benefit of all persons.
But if it should be proved that the husband has sold the common property,
or otherwise disposed of the same by fraud, to injure his wife, she may have her
action against the heirs of her husband, in support of her claim in one-half of
the property, on her satisfactorily proving the fraud.
104. These are stipulated in LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2404 and 2334. See notes 107-
16, infra, and accompanying text.
105. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2327.
106. R. PASCAL, LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW COURSE § 6.8 (1973); Comment, Liability
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Limitation on Husband's Power
The husband's managerial powers are not totally unre-
stricted. Since 1825, article 2404 has prohibited the intervivos
donation of community immovables or of a whole or a quota of
movables except for the "establishment of the children of the
marriage."'" 7 More recently, his power to enter onerous transac-
tions with respect to certain community property has been lim-
ited. The first restriction of this sort made it possible to record
a declaration designating certain property as the family
home.1 8 After recordation, the husband cannot sell, lease, or
mortgage the home without the wife's written consent."'" The
wife may make this recordation if the husband fails to do so,""
although until recently she had to wait until his inaction had
lasted for six months after acquisition of the property."' In
1962, Civil Code article 2334 was amended to require the wife's
written consent to the sale, lease, or mortgage of any com-
munity property registered in her name alone."2 She could like-
wise require her written consent for the sale, encumbrance, or
lease of all community immovables registered in the name of
both spouses by recording in the parish of situs an authentic
act declaring that her authority or consent was required. '' The
husband continued to have unrestricted powers with respect to
onerous transactions affecting community property registered
in his name alone-a significant loophole in the protective
of the Husband for Contractual Obligations of His Wife, 30 LA. L. REV. 441 (1970).
107. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2404. The 1808 statute placed no such restriction on the
husband and, in fact, stated that he could "sell and even give away the [community
assetsl without the consent and permission of his wife, because she has no sort of right
in them until her husband be dead."
108. LA. R.S. 9:2801 (Supp. 1976), 9:2802 (Supp. 1976), 9:2803 (1950), 9:2804
(Supp. 1976), repealed by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627.
109. LA. R.S. 9:2801 (1950) (as it appeared prior to 1976 La. Acts, No. 679, § 2).
In 1976, the possibility of a recorded declaration by the wife permitting alienation
without her consent was added to the statute. See text at notes 114-16, infra. Sections
2801 through 2804 are repealed by Act 627, see note 108, supra. The declaration of a
family home is no longer needed since all community immovables are subject to con-
currence in management. See note 125, infra, and accompanying text.
110. LA. R.S. 9:2802 (1950).
Ill. LA. R.S. 9:2802 (1950) (as it appeared prior to 1974 La. Acts, No. 405).
112. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2334 (as it appeared prior to 1976 La. Acts, No. 679, §
113. Id.
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measures since he alone has the power to acquire community
property and he can thus determine in whose name it will be
held.
In 1977, the burden of inaction was shifted with respect to
community immovables in the name of both spouses; pres-
ently, the wife's consent is required in the sale, encumbrance,
or lease of such immovables, unless she has recorded in the
parish of situs an authentic declaration that her authority or
consent is not required."4 The declaration may specify certain
property or encompass all property in the parish; it may even
apply generally to property acquired in the future, although in
that case, the wife can later file a contrary declaration with-
drawing her authority or consent."' The latter amendment also
now requires the wife's consent to the alienation, encumbrance,
or lease of the family home standing in the husband's name
alone, unless a declaration as described above has been re-
corded."'
Thus, while the wife presently has no independent man-
agement powers, she may exercise a veto over transactions af-
fecting property in her name and property deemed of particular
importance to the family, i.e., the family home and immovable
property held in both spouses' names. However, the protection
this veto power affords is far from complete; it basically leaves
intact the loophole for community property in the husband's
name and likewise leaves all community movables not in the
wife's name alone subject to his unrestricted powers of onerous
alienation. Such movables may constitute a significant part of
the family wealth, since the category of movables includes such
things as stock shares, bank certificates, valuable paintings or
antiques, and actions for damages. Furthermore, while these
statutory changes have afforded some protection to the wife
and family, they have also served to protect the head and mas-
ter management scheme when it. has been subjected to consti-
tutional challenges." 7 Recently, a four-man majority of the
state supreme court was able to avoid reaching an equal-
114. 1976 La. Acts, No. 679, § 1, amending LA. CIv. CODE art. 2334 (effective
January 1, 1977).
115. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2334.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., the cases cited in note 15, supra.
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protection-based constitutional challenge to the present man-
agement provisions, principally by noting that the complaining
wife could have prevented her husband's mortgage of the fam-
ily home had she followed the statutorily prescribed method.'"
Equal Management
The new management scheme radically departs from ex-
isting law by giving the wife equal management power with the
husband."' The change perhaps reflects a perception that it is
inappropriate and demeaning for adults of normal mental ca-
pacity to be deprived of all management powers over property
in which they have an ownership interest. Even the expansion
of a wife's control over community property represented by the
consent requirements discussed above falls far short of actually
giving her management authority. As the dissenting justices in
Martin point out, for example, the wife could not herself sell
or mortgage the family home, even with her husband's consent
(and even when, as in that case, it was purchased largely with
her earnings).12° This differential treatment of husband and
wife was a strong reason for the enactment of an equal manage-
ment regime. Even if not viewed as in itself an evil requiring
correction, such differential treatment makes the present law
vulnerable to constitutional attack. Furthermore, the head and
master arrangement has become increasingly inappropriate for
the circumstances of modern marriages and property owner-
ship. Louisiana is, in fact, the only community property state
in the country which continues to make the husband the man-
datory manager of the community property.' 2'
118. Corpus Christi Parish Credit Union v. Martin, 358 So. 2d 295 (La. 1978).
The law at the time of the challenged mortgage of the family home required the wife's
consent for such an encumbrance only if she had recorded a declaration in authentic
form that her authorization was necessary. The court considered this protection suffi-
cient although Mrs. Martin, unaware of the law, bore the burden of the action. The
rationale is akin to the "no insurmountable barrier" notion raised by the United States
Supreme Court in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), and largely repudiated by
that same court in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). The same statutory provi-
sion was relied upon by a federal court to uphold the head and master management
scheme in Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 420 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. La. 1977).
119. LA. R.S. 9:2842, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
120. Corpus Christi Parish Credit Union v. Martin, 358 So. 2d 295, 301 (La. 1978)
(Tate, Calogero, and Dennis, JJ., dissenting).
121. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLS,
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The new act initially establishes that each spouse acting
alone may manage, control, and dispose of his or her separate
property and, except as otherwise provided by law, may man-
age, control, and dispose of community property.'22 The Act
then limits the equal management power of the spouses by
defining certain instances in which the concurrence of both
spouses is required'23 and others in which one spouse has man-
agement power to the exclusion of the other.'24
Concurrence Requirements
The spouses must concur to alienate, lease, or encumber
(except for encumbrances imposed by law): (1) community
immovables; (2) community furniture or furnishings in use in
the family home; (3) a community business or all or substan-
tially all of its assets; and (4) movables when issued or regis-
tered as provided by law in the names of both spouses.'25 Addi-
tionally, the donation of community assets requires concurr-
ence, except in cases of usual or customary gifts of a value
"commensurate with the economic status of the spouses at the
time of the donation.' '
Some of these transactions requiring concurrence of the
spouses correspond to those which presently require the con-
sent or authorization of the wife. The first category-the alien-
ation, lease, or encumbrance of community immovables-
corresponds generally to the present statute requiring a wife's
consent in transactions affecting community immovables in
her name or the names of the spouses jointly. The new pro-
vision, however, closes the present loophole with respect to
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 558 (1978); Bartke, Community Property Law Reform in the
United States and in Canada-A Comparison and Critique, 50 TUL. L. REV. 214, 228,
230 (1976).
122. LA. R.S. 9:2842, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1. The power of manage-
ment in each spouse is a change not only with respect to community property, but also
with respect to the wife's separate property. Under present law, the wife has a right to
administer her paraphernal property, but there is a presumption that it is under the
administration of her husband with its fruits entering the community of gains. She
must make and record a notarial act in order to reserve the fruits and administration
to herself. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2384-86.
123. LA. R.S. 9:2843, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
124. LA. R.S. 9:2844, 2845, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
125. LA. R.S. 9:2843, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
126. Id.
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community immovables in the name of the husband alone.
Since all community immovables are covered by the provi-
sion, special protection for the family home is no longer neces-
sary. Some additional protection is given the home environ-
ment, however, by the concurrence requirement imposed on
transactions involving community furniture or furnishings in
use in the family home.
The concurrence requirement placed on alienation, en-
cumbrance or lease of a family business is entirely new. It
seems to reflect a recognition that when spouses own a business
in community, it probably represents a significant, if not the
principal, source of income to the community. Frequently it
will also have been purchased, established, continued, or ex-
panded through considerable community investment. The
statute does not impose the need for concurrence on every
transaction affecting the business-only those which affect the
entire entity, immovable property owned by it, or all or sub-
stantially all of its assets. Thus, for example, if both spouses
participate in managing the business, either one alone could
order or sell merchandise or equipment, and enter contracts to
purchase or render service.
The new concurrence requirements also affect community
movables when issued or registered as provided by law in the
name of both spouses. This is a change from present law and
gives some attention to the fact that significant portions of a
couple's wealth may be held in movables. Among the movables
affected by this provision are stocks, bonds, securities, bank
certificates, and motor vehicles, if held in both names jointly.
However, either spouse may, under equal management, pur-
chase these items individually and have them registered in his
name alone; in that case the m6vables would be exempt from
the concurrence requirements and from the control of the other
spouse.
The new requirement for concurrence with respect to do-
nations is somewhat like the current restriction imposed on the
husband by Civil Code article 2404. Act 627's scope is broader,
however, since individual community movables are also cov-
ered. The practical exception made for "usual or customary"
gifts presumably includes such donations as birthday, Christ-
mas, and wedding gifts; small charitable contributions; and
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perhaps even small political contributions. The two limita-
tions-that the donations be "usual or customary" in nature 7
and "commensurate with the economic status of the spouses at
the time of donation"-should prevent'any excessive donations
of movables. 25
While the new statutes establish a need for concurrence in
specified instances, they do not define the method of concur-
ring-whether written consent is sufficient or whether both
spouses need be party to each transaction. A comment to this
section states that "a spouse who joins in a transaction or
grants a power of attorney or mandate becomes a party to the
transaction unless personal responsibility as a party is ex-
pressly negated."'' 9 A possible inference from this comment is
that a spouse can concur by some action short of joining in the
transaction or granting a power of attorney or mandate.
The redactors' comments indicate that concurrence is re-
quired in each of these situations because of their importance
to the well-being of the family. 30 With this as the declared
policy, it is appropriate that the requirement ' of concurrence
may be circumvented when the effect of its enforcement would
be contrary to the interests of the family. Thus, Act 627 pro-
vides that a court may authorize either spouse, through a
summary proceeding, to act without the other's consent upon
a showing by that spouse that (1) the action is in the best
interest of the family and that (2) the lack of concurrence is due
to either the arbitrary refusal or the physical incapacity, men-
tal incompetence, commitment, imprisonment, or absence of
the other spouse.' This language is almost identical to that of
Code of Civil Procedure article 4502, 31 which authorizes the
127. There is no indication of the standard by which "usual or customary" is to
be judged. It might be a broad social one-e.g., in this culture, gifts are exchanged on
birthdays, for Christmas, at the birth of babies, etc. On the other hand, it could be
developed from the behavior patterns of the particular spouses or family-e.g., their
generosity is annually most conspicuous in celebration of the spring solstice, or they
celebrate Easter with more gifting than Christmas.
128. The restriction is still greater than that in the present law, and these limita-
tions can be applied by a fact finder should a spouse bring an action to nullify an
unauthorized alienation by donation. LA. R.S. 9:2846,-added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627,
§ 1, and LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1960), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 4.
129. LA. R.S. 9:2843, comment, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
130. LA. R.S. 9:2842, comment, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
131. LA. R.S. 9:2847, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
132. LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 4502 states: "The mother shall have the authority of
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mother to act in place of the father as administrator of the
minor child's property under certain circumstances.
The principal difference between the two provisions is the
inclusion of interdiction within the circumstances listed in arti-
cle 4502 and its absence in the matrimonial regime provision.
The omission presumably reflects an intent that the curator
have the power to concur or refuse consent for the interdicted
spouse. If the curator refused consent, the other spouse would
presumably be able to go to court and get authorization for the
transaction upon showing that the refusal was arbitrary. In
order to consent for the interdicted spouse, the curator might
have to go to court under the procedural articles that require
court approval for the alienation, lease, or encumbrance of an
interdict's property.'33 This would depend on whether consent
to such a transaction was interpreted as requiring the same
supervision as actually participating in it. If so, the court su-
pervision of the curator would serve the same protective func-
tion as court supervision of the spouse wishing to act without
the other's concurrence. This would be particularly relevant if
the curator were the spouse.' 4 Then the court authorization for
the spouse acting as curator would simply substitute for court
authorization to a spouse to act without concurrence.
There are no comments clarifying whether court authori-
zation is limited to specific, named transactions or may be
more general in character. It would be appropriate for the court
authorization to be limited to a specific transaction or group
of transactions when based on a showing of arbitrary refusal.
When consent is lacking for one of the other listed reasons, and
if there are also indications that repeated resort to court au-
thorization will be necessary, it should be possible for a spouse
to get a broader authorization for some period of time. The
phrasing of the statute does not appear to preclude this inter-
pretation; action in the best interest of the family may encom-
the father during such time as the father is mentally incompetent, committed, inter-
dicted, imprisoned, or an absentee. Moreover, with permission of the judge, the mother
may represent the minor whenever the father fails or refuses to do so; and in any event
she may represent the minor under the conditions of the laws on the voluntary manage-
ment of another's affairs."
133. LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 4554, 4268, 4270, 4271, 4301.
134. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4550 provides in part that "[tihe spouse of an inter-
dicted person has the prior right to be appointed curator."
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pass more than one transaction and certain of the conditions
creating a lack of consent are inherently of more than momen-
tary duration.
Sole Management
It is also possible for the concurrence requirement to be-
come a cumbersome and unnecessary form of protection for
certain couples under some circumstances. The nuisance po-
tential of the provision has been recognized and partially miti-
gated by granting authority to one spouse to confer expressly
upon the other the "sole and irrevocable" right to alienate,
encumber, or lease a community immovable or a community
business or all or substantially all of its assets.3 5 This provision
was not a part of the original advisory committee bill,' and it
probably addresses the concerns of persons, such as real estate
dealers who are not really covered by the business exception
discussed below, ' 37 and whose daily business dealings would be
considerably hampered by the requirement that both spouses
concur in the sale of an immovable. The comments elaborate
upon the irrevocability of this right. It may be of unlimited
duration, for a definite period of time, or until the happening
of a certain or uncertain event. Additionally, the giving of con-
sideration is not required to support the irrevocability of the
right.'
In several respects the exact operation of this provision is
not sufficiently clear from either the statutory language or the
comments. For example, the Act does not indicate whether this
135. LA. R.S. 9:2843, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
136. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, 4th Reg. Sess. at 42 (June 21, 1978).
137. See notes 143, 144, infra, and accompanying text.
138. LA. R.S. 9:2843, comment, added by La. Acts, No. 627, § 1. Obviously a
spouse could empower the other to act for him through an ordinary mandate, LA. Civ.
CODE art. 2985, since the contractual incapacity between spouses is removed. See notes
4, 30, supra, and accompanying text. Mandate, however, would not be irrevocable
unless coupled with an interest. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3027, 3028; Robinson v. Hunt, 211
La. 1019, 31 So. 2d 197 (1947); Marchand v. Gulf Refining Co., 187 La. 1002, 175 So.
647 (1937), and would also bind the principal spouse as a party to transactions by the
mandatary spouse. See note 129, supra, and accompanying text. Since irrevocability
would appear to be necessary, at least for some period of time, to facilitate credit
financing, this provision was evidently designed to provide an alternative to mandate,
which would not be accompanied by the latter's disadvantages.
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right of sole management can be conferred in a marriage con-
tract, though it would not contravene the prohibitions with
respect to such contracts. The precise nature of the grant of an
irrevocable right is also unclear. It could, for example, be a type
of power of attorney, with consequent personal responsibility of
the granting spouse as a party to all transactions, or it could
be a waiver, with freedom from such personal responsibility on
the part of the granting spouse. A provision of this sort may be
necessary to address adequately the needs of commerce; 3,
clarification is needed, however, and apparently will be pro-
vided in the 1979 session."'
Three provisions of Act 627 place sole management in
one spouse by law, rather than by agreement of the parties.
When movables are issued or registered as provided by law in
the name of one spouse, they may be managed by only that
spouse.' This is largely a change in the law in favor of the
wife's management powers. While the husband presently may
not alienate, encumber, or lease any community property in
the wife's name without her consent (or without a recorded
declaration permitting him to do so), she has not generally had
actual management powers over such property.' The hus-
band, however, as head and master of the community property,
possesses the right of sole management of such property in his
name, except for the restrictions placed on alienation of the
family home in his name. The new law places the spouses on
equal footing with respect to community movables registered
in the name of one spouse.
139. The comments refer to "instances of such importance to commerce that one
spouse is entitled to act to the exclusion of the other." LA. R.S. 9:3842, comment,
added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
140. The Joint Legislative Subcommittee Considering a Revision of Louisiana's
Community Property Laws will propose to change this portion of the law to read as
follows: "A spouse may expressly and irrevocably waive the necessity of concurrence
to the alienation, encumbrance, or lease of a community immovable or a community
business or all or substantially all of the assets of a community business." Minutes,
Meeting of the Joint Legislative Subcomm. Considering a Revision of Louisiana's
Community Property Laws (Sept. 6, 1978).
141. LA. R.S. 9:2845, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
142. There are limited exceptions, however, with respect to funds in bank ac-
counts, savings and loan shares in her name, and negotiable securities in her name.
Special statutes permit her to act alone in disposing of such community assets in
certain instances. R. PASCAL, supra note 106, at § 6.5.
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In order to facilitate commerce, the Act also includes a
"business exception," which gives the spouse who manages a
community business "without the participation in manage-
ment of the other"'' the sole power to acquire, encumber, al-
ienate, or lease the movable assets of the business.' This
power is simply a restriction upon equal management and does
not alter concurrence requirements or the reservation of any
asset to the sole management of one spouse. It thus must be
exercised within the limitations imposed by the other manage-
ment provisions. Consequently, the spouse managing under the
business exception does not have the power to alienate, encum-
ber, or lease all or substantially all of the business's movable
assets, or any movables issued or registered in the name of both
spouses jointly or the other spouse alone. The exception, by its
terms, applies to movable assets and thus does not alter the
concurrence requirements with respect to community immova-
bles, even if they are part of the business. The only actual effect
of the exception is to withdraw the non-managing spouse's
power to act alone with respect to movable assets of a com-
munity business.
A final instance of sole management concerns a spouse
who is a partner. The new statute provides that such a spouse
will have the sole right to alienate, encumber, or lease his or
her partnership interest.' This is equivalent to treating a
spouse's partnership interest as a movable in that spouse's
name and is analogous to the treatment of corporate stock.'"
It should be noted that the reservation of any property to
the sole management of a spouse under any of the provisions
discussed above does not alter creditors' rights in the property.
The comments warn that none of the instances of sole manage-
ment in one spouse are intended to limit the rights of creditors
143. This phrase is important in determining the applicability of the business
exception. If both spouses participate in the community business at the managerial
level, then they have equal management of this asset. The business exception applies
only to situations where one spouse does not participate in the business at all, or does
not participate in a managerial capacity.
144. LA. R.S. 9:2844, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
145. Id.
146. Furthermore, since partnership is a contract, LA. CIv. CODE art. 2801, it is
appropriate that only the spouse who is a party to the contract will have management
power with respect to it.
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of the other spouse to seize the community property so man-
aged."47
ENFORCEMENT AND PROTECTION PROVISIONS
Several provisions of the new law address enforcement of
the management provisions and protection against their abuse.
Any alienation of community property made by a spouse with-
out authority is voidable by the other spouse."' Spouses are
also liable to each other, even during existence of the com-
munity regime, for losses or damages caused by fraud or bad
faith in management of the community.' 4 Present law imposes
liability for fraudulently disposing of community property, but
the wife's action is only enforceable upon dissolution of the
community."' The courts have traditionally required the proof
of fraud to meet a particularly stringent standard,"' and there
is no reason to assume that they will not continue to do so. The
addition of "bad faith" as a ground for this action, however,
may be indicative of a legislative intent to lighten somewhat
the plaintiff-spouse's burden.
Protection from both fraudulent and non-fraudulent mis-
management by one spouse is afforded by the right of either
spouse to sue for a separation of property"-a right the wife
147. LA. R.S. 9:2843-45, comments, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
148. LA. R.S. 9:2846, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1. No prescriptive period
is provided for such an action by a spouse against a spouse. The ten-year prescription
of Civil Code article 2121 would seem to be the most likely to be applied by the courts
in the absence of statutory stipulation. See Berry v. Franklin St. Bank & Trust Co.,
186 La. 623, 173 So. 126 (1937). However, a shorter prescriptive period would seem to
be more appropriate, since this is an action available only to the immediate parties to
the marriage (not to their creditors). A special prescriptive period should therefore be
provided by statute.
149. LA. R.S. 9:2846, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
150. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2404 states in part: "But if it should be proved that the
husband has sold the common property, or otherwise disposed of the same by fraud,
to injure his wife, she may have her action against the heirs of her husband, in support
of her claim in one-half of the property, on her satisfactorily proving the fraud."
Although the language seems to address dissolution of the community only by death,
the courts have interpreted the article as permitting the wife's action upon dissolution
of the community by any cause and against the husband as well as his heirs. Thigpen
v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So. 2d 12 (1957).
151. Peltier v. Begovich, 239 La. 238, 118 So. 2d 395 (1960); Succession of Pack-
wood, 12 Rob. 334 (1845).
152. LA. R.S. 9:2856, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
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currently enjoys whenever her dowry is threatened by the mis-
management of the husband or the "disorder of his affairs"
causes her to believe that his estate may be insufficient to meet
"her rights and claims."'53 The jurisprudence has interpreted
this protection to include a right to sue for a judicial separation
of property simply to protect her earnings, even where there is
no dotal or paraphernal property to be protected. 5' With the
inception of equal management, a separation of property will
be available to either spouse for essentially the same grounds
as under the present law and for the additional grounds of
fault, negligence, or incompetence. The new statute grants a
right to sue for separation of property whenever a spouse's in-
terest is "threatened or diminished by the fraud, fault, neglect
or incompetence of the other or when the disorder of the other's
affairs jeopardizes that spouse's interests under their matri-
monial regime." '55 Thus a spouse may protect his or her share
in the community property before drastic losses become immi-
nent and without having to show egregious mismanagement on
the part of the other spouse. The action protects a spouse
against the other's recalcitrance in entering into or modifying
a marriage contract if equal management proves unworkable
for them. However, it permits judicial intervention only when
there is a financial justification-not merely for purposes of
enforcing the wishes of one spouse when the two cannot agree.
Therefore, the complaining spouse must prove that his or her
community property interests are being threatened or dimin-
ished.
Both the current judgment of separation of property and
that authorized by Act 627 are retroactive to the date of filing'"
and are also subject to an attack by the creditors of a spouse
as in fraud of their rights.'57 The new legislation specifies a
153. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2425.
154. Mock v. Kennedy, 11 La. Ann. 525 (1856): Davock v. Carcy, 6 Rob, 342
(1844); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 231 So. 2d 414 (La. App. 2d.Cir. 1970).
155. LA. R.S. 9:2856(A), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
156. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2432; LA. R.S. 9:2856(B), added by 1978 La. Acts, No.
627, § 1.
157. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2434; LA. R.S. 9:2856(C), added by 1978 La. Acts, No.
627, § 1. The latter provision states: "The creditors of a spouse may object to the
separation of property as in fraud of their rights, either pending the suit for separation
or within one year after final judgment without prejudice to the rights of third parties.
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prescriptive period of one year from final judgment for the
exercise of this right by the creditors.' 8
Separation of property may also be established by marital
contract.' 5 Each spouse under such a regime has complete con-
trol over all of his property, but is obligated to contribute to
the expenses of the marriage. The contract may stipulate how
expenses are to be divided; in the absence of such a stipulation,
each spouse is to contribute "in proportion to his or her
means." 60
When separation of property is accomplished judicially,
the problem of allocation of marriage expenses is not directly
addressed by the legislation. Logically, expenses should also be
divided in proportion to the means of the spouses if they do not
choose to contractually resolve their respective responsibili-
ties.''
The Civil Code presently handles responsibility for mar-
riage expenses in a separate property regime in a similar man-
ner, permitting such responsibility to be established by the
antenuptial marriage contract and stipulating that it otherwise
is to be shared between the spouses, with the wife's contribu-
tion limited to one-half of her income.'62 The Code does not
state that the sharing of expenses in a contractual separation
of property is proportionate to the means of the spouses; pro-
portionate sharing is stipulated, however, if a judicial separa-
tion of property is obtained by the wife during the marriage.'8 3
In that case, there is also no limit on the wife's contribution
If the judgment has been executed, they may assert its nullity to the extent they have
been defrauded."
158. LA. R.S. 9:2856(C), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
159. LA. R.S. 9:2855, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
160. "Means" has been defined by the courts (while interpreting the alimony
articles of the Civil Code) as including all resources and income. Ward v. Ward, 339
So. 2d 839 (La. 1976); Bowsky v. Silverman, 184 La. 977, 168 So. 121 (1936).
161. This will be proposed by the Joint Legislative Subcommittee Considering
Revision of Louisiana's Community Property Laws in the 1979 regular session.
Minutes, Meeting of the Joint Legislative Subcomm. Considering a Revision of Louis-
iana's Community Property Laws (Sept. 6, 1978).
162. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2395.
163. Id. If the wife has obtained a separation of property during the marriage,
however, Civil Code article 2435 provides that she must contribute in proportion to
"her fortune and to that of her husband" and must support the expenses alone "if there
remains nothing to her husband."
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and she must bear all expenses of the marriage if the husband
is unable to contribute.
DISSOLUTION
Under the new legislation the community regime is dis-
solved by the death of one spouse, a judgment of divorce or
separation, a judgment decreeing separation of property, or the
contract of the spouses;'"4 only the latter is an addition to pres-
ent law. 165 At the time of dissolution, either spouse may petition
for an administration of the property.'" The legislation estab-
lishes principles for liquidation of the community by the ad-
ministrator, including preference to secured creditors against
secured property, pro rata satisfaction of all other creditors
from unsecured property, and satisfaction of claims between
the spouses (in the nature of reimbursement or damages for
fraud or bad faith in administration of the community) only
after third party creditors."7 If there is no administration, cred-
itors' claims are satisfied in the same way as during the exis-
tence of the community, i.e., from the community property
and the separate property of the spouse incurring the obliga-
tion. '6 A principal effect of the petition for administration is
to prevent execution against any community property except
through a conventional mortgage or pledge' 6 -much as admin-
istration of a succession prevents such execution. 70
Presently, the wife has the option upon dissolution of the
community to accept the community under benefit of inven-
tory, "in the same manner and with the same benefits and
advantages as the heirs of a succession."'' The new legislation
164. LA. R.S. 9:2848, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
165. Dissolution of the community under present law is provided by LA. Civ.
CODE arts. 155 (separation of bed and board), 159 (divorce), 136, 2406 (death of a
spouse, divorce, nullity), and 2425 (judgment of separation of property).
166. LA. R.S. 9:2851, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1. The petition for
administration may also be filed when a suit which may result in dissolution of the
community is pending. Id. Rules are to be provided in the Code of Civil Procedure;
the statutes providing for the administration of community property will not take
effect until such articles are enacted. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 9.
167. LA. R.S. 9:2852, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
168. LA. R.S. 9:2849, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
169. LA. R.S. 9:2851, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
170. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 3247, 3248.
171. LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950).
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repeals this statute'7 but establishes the same options for both
spouses through two mechanisms-the petition for administra-
tion7 3 and the provision requiring an express and unconditional
acceptance of the community before a spouse assumes personal
liability for debts incurred (for their common interests) by the
other spouse."' The latter provision changes the law in that it
requires any acceptance to be express, while presently it is
possible for a wife tacitly to accept the community simply by
her actions. '75 Further, by predicating personal liability on an
express and unconditional acceptance, the statute implicitly
recognizes the possibility of a conditional acceptance having an
effect similar to an acceptance with benefit of inventory.
EFFECTIVE DATE AND CONTINUED STUDY
It should be noted that none of the new law's provisions
take effect before September 1, 1979,176 and most of them take
effect on January 1, 1980.' 7 The changes in law which permit
the spouses to contract with each other and, in particular, to
enter a marriage contract during marriage become effective in
September, 1979,17 s so that spouses under the present regime
may contract out of the new regime before it affects them, if
they so desire.
In addition to delaying the implementation of the new law,
the legislature has extended the life of the joint legislative com-
mittee and its advisory committee for the express purpose of
"further studying the equal management concept and coordi-
nating efforts to draft such additional legislation as may be
necessary to properly and orderly implement the concept of
equal management of the community of acquets and gains
and all of the laws related thereto.' 179
The Louisiana Law Institute is authorized and directed to
review Act 627, the existing statutes and codes, and any pro-
172. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 8.
173. See text at note 166, supra.
174. LA. R.S. 9:2850, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
175. White v. White, 153 La. 313, 95 So. 791 (1923).
176. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 9.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. La. H. Con. Res. No. 232, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978).
[Vol. 39
LEGISLATIVE SYMPOSIUM
posals of the legislative and advisory committees. It is also
directed to submit three different proposals with respect to the
spouses power to contract with each other-one which would
give the spouses an unlimited right to contract with each other
(as in Act 627), one which would allow them to contract with
each other only in specific instances, and one which would
prohibit all contracts between spouses.'
Concern over the contractual capacity of the spouses was
clearly a principal reason for the resolution. Also acknowledged
is a need for further study of the changes in the law, because
"House Bill 1569 does not encompass all of the necessary modi-
fications, repeals, or changes in the many provisions of the
various statutes and codal articles not found in Title VI of the
Revised Civil Code of Louisiana, particularly those laws which
are premised upon the husband being the head and master, or
the sole legal representative, of the community or laws which
are in any manner affected by the repeal of the head and mas-
ter concept."'' Because of Act 627's delayed implementation
and the specific mandate of further legislative study in House
Concurrent Resolution 232, it is clear that further enactments
on matrimonial regimes will be forthcoming in the 1979 legisla-
tive session. It was intended that any such changes be consis-
tent with the modifications adopted in 1978-i.e., that they
only add clarifications or conform related laws to the new man-
agement provisions. However, more substantial changes are
not foreclosed, and they will almost certainly be proposed.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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PROPERTY
The first time that a Louisiana Law Institute bill propos-
ing a major change in the law was defeated was during the 1977
legislative session when a property bill revising book II, title I
of the Civil Code on Things was deferred indefinitely by com-
mittee.' Efforts by the Law Institute to overcome last year's
opposition, which had focused primarily upon changes in arti-
cles 451, 455, and 457, defining the seashore and the banks of
navigable rivers, resulted in the 1978 passage of House Bill 191
with only a few amendments.' The bill's approval completes
the modernization of all the property sections in the Civil Code
except title II on Ownership. 3
The revision of title I achieves the dual purposes of clarify-
ing and synthesizing the Civil Code, which facilitates reading
and understanding it. These accomplishments are reflected in
the elimination of outdated terminology and illustrations as
well as in a reduction of the number of codal articles.4 The
revision generally retains the basic conceptual structure of the
Civil Code of 1870 despite a noteworthy but uncontroversial
abolishment of immovables by destination.'
COMMON, PUBLIC, AND PRIVATE THINGS
In accord with early civilian classification, article 448 as
amended still divides "things" into: 1) common, public, and
private things; 2) corporeals and incorporeals; and 3) movables
and immovables.1 The significance of these classifications is in
1. See The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1977 Regular Ses-
sion-Property, 38 LA. L. REv. 52, 62 (1977).
2. See 1978 La. Acts, No. 728.
3. The effective date of the revision of book II, title I on Things is Jan. 1, 1979.
The proposed revision of title II on Ownership is scheduled to be presented to the
Louisiana Legislature during the 1979 legislative session. The revision of title III on
the personal servitudes of Usufruct, Use, and Habitation has been in effect since Jan.
1, 1977, and the revised versions of title IV concerning Predial Servitudes, title V on
Building Restrictions, and title VI on Boundaries all became effective on Jan. 1, 1978.
4. The revision eliminated eleven articles by combining those articles which
presented similar concepts.
5. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 467, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728.
6. LA. CIv. CODE art. 448, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728, combines prior
LA. CIv. COnE arts. 449, 460, and 461.
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the applicability of different legal rules to each division of
things.7 In the first division of common, public, and private
things, the analytical framework involves susceptibility of own-
ership.' Common things are not owned by anyone; public
things are owned by the state or its political subdivisions in
their capacity as public persons; and private things are owned
by individuals, other private persons, and by the state or its
political subdivisions in their capacity as private persons.'
Article 450, summarizing several scattered codal provi-
sions,'0 offers a logical approach to public property law. It em-
bodies the legislative reclassifications and also explains the
nature of public things, stating that water bodies are owned by
the state in its sovereign capacity," and that streets and public
squares may belong to the state's political subdivisions. These
examples of public things are illustrative rather than exclusive.
In addition, the deletion of the concept of "public domain"
should be noted throughout the title I revision.2
Strong opposition during the 1977 legislative session to the
Law Institute's proposed definition of "seashore" was a major
factor contributing to the revision's defeat. At that time, article
451 of the Civil Code stated: "Seashore is that space of land
over which the waters of the sea spread in the highest water,
during the winter season." The change advocated by the Law
7. Yiannopoulos, Introduction to the Law of Things: Louisiana and Comparative
Law, 22LA. L. REv. 756, 763-64 (1962).
8. See Expose des Motifs of 1978 La. Acts, No. 728, at 3-6; and Yiannopoulos,
Common, Public and Private Things in Louisiana: Civilian Tradition and Modem
Practice, 22 LA. L. REv. 697, 700 (1961).
Legislative reclassification has greatly enlarged the category of public things by
adding running water, the sea, and the seashore, which were formerly common things,
so that the state can impose conservatory measures while gaining financial and admin-
istrative advantages. The category of common things has dwindled to include only the
air and the high seas.
9. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 449, 450, 453, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728.
10. These provisions include LA. CIv. CODE arts. 453, 454, 481, and 483 (as they
appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts, No. 728).
11. The comment to LA. Cwv. CODE art. 450, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No.
728, provides that the expression "natural navigable water bodies" refers to inland
water bottoms belonging to the state because of its sovereignty or other modes of
acquisition, including expropriation.
12. A possible reason for dispensing with the concept of "public domain" may
be the disagreement among legal scholars as to the criteria for distinguishing things
in the public domain from those belonging to the private domain. See A. YtANmoPou-
Los, PROPERTY § 30 in 2 LOuISIANA CML LAw TRzATiSE 77 (1967).
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Institute in 1977 was somewhat drastic and would have defined
the "seashore" as the "area between the ordinary low and the
ordinary high stage of the water of the sea."'" Forced to cApitu-
late on this particular article, the Law Institute altered its 1977
proposal and reenacted prior article 451 with only a minor word
change. Article 451 now provides that "seashore is the space of
land over which the waters of the sea spread in the highest tide
during the winter season."' 4 Such a compromise undoubtedly
aided in saving the entire revision from a second defeat and
avoided possible future problems concerning the taking of pri-
vate property without due process of law."
Article 452 of Act 728 changes the law by eliminating the
public's right to build cabins on the seashore, but it retains the
other enumerated rights of the public, which include the right
to fish, to land on the seashore, to have shelter, to moor boats
and to dry nets, provided no injury occurs to the property of
adjoining owners. 6 A possible reason for the change may have
been that the right to build cabins was too great a burden on
adjoining landowners.
The most controversial subject in the revision concerns the
definition of the banks of navigable rivers or streams as out-
lined in article 456 of Act 728. A complete understanding of the
troublesome area can be reached only by examining the perti-
nent Civil Code articles of 1870, the 1977 Law Institute pro-
posal, and the 1978 provision which ultimately passed after
committee and floor amendments. Part of the problem stems
from a mistranslation of the French text into English in the
drafting of Civil Code article 457, which provided:
The banks of a river or stream are . . . that which con-
tains it in its ordinary state of high water; for the nature
of the banks does not change, although for some cause
they may be overflowed for a time.
13. La. H.B. 213, 3d Reg. Sess. (1977). For doctrinal observations on LA. Civ.
CODE art. 451, see A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 12, at § 28.
14. LA. CIr. CODE art. 451, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728.
15. See Proposed Revision of the Civil Code: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Civil Code Revision of the House Comm. on Civil Law and Procedure, 4th Reg. Sess.
(Jan. 17, 1978) (statement of Professor A. N. Yiannopoulos).
16. In addition, article 452 provides that the seashore within municipal limits is
subject to ordinances under the local police power.
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Nevertheless on the borders of the Mississippi and other
navigable streams, where there are levees . . . the levees
shall form the banks. 17
The French text used the word "lit" meaning "bed," but
the English version erroneously translated it to mean
"banks."'" Apparently, the Louisiana legislatures of 1825 and
1870 intended that the bed of a river be the area from ordinary
low to ordinary high. If so, then article 457 was actually the
definition of the bed of a river, not the bank," and the area
above the ordinary high mark should have been defined as the
bank.20
The mistranslation had important repercussions when oil
was discovered and the definition of banks was litigated. The
Louisiana Supreme Court followed the erroneous translation
by defining banks as the area between the ordinary low and the
ordinary high which resulted in favoring landowners as recipi-
ents of the oil production.2
Since a legislative overruling of the jurisprudence could
have created serious constitutional due process problems, the
Law Institute's 1977 proposal retained the definition of banks
that had been judicially sanctioned since the early 1900's.
However, concerning public use in general, the 1977 proposal
would have eliminated the second paragraph of article 457 de-
fining levees as banks, apparently to insure that private land-
owners would receive remuneration if the public used areas
above the ordinary water mark. 2
17. LA. CIv. CODE art. 457 (as it appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts, No. 728). See
also LA. CIv. CODE art. 456, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728.
18. See The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1977 Regular Ses-
sion-Property, 38 LA. L. REv. 62, 75-80 (1977), which discusses the historical back-
ground concerning the mistranslation from French into English. See also Proposed
Revision of the Civil Code: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil Code Revision of
the House Comm. on Civil Law and Procedure, 4th Reg. Sess. (Jan. 17, 1978) (state-
ment of Professor A. N. Yiannopoulos).
19. See The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1977 Regular Session-
Property, supra note 18, at 75-80.
20. Id.
21. See Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637 (1922). See also State v.
Richardson, 140 La. 329, 72 So. 984 (1916); Morgan v. Livingston, 6 Mart. (O.S.) 19
(La. 1819); State v. Cockrell, 162 So. 2d 361 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
22. See Proposed Revision of the Civil Code: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Civil Code Revision of the House Comm. on Civil Law and Procedure, 4th Reg. Sess.
(Jan. 17, 1978) (statement of Professor A. N. Yiannopoulos.)
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The 1978 version of article 456 produces a significant
change in that banks are still defined as the area between the
ordinary low and the ordinary high water mark in accord with
previous Louisiana jurisprudence, but levees are only defined
as banks when they are in proximity to the water.3 As a result,
levees which are a considerable distance from the water, which
are fairly common under present conditions,24 are no longer
considered banks. Since the bank of a navigable river is a pri-
vate thing subject to a servitude of public use, 5 the levee provi-
sion seems to favor private landowners by diminishing the area
constituting banks and thus decreasing the land subject to
public use.26
Article 458 as amended by Act 728 reproduces the sub-
stance of Civil Code article 861 by stating that works built
without a permit on public things such as the sea, the seashore,
the bottoms of natural navigable waters, or the banks of navig-
able rivers may be removed at the expense of those who built
them, if such works obstruct the public use. Public authorities
or anyone residing in the state may require such removal, and
the owner of the works cannot use prescription or possession as
a defense.27 However, revised article 460 provides that state
port commissions or municipalities have the authority to con-
23. Id.
24. See Mayer v. Board of Comm'rs, 177 La. 1119, 150 So. 295 (1933), in which
the court stated:
When article 457, defining the banks of rivers, was carried into the present
Code . . . , levees . . . were small affairs and were generally constructed close
to the river, say between 60 feet and an acre or two. The levees could then serve
with some degree of exactness as the banks of the river, and may do so, in many
instances, now. Today, however, the levees are usually built much larger, and
not infrequently some distance from the natural bank of the river . . . . To
apply the codal definition of the banks of a river, and thereby make, with the
aid of article 453 . . . , all land lying between the levee and the river a part of
the bed of the river, and a public thing, no longer available for private use,
without reservation or qualification, to present methods of building levees,
would be going further than the Legislature ever intended by its enactment.
25. According to LA. Cjv. CODE art. 665 (as it appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts,
No. 728), the law imposes a servitude for the common utility on lands abutting naviga-
ble streams for construction and repair of levees, roads and other purposes. See also
Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452, 463 (1896); Ruch v. New Orleans, 43 La. Ann.
275, 9 So. 473 (1891); Morgan v. Livingston, 6 Mart. (O.S.) 19, 235, 236 (La. 1819).
26. See Mayer v. Board of Comm'rs, 177 La. 1123, 150 So. 299 (1933).
27. See Yiannopoulos, The Public Use of the Banks of Navigable Rivers in
Louisiana, 31 LA. L. REV. 563, 579-85 (1971).
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struct navigation facilities on public places within their juris-
dictions.2 8 In addition, according to revised article 459, a build-
ing encroaching on the public way may remain if it does not
inhibit the public use and can not be removed without great
damage to its owner.2"
IMMOVABLES
Of special interest to practitioners is the elimination of the
categories of immovables by nature, immovables by destina-
tion, and immovables by their object.30 Classifying things
merely as movables or immovables should greatly simplify the
entire practice of law because the division of things affects not
only property law but also "carries consequences in the fields
of obligations, family law, successions, civil procedure, taxa-
tion, criminal law and conflict of laws. ''31 The division of things
into movables and immovables was retained, and the distinc-
tion remains significant in understanding the scope, acquisi-
tion, protection, and transfer of rights.32
The revision's entire section concerning immovables, arti-
cles 462-470, was completely rewritten, but only some articles
28. Prior to its amendment, the bill stated that municipalities could, within their
jurisdictions, construct and maintain works necessary for public utility on public
places, in the beds of natural navigable water bodies, and on their banks or shores.
Examples included buildings, wharves, and other facilities for the mooring of vessels
and loading or discharging of cargo and passengers. However, after its amendment by
the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure, the bill gave this authority to the
state port commissions, and only in the absence of port commissions having jurisdic-
tion, can municipalities exercise these powers.
29. LA. Civ. CODE art. 459, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728, further pro-
vides that if such a building is demolished from any cause, the owner is bound to
restore to the public the part of the way upon which the building stood.
30. LA. Civ. CODE art. 463 (as it appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts, No. 728) listed
the kinds of immovables as immovables by nature, by destination, and by the object
to which they are applied. Immovables are now only classified as corporeal or incorpo-
real according to LA. Civ. CODE art. 461, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728.
31. Yiannopoulos, Movables and Immovables in Louisiana and Comparative
Law, 22 LA. L. REv. 517, 517 (1962). See also Expose des Motifs of 1978 La. Acts, No.
728, at 9.
32. Yiannopoulos, supra note 31, at 517 n.4. Professor Yiannopoulos gives the
following examples of areas which are affected by the division of movables and immov-
ables: "Civil Code articles 600-708 (legal servitudes); articles 3472-3477 (acquisitive
prescription); articles 1536, 1539, 2440, 2441 (formalities of transfer); articles 3191-3251
(privileges); articles 3278-3471 (mortgages); articles 3176-3181 (antichresis); and arti-
cles 3133-3175 (pledges) of the Civil Code of 1870." Id.
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represent substantive changes in the law while others merely
codify Louisiana jurisprudence. Revised article 462 codifies
prior law by stating that tracts of land, with their component
parts, are immovables.13 Revised article 463 defines these com-
ponent parts as "buildings, other constructions permanently
attached to the ground, standing timber, and unharvested
crops or ungathered fruits of trees. . . when they belong to the
owner of the ground."34
The practical significance of the term "component part"
is that an alienation or encumbrance of the land will include
the component parts. However, it should be noted that the
revision states that constructions permanently attached to the
ground, other than buildings, are component parts only when
they belong to the owner of the ground-they are movables
when they belong to another person. 5 According to revised arti-
33. LA. CIv. CODE art. 462, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728. LA. CIv. CODE
art. 464 (as it appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts, No. 728) designated land, buildings,
and other constructions as immovables by nature, whether or not they had their
foundations in the soil. Since the revision designates them as simply immovables,
which only serves as a clarification or conceptual tool rather than as a substantive
change in the law, the Louisiana jurisprudence concerning article 464 remains relevant.
See LA. CiV. CODE art. 462, comment, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728.
34. LA. CiV. CODE art. 463, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728, defining the
component parts of a tract of land, is based on LA. CiV. CODE arts. 464 and 465 (as
they appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts, No. 728). LA. Civ. CODE art. 465 (as it appeared
prior to 1978 La. Acts, No. 728) provided:
Standing crops and fruits of trees not gathered, and trees before they are
cut down, are likewise immovable and are considered as part of the land to
which they are attached.
As soon as the crop is cut, and the fruits gathered, or the trees cut down,
although not yet carried off, they are movables.
If a part only of the crop be cut down, that part only is movable.
Some examples of "other constructions permanently attached to the ground," as
construed by Louisiana courts, are: American Creosote Co. v. Springer, 257 La. 116,
241 So. 2d 510 (1970) (railroad tracks); Prevot v. Courtney, 241 La. 313, 129 So. 2d 1
(1961) (tractor and poultry house); Ellis v. Dillon, 345 So. 2d 1241 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1977) (a mobile home); Bailey v. Kruithoff, 280 So. 2d 262 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973) (a
fence); Industrial Outdoor Displays v. Reuter, 162 So. 2d 160 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
The Ellis case states that what constitutes a building or other construction qualifying
as an immovable is to be judicially determined based on societal needs at the time.
Three criteria have generally been used to determine whether an object is an "other
construction:" the size of the structure; the degree of integration or attachment to the
soil; and, most importantly, the degree of permanency. Telerent Leasing Corp. v. R
and P Motels, Inc., 343 So. 2d 267 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Benoit v. Acadia Fuel and
Oil Distrib., Inc., 315 So. 2d 842 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 320 So. 2d 550
(La. 1975).
35. See comment to LA. CIv. CODE art. 464, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No.
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cle 464, only buildings and standing timber are separate
immovables when they belong to a person other than the owner
of the ground. Therefore, if buildings and standing timber be-
long to a lessee rather than the owner of the ground, then these
immovables are not component parts. These things would
clearly be separate immovables, and in the event of an aliena-
tion or encumbrance of the land by the owner, the lessee would
be protected because separate immovables do not pass with the
land. The revised article encourages economic growth and land
development by facilitating leasing. "
Revised article 465 is a new version of the principle that
things such as building materials which are incorporated into
a tract of land, a building, or an "other construction" and
become an integral part of it are considered its component
parts. Also retained is the jurisprudential idea that movables
incorporated into a tract of land or building become part of the
immovable regardless of whether the owner or the lessee has
incorporated them.37
Revised article 466 creates a substantive change in the law
by eliminating the "use or convenience of the building" test for
component parts as well as the "unity of ownership" require-
ment, except when an immovable by declaration exists as pro-
vided in revised article 467. Former article 467 provided that
fixtures connected or attached to a building by its owner for its
use or convenience were immovables by nature.:" Revised arti-
36. See Proposed Revision of the Civil Code: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Civil Code Revision of the House Comm. on Civil Law and Procedure, 4th Reg. Sess.
(Jan. 17, 1978) (statement of Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos). Professor Yiannopoulos
gives shopping centers and individual lot development as examples envisioned by LA.
CiV. CODE art. 464. According to the Louisiana Condominium Act, LA. R.S. 9:1121
(Supp. 1974), a unit in a condominium is also a separate immovable.
37. See Lighting Fixture Co. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 176 La. 499, 146 So. 35
(1932). Immobilization under LA. CIv. CODE art. 465, as amended by 1978 La. Acts,
No. 728, is inoperative when the law provides otherwise. An example is LA. R.S. 9:5357
(1950), which states that a movable subject to a chattel mortgage remains a movable
and does not pass with a sale of the immovable property.
38. LA. CIV. CODE art. 467 (as it appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts, No. 728). In
Lafleur v. Foret, 213 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968), one court in interpreting this
article held that portable window unit air conditioners, with racks attached to window
sills by two screws, and small doghouses were "movables" that did not pass with the
sale of the house, but the chicken brooder sheds were "immovables" that did pass with
the sale.
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 466, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728, which reads:
Things permanently attached to a building or other construction, such as
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cle 466 does not require that there be unity of ownership or that
a component part be attached for the use or convenience of the
building.39 Instead, the only requirement for a component part
under revised article 466 is that the thing be permanently at-
tached to the building. "Things are considered permanently
attached if they cannot be removed without substantial dam-
age to themselves or to the immovable to which they are at-
tached."' 0 The result of revised article 466 is that purchasers
of property are protected against lessees who have installed
such items as electrical devices and intend to remove them.
Buyers can now assume that any device incorporated into a
building was installed by the owner and will pass with the sale,
unless the public records prove otherwise. The revised article
not only simplifies the law in this area, but also abolishes im-
movables by destination, a category which has burdened the
courts by requiring a case-by-case definition."
Practitioners should note that revised article 467 makes
some changes in the category of immovables by declaration.
Article 467 now states:
The owner of an immovable may declare that machinery,
appliances, and equipment owned by him and placed on
the immovable, other than his private residence, for its
service and improvement are deemed to be its component
parts. The declaration shall be filed for registry in the
plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical or other installations are the component
parts.
Things are considered permanently attached if they cannot be removed
without substantial damage to themselves or to the immovable to which they
are attached.
39. See comments to LA. CIv. CODE art. 466, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No.
728.
40. LA. CiV. CODE art. 466, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728.
41. See Hilltop Bowl, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 248 F. Supp.
572 (D.C. 1966); Indoor Displays v. Reuter, 162 So. 2d 160 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 246 La. 348, 164 So. 2d 352 (1964) (stating that a movable does not become
immobilized unless it is placed on or attached to real estate by the owner, or by his
direction, for its service and improvement); Chestnut v. Hammatt, 157 So. 2d 915 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1963) (holding that a bulk milk tank on a farm was an "immovable by
destination" and usually would pass with the land as an improvement). According to
the jurisprudence, the elements of an immovable by destination were that the object
must be: 1) an accessory to the property, 2) employed in service of such.property, and
3) placed there by one who owned both the property and the accessory. See Louisiana
Dept. of Highways v. Thompson, 188 So. 2d 753 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
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conveyance records of the parish in which the immovable
is located.42
This provision expands the concept of a section of the Louisi-
ana Revised Statutes dealing with industrial establishments"'
to include all immovables except private residences." Contrary
to the area of immovables by incorporation, immobilization by
declaration is subject to the same unity of ownership require-
ment as was immobilization by destination under prior article
468(1).15 Consequently, the major difference between the two
types of immobilization is that immobilization by declaration
can take effect only by declaration of the owner while pre-
viously immobilization by destination took place by operation
of law.4" An owner may still immobilize the movables which he
uses as part of his immovable, but he must declare his intent
to do so rather than rely on the operation of law.47
Revised article 468 codifies Louisiana jurisprudence by
outlining three instances where deimmobilization occurs: 1)
Where component parts of an immovable are so damaged or
deteriorated that they can no longer be useful to the land or
buildings; 2) Where the owner deimmobilizes the component
parts of an immovable by an act translative of ownership and
delivers such parts to an acquirer in good faith who does not
know that he is acquiring the component parts of an immova-
ble; or 3) Where the rights of third persons are not involved and
the owner deimmobilizes things by detachment or removal."
Revised article 469 is an important provision concerning
42. LA. CIv. CODE art. 467, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728.
43. LA. R.S. 9:1104 (1950) states that an owner may file a declaration, for pur-
poses of mortgage and sale, to the effect that machinery and appliances are to be
considered part of the land and thus immovables by destination.
44. See Proposed Revision of the Civil Code: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Civil Code Revision of the House Comm. on Civil Law and Procedure, 4th Reg. Sess.
(Jan. 17, 1978) (statement of Professor A. N. Yiannopoulos). Residences are exempted
to prevent money lenders from taking advantage of the general public by incorrectly
stating that a mortgage on a private residence includes all objects in the home.
45. For cases discussing the unity of ownership requirement for immovables by
destination, see note 41, supra.
46. See Proposed Revision of the Civil Code: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Civil Code Revision of the House Comm. on Civil Law and Procedure, 4th Reg. Sess.
(Jan. 17, 1978) (statement of Professor A. N. Yiannopoulos).
47. Id.
48. LA. CIv. CODE art. 468, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728.
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the relationship between an immovable and its component
parts, and it states that "the transfer or encumbrance of an
immovable includes its component parts."4 Nevertheless, one
with a pre-existing right to a component part of an immovable
may assert that right against a third person if an appropriate
instrument has been filed for registry in the parish where the
immovable is located 0
The last new provision in the section on immovables, arti-
cle 470, defines incorporeal immovables as "rights and actions
that apply to immovable things."5' This changes the law by no
longer classifying an action for the recovery of an entire succes-
sion as an immovable, but instead allowing classification to
depend upon the object of the action.52
MOVABLES
Similar to its treatment of immovables, the revision mod-
ernizes codal language dealing with movables. Revised article
471 defines corporeal movables as animate or inanimate things
that move or can be moved from one place to another. 3 Incor-
poreal movables are defined as rights, obligations, and actions,
such as bonds and annuities, that relate to a corporeal mova-
ble." Materials used to erect a new building or other construc-
tion, even though derived from the demolition of an old
building, are movables until after their incorporation into the
new building or until after construction.5 However, materials
separated from a building or other construction to repair, add,
or alter it, with the intention of putting them back, remain
immovables. 51 Revised article 4745? codifies the holdings of
49. LA. CIv. CODE art. 469, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728.
50. Id.
51. LA. CIv. CODE art. 470, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728. Examples of
incorporeal immovables are illustratively listed as "personal servitudes established on
immovables, predial servitudes, mineral rights, and petitory or possessory actions."
52. See comments to LA. CIv. CODE art. 470, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No.
728.
53. LA. CIv. Cone art. 471, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728.
54. LA. CIv. CODE art. 473, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728. Article 473
further states: "Interests or shares in a juridical person that owns immovables are
considered as movables as long as the entity exists; upon its dissolution, the right of
each individual to a share in the immovables is an immovable."
55. LA. Civ. CODE art. 472, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728.
56. Id.
57. LA. CIv. CoDE art. 474, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728, states:
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Citizens Bank v. Wiltz55 and Succession of Minter."U Wiltz clas-
sified unharvested crops and ungathered fruits of trees as mov-
ables by anticipation when they belong to one other than the
landowner or when they are encumbered by the rights of third
parties. Minter held that a landowner's act of deimmobiliza-
tion must be recorded to be effective against third persons.",
Revised article 475 states the basic principle that all things
which are not considered immovables are movables.
Unharvested crops and ungathered fruits of trees are movables by anticipa-
tion when they belong to a person other than the landowner. When encumbered
with security rights of third persons, they are movables by anticipation insofar
as the creditor is concerned.
The landowner, by act translative of ownership or by pledge, mobilizes by
anticipation unharvested crops and ungathered fruits of trees that belong to.
him.
58. 31 La. Ann. 244 (1879).
59. 180 La. 38, 156 So. 167 (1934).
60. See also comments to LA. Civ. CODE art. 474, as amended by 1978 La. Acts,
No. 728.
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SECURITY DEVICES
New provisions in the area of security devices concern
pledges of alternative deposits to financial institutions; a pled-
gor's use or disposition of a pledged incorporeal without ac-
counting to the pledgee; exemptions from the vendor's privi-
lege' and the usury law; and investments in real estate mort-
gages.
I According to Act 703, the most important of the new provi-
sions, a pledgor of an incorporeal can collect an account receiv-
able, exercise contract rights, or use or dispose of any proceeds
without invalidating the pledge or defrauding his creditors,
regardless of whether he is required to account to the pledgee
for the proceeds and regardless of whether the pledge is evi-
denced in writing.2 The new provision eliminates an area of
uncertainty by making-it clear that in a pledge of an incorpo-
real, the mere fact that the pledgee allows the pledgor to re-
ceive or enjoy the proceeds will not render an otherwise valid
pledge ineffective or fraudulent.
Also relating to pledges, Act 586 provides that, absent a
specific contractual provision to the contrary, any person with
a right to make withdrawals from a joint deposit may validly
pledge all or part of the entire deposit to a bank, savings bank,
or trust company.' Act 586 includes, but is not limited to, time
and savings accounts and certificates of deposit.'
Another change during the session concerns domestic in-
surers who are presently prohibited from investing directly or
indirectly in loans that are not secured by a first mortgage or
a privilege on the property.' Act 454 creates an exception which
permits an insurer to acquire a second mortgage and treats it
as equivalent to a first mortgage if the following requirements
are met:
1. 1978 La. Acts, No. 609, adding LA. R.S. 9:4544, exempts fresh and frozen
vegetables, seafood, and other perishable food products from the vendor's privilege.
2. 1978 La. Acts, No. 703, adding LA. R.S. 9:4324.
3. 1978 La. Acts, No. 586, adding LA. R.S. 6:32(E).
4. Id.
5. LA. R.S. 22:844(A), (H) (Supp. 1977) (as it appeared prior to Act 454 of 1978).
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1. The insurer who makes or acquires the second mort-
gage loan also holds the first mortgage loan on the immov-
able property, and there are no intervening liens;
2. The total of the balance due on the original loan and
the amount of the additional loan does not exceed a cer-
tain set percentage of the appraised value of the immova-
ble property.'
Permitting investment for such second mortgages should facili-
tate domestic insurance investments without prejudicing the
basic integrity of the policy against second mortgage financing.
Before the amendment the same result could have been ob-
tained through refinancing the first mortgage debt and consoli-
dating it with the second mortgage loan, and the Act eliminates
this needlessly expensive procedure.
Revised Statutes 9:3504 provides that mortgage loans in-
sured or guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration or
the Veterans Administration are not usurious if the interest
rates charged are not in excess of those permitted by the regula-
tions of these agencies and are agreed to by the parties in
writing. Act 621 extends the benefit of this provision to loans
which, although "eligible" to be guaranteed or insured by such
agencies, have been turned down for some reason other than an
excessive rate of interest The Act does not specifically define
"eligible" for guarantee or insurance, but rather refers to the
statutory provisions governing the Federal Housing Adminis-
tration and the Veterans Administration.8 The regulations are
so extensive that it is difficult to imagine why an "eligible"
loan would be turned down. However, if a loan is denied be-
cause it is "ineligible," then the Act's usury exemption will not
apply. Consequently, unless "eligible" loans are frequently
denied, the scope of the Act seems limited.
6. 1978 La. Acts, No. 454, amending LA. R.S. 22:844(A), (H) (Supp. 1977).
7. 1978 La. Acts, No. 621, amending LA. R.S. 9:3504,(Supp. 1969).
8. National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1709(b) (1977). Veteran's Benefits Act,
Pub. L. No. 85-857, §§ 1801-17, 72 Stat. 1203 (1958) (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 1801-17
(1976)). To be "eligible" for mortgage insurance a mortgagee must be approved as
responsible and capable of servicing the mortgage. In addition, the terms of the mort-
gage must meet numerous technical requirements relating to amount, duration, inter-
est, insurance, etc.
1978]
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CORPORATIONS
Several provisions concerning corporations were passed
during the 1978 legislative session. Possibly the most notewor-
thy addition to Louisiana corporate law is the increased power
of state and local political subdivisions to create nonprofit cor-
porations, especially for economic development purposes.
A new chapter, known as the Cooperative Economic De-
velopment Law, was added to title 33 of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes.' It authorizes the state, its local political subdivi-
sions, and public corporations to participate with one another,
federal agencies, and others in cooperative endeavors designed
to alleviate unemployment or underemployment through
"cooperative financing ' 2 or "cooperative development."' 3
A nonprofit economic development corporation may be
created upon the application of at least three persons either to
the legislature or to the governing authority of a local govern-
mental subdivision.' After the application is submitted, but
before it is approved, the proposed corporation must send its
economic development plans to state and regional
"clearinghouses" for review.' The local governing authority
must consider any clearinghouse comments and hold ,a public
hearing' before it can vote on the need for such a corporation.
1. 1978 La. Acts, No. 617, adding LA. R.S. 33:9020-31 (Chapter 27).
2. LA. R.S. 33:9022(2), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 617, defines "cooperative
financing" as "any method of financing an economic development project between
. . . the state [and) its local governmental subdivisions . . . . Said methods shall
include loans, loan guarantees, land writedowns, grants, lease guarantees or any form
of financial subsidy or incentive."
3. LA. R.S. 33:9022(3), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 617, defines "cooperative
development" as "any method of cooperative development between . . . the state
[and] its local governmental subdivisions . . . . Said methods shall include any
number of joint development agreements such as condominiums and cooperative own-
ership limited partnerships and investment syndicates."
4. LA. R.S. 33:9023(B), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 617. An application must
contain the articles of incorporation, the bylaws, a description of the proposed corpo-
rate structure, a listing of assets, a proposed economic development plan, an overall
policy, the geographic location of the corporation, and a statement of whether the
proposed corporation will request any assistance from other public or private associa-
tions or individuals. Id.
5. LA. R.S. 33:9023(F), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 617.
6. LA. R.S. 33:9023(E), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 617.
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After the approval of the application, the governing authority
may provide funds for the corporation.7
The economic corporation has a wide range of powers,' but
it must operate as a private nonprofit corporation9 and file an
annual report available for public inspection with the proper
governing authority.'0 Every economic development plan is
subject to annual review and reapproval by the governing au-
thority," and the failure to submit a plan or the rejection of it
by the governing authority will result in the termination of the
corporation as a matter of law.'"
Neither the state nor any local political subdivision is lia-
ble for any actions of this type of corporation,'3 and any judg-
ment against the corporation must be paid from corporate
funds, even though corporate property and funds are exempt
from seizure.' 4 Purchasers or lessees who obtain real property
from the corporation must devote the property only to the uses
mentioned in the economic development plan and must com-
ply with other requirements of the corporation, including the
obligation to begin improvements within a reasonable time.'5
These economic development corporations should aid in reduc-
ing the state's unemployment by providing a vehicle with
which to attack the problem.
Another piece of legislation concerning nonprofit corpora-
tions is Act 203, which makes the limitations on incorporation
of nonprofit corporations inapplicable to local political subdivi-
sions with populations in excess of 150,000, or to their boards,
commissions, or departments.'" Additionally, although subsec-
7. LA. R.S. 33:9023(G), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 617.
8. LA. R.S. 33:9023(C), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 617. The economic corpora-
tion's powers include, but are not limited to, the power to sue and to be sued; to adopt,
amend and repeal bylaws; to purchase, lease, mortgage, bequeath or otherwise dis-
pose of any real or personal property; to issue revenue bonds which are exempt from
all taxes; to contract, to apply for loans from any source and to give security as re-
quired; to invest funds not required for immediate use; and to designate economic
development areas. Id.
9. LA. R.S. 33:9024, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 617.
10. LA. R.S. 33:9025, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 617.
11. LA. R.S. 33:9026, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 617.
12. Id.
13. LA. R.S. 33:9027, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 617.
14. LA. R.S. 33:9028, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 617.
15. LA. R.S. 33:9029, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 617.
16. 1978 La. Acts, No. 203, adding LA. R.S. 12:202.1(D). LA. R.S. 12:202.1 (Supp.
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tion (C) of the present statute allows the creation of quasi-
public nonprofit corporations with the right to issue both nego-
tiable revenue bonds and other obligations not in excess of one
million dollars," new subsection (D) gives the corporations cre-
ated by local political subdivisions the right to issue only nego-
tiable revenue bonds.'8 Act 203 provides that all property and
assets owned by these nonprofit corporations shall be exempt
from state and local taxation, including ad valorem taxes. It
further states that these quasi-public nonprofit corporations
are subject to the public contract, public meeting, and public
records laws.
In a different area of corporate law, the legislature passed
Act 178,1 which prohibits corporations from making campaign
contributions without specific authorization from the board of
directors or from an executive officer acting with board authori-
zation. The Act also provides that all contributions, except
those in kind, must be made by check. Neither of these provi-
sions departs from prior law, but the Act does make a needed
change, which should promote greater public accountability,
by extending the applicability of the regulations to labor corpo-
rations; profit and nonprofit corporations; and trade, business,
or professional associations.
Act 181 adds new provisions to the several titles in the
Louisiana Revised Statutes which regulate deceptive advertis-
ing.1° The new provisions prohibit a profit-making corporation
1970) presently outlines the limitations on the formation of nonprofit corporations.
State boards, commissions, and departments are forbidden to incorporate any non-
profit corporation with a public or quasi-public function if any bonds or other forms
of corporate indebtedness will be issued, unless certain relevant information has first
been submitted to and approved by the legislature. Such information includes: the
purpose of the proposed corporation; the amount of bonds it will issue; the method of
financing the bonds, including, but not limited to, the term of the bonds; the interest
and other charges; and the purpose of the issuance of the bonds. One exception to these
limitations on nonprofit corporations is found in LA. R.S. 12:202.1(C) (Supp. 1970),
which allows the city of Baton Rouge and East Baton Rouge Parish to grant permits
or franchises to a public transportation corporation without following these procedures.
17. LA. R.S. 12:202.1(C) (Supp. 1970).
18. LA. R.S. 12:202.1(D), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 203. Both LA. R.S.
12:202.1(C) (Supp. 1970) and LA. R.S. 12:202.1(D) (Supp. 1978) limit the total issu-
ance of the negotiable revenue bonds (or the other obligations, if allowed) to one
million dollars at a tax exempt interest rate not in excess of eight per cent per annum.
19. 1978 La. Acts, No. 178, amending LA. R.S. 18:1488(C) (Supp. 1975).
20. 1978 La. Acts, No. 181, amending LA. R.S. 12:23 (Supp. 1968), and LA. R.S.
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or organization from using any corporate name, trademark, or
trade name which deceptively or falsely suggests a charitable
or nonprofit nature. The Secretary of State is prohibited from
registering or allowing the use of a deceptive name and is au-
thorized to establish all review procedures necessary to effec-
tuate the intent of the Act.2'
51:212-13 (Supp. 1976). For a general discussion of section 23 of the Louisiana Business
Corporation Act, see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974
Term-Corporations, 35 LA. L. REv. 341-42 (1975).
21. LA. R.S. 12:213, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 181.
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FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Legislative changes concerning financial institutions
should increase the ease with which commercial transactions
may be accomplished, affording greater power and protection
to financial institutions.
Act 153 facilitates monetary exchanges by increasing from
$5,000 to $7,500 the amount which a bank, credit union, or
other depository may pay to a surviving spouse without a court
proceeding.' The surviving spouse can avoid the delays inher-
ent in a court proceeding by giving an affidavit to the deposi-
tory stating that the total funds withdrawn from all deposito-
ries do not exceed $7,500. According to Hornsby v. Fidelity
National Bank of Baton Rouge,I the surviving spouse may draw
upon either the decedent's deposits or community deposits as
a source of available funds to continue community affairs; to
.meet the needs of the surviving spouse and other dependents
of the decedent; and to defray the costs of the decedent's illness
or funeral and other reasonable expenses.3 The duty of a bank
to allow withdrawal was construed to be permissive, not man-
datory,' but the financial institution's discretion may not be
exercised arbitrarily.' Since Act 153 merely increases the
amount which may be withdrawn and was perhaps only passed
in an effort to accommodate the rising cost of living for a sur-
viving spouse, prior jurisprudence should remain relevant.
Act 5476 is an important relaxation of banking association
requirements. Although the Act does not change the provision
1. 1978 La. Acts, No. 153, amending LA. R.S. 9:1513-14 (Supp. 1974).
2. 243 So. 2d 96 (La. App. lst Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 258 La. 215, 245 So. 2d
411 (1971).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. In Hornsby, the court held that where the surviving wife made no claim
of need until 18 months after her spouse's death, and her claim to deposits in the name
of decedent was disputed by the executrix of the estate, it was within the bank's
discretion to refuse withdrawal.
6. 1978 La. Acts, No. 547, amending LA. R.S. 6:249(E) (Supp. 1974), and LA.
R.S. 6:326(E) (Supp. 1974).
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that cash items in transit7 or in the process of collection" are
not considered part of the reserve fund,' it increases from thirty
to fifty per cent the maximum percentage of required reserves
which may be hpld in the form of investments that are direct
obligations of the state and federal governments and mature
within two years from the date of the reserve computation. 0
The Act reiterates the requirement that both types of govern-
mental securities must be owned by the bank as of the date of
the computation and cannot be subject to pledge, right of re-
purchase, or any method of hypothecation."
Act 547 deletes the previous requirement that the remain-
der of a banking association's liabilities for demand deposits be
offset by an amount equal to its liabilities either in United
States currency; in cash due from other banks, bills of ex-
change, or discounted paper maturing within not more than
one year; or in federal, state, levee board, municipality, or
municipal corporate bonds, stocks, or securities.2 Although
this provision was not being used by state banks at the time of
its deletion, there was a possibility that it would be misused.
The clause allowing the banks to hold "discounted paper ma-
turing within not more than one year" could have been inter-
preted to allow the use of a loan, a risk asset, as part of the
required reserve. Since this was not the intent of the statute,
the provision was deleted.
A further legislative change encourages consumer protec-
tion by including deferral charges within the Louisiana Con-
sumer Credit Law's definition of a "loan finance charge,"'"
thereby facilitating consumer recovery of prepayment rebates.
Act 761 provides that deferral charges must be rebated upon
7. See LA. R.S. 6:326(A)(4) (Supp. 1974), which states that "cash items in
transit" are items in the process of collection.
8. See LA. R.S. 6:326(A)(5) (Supp. 1974), which defines "cash items in process
of collection" as items which are going to be collected or credited within twenty-four
hours or less.
9. 1978 La. Acts, No. 547, amending LA. R.S. 6:249(E) (Supp. 1974), and LA.
R.S. 6:326(E) (Supp. 1974).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 1978 La. Acts, No. 761, amending LA. R.S. 9:3516(20) (Supp. 1972), and LA.
R.S. 9:3528 (Supp. 1972). The Louisiana Consumer Credit Law is found in LA. R.S.
9:3510 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
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prepayment on the same basis as loan finance charges.'4 The
Act retains the definition of "loan finance charge" as the sum
of all charges payable by the consumer and imposed by the
lender, as well as the charges paid by the consumer for investi-
gating his credit worthiness.' 5 Only default and delinquent
charges are not covered by the term "loan finance charge,"
and, therefore, these charges are not subject to prepayment
rebates on the same basis.
Act 412 broadens the public records exception to the evi-
dentiary hearsay rule by authorizing banks to install photo-
static copying machinery to supplement the present use of mi-
crofilm.'" The Act provides that a photostatic copy will be
deemed an original record for all purposes and will be admissi-
ble evidence in all courts.
14. 1978 La. Acts, No. 761, amending LA. R.S. 9:3528 (Supp. 1972). The method
for computing the unearned loan finance charge which must be rebated upon prepay-
ment is either the "rule of 78's" or the "sum of the digits" method. The lender must
refund the unearned loan finance charge and the refund must represent at least as
great a proportion of the total charge (after deducting a prepayment charge of not more
than twenty-five dollars) as the sum of the remaining monthly balances (beginning one
month after prepayment is made) bears to the sum of all the monthly balances under
the contract's schedule of payments.
15. 1978 La. Acts, No. 761, amending LA. R.S. 9:3516(20) (Supp. 1972).
16. 1978 La. Acts, No. 412, amending LA. R.S. 6:69 (1950).
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SALES
Act 164, a "book" bill' proposed by the, Law Institute,
adopts articles 7 and 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code with
minor modifications. The Act affects warehouse receipts, bills
of lading, and other documents of title and produces a major
change in the law which should facilitate interstate business
transactions. The complex implications of this legislation are
beyond the scope of this brief symposium article.
One of the bills which passed during this legislative session
and affects the law of sales is Act 212, which retains the bulk
sales law's requirement that the transferee in a bulk sales con-
tract personally notify every creditor2 of the terms of the pro-
posed transfer; the consideration paid; and the time, terms,
and conditions of the sale. The transferee must send this notifi-
cation to each creditor at least ten days before the completion
of the transfer or the payment of any consideration.' The Act
restates the present provision that any creditor whose name has
been omitted from the statement notifying creditors can give
written notice of his claim to the transferee, thereby entitling
him to share equally with other notified creditors in any pro-
ceeds.' In addition to these provisions, Act 212 further requires
the transferee to advertise the date, place, and time of the sale
in the official journal of the parish where the business is located
at least fifteen days before the completion of the transfer.5
One piece of legislation somewhat related to sales is Act
692, the Louisiana Abandoned Animals Act, which defines an
"abandoned animal" as one whose owner has not paid the
charges for veterinarian services or for boarding within thirty
1. A "book" bill is one proposing a major change in the law. See the introduction
to The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1977 Regular Session, 38 LA. L. REv.
51, 52 n.6 (1977).
2. 1978 La. Acts, No. 212, amending LA. R.S. 9:292(C) (1950), retains the re-
quirement that the transferee in a bulk sales contract must personally notify every
creditor who is listed or of whom the transferee has knowledge or could, with reasonable
diligence, acquire knowledge. The notification must be by registered or certified mail.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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days after receiving the invoice.' After thirty days, the veteri-
narian may give notice by registered or certified mail that if the
animal is not claimed within ten days after receipt of the no-
tice, the animal may be sold, donated to a humane society or
pound, or euthanized.7 If the notice cannot be delivered, then
it must be published in a newspaper of general circulation
where the custodian of the animal is doing business.' The
owner's receipt of notice or publication relieves the custodian
of any liability for the animal. If the animal is sold, the pro-
ceeds will be applied to the delinquent bill, and the balance, if
any, will belong to the animal's owner If the sale brings less
than is owed, the custodian can proceed against the owner for
the deficiency.' 0 Prior to sale or other disposition, the owner can
reclaim the animal by paying all charges and costs."
6. 1978 La. Acts, No. 692, adding LA. R.S. 3:2451-54.
7. LA. R.S. 3:2453(A), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 692.
8. LA. R.S. 3:2453(B), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 692.
9. LA. R.S. 3:2454(A), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 692.
10. Id.
11. LA. R.S. 3:2454(B), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 692.
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PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
STATE CONTRACTS
The 1978 amendments to the statutes concerning state
contracts significantly restrict those contracts not subject to
public bid requirements. Act 772' establishes new procedures
for the letting of contracts for personal, professional, and con-
sulting services by the state or its agencies. Consulting service
contracts of more than $75,000-for feasibility studies, research
projects, and similar work-must be put through a competitive
negotiation process pursuant to regulations of the newly cre-
ated Office of Contractual Review. This office will be within
the Office of Division of Administration and will be headed by
a director appointed by the Commissioner of Administration.
The Act mandates that contracts contain specific information
about the services to be rendered, the time frame within which
the work must be completed, and certification after the con-
tractual review is made that the funds for the project have been
appropriated. The distinction between personal' and profes-
sional3 services is clarified so as to remedy past problems that
have occurred when state agencies have awarded non-bid con-
1. 1978 La. Acts, No. 772, adding LA. R.S. 39:1428-73.
2. 1978 La. Acts, No. 772, adding LA. R.S. 39:1431(15), defines "personal service"
as follows:
"Personal Service" means work rendered by individuals which require use of
creative or artistic skills, such as but not limited to graphic artists, sculptors,
musicians, photographers, and writers, or which require use of highly technical
or unique individual skills or talents, such as, but not limited to, paramedicals,
therapists, handwriting analysts, and expert witnesses for adjudications or other
court proceedings.
3. 1978 La. Acts, No. 772, adding LA. R.S. 39:1431(17) defines "professional
service" as follows:
"Professional Service" means work rendered by an independent contractor
who has a professed knowledge of some department of learning or science used
by its practical application to the affairs of others or in the practice of an art
founded on it, including but not limited to lawyers, doctors, dentists, veterinari-
ans, architects, engineers, landscape architects, and accountants. A profession
is a vocation founded upon prolonged and specialized intellectual training which
enables a particular service to be rendered. The word "$rofessional"' implies
professed attainments in special knowledge as distinguished from mere skill.
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tracts to firms whose services were not of such a creative or
artistic nature as to warrant a non-bid status. The evident
purpose of Act 772 is to structure the competitive negotiation
process followed by state agencies so needed services may be
obtained at the best price. More importantly, an attempt is
made to put an end to the expenditures of tremendous amounts
of money which are often wasted on consulting services that are
of little importance or benefit to the state. 4
The procedure relative to state agency purchases was also
altered by new legislation. Act 5785 prohibits state agencies
from entering into any agreement, including agreements of
lease, lease-purchase, or third party financing, which requires
annual state payments of $100,000 or more, without prior writ-
ten approval of the State Bond Commission. A companion
measure, Act 742,1 was also approved, mandating that multi-
year contracts for the purchase of movable property or equip-
ment be contingent upon a legislative appropriation.7 The re-
quirement of a legislative appropriation is intended to prevent
state agencies from entering into long-term contracts that have
not been approved by the legislature.'
MOTOR VEHICLES
Revised Statutes 32:412 currently provides that every
applicant for an initial driver's license, or renewal thereof every
4. The Act sets particular restrictions on the handling of consulting services.
These restrictions may be in response to a Department of Corrections consultants'
contract for a feasibility study on a prison mental facility in the Orleans area that
raised a House inquiry early in the 1978 regular legislative session.
5. 1978 La. Acts, No. 578, designating LA. R.S. 39:1410.1-.9 as Subpart A of Part
II of Chapter 11 of Title 39 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, and adding
Subpart B thereto.
6. 1978 La. Acts, No. 742, adding LA. R.S..39:171.3.
7. All such contracts will have to contain the following clause:
The continuation of this contract is contingent upon the appropriation of funds
to fulfill the requirements of the contract by the legislature. If the legislature
fails to appropriate sufficient monies to provide for the continuation of the
contract, the contract shall become null and void on the date of the beginning
of the succeeding fiscal year from the one in which the contract was initiated.
Id.
8. Acts 578 and 742 are probably responses to the recent investigation by the
Legislative Audit Advisory Committee into the Division of Administration's controver-
sial lease-purchase agreement for $6 million worth of Honeywell computer equipment.
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two years, must pay a fee of $3.50. Act 311' effects an important
change in the renewal period by extending it from two years to
four years with a lump sum license fee of $7.00.10 The four-
year interval should serve as a convenience to Louisiana drivers
at no extra cost and should result in savings to the state be-
cause of the reduced need for driver's license examiners. Act
311 also provides that out-of-state students who have a valid
driver's license from their home state do not need a Louisiana
driver's license until ninety days after they stop being stu-
dents."
Act 12212 requires the Department of Public Safety to fur-
nish written information concerning gifts pursuant to the Ana-
tomical Gift Act upon the request of any applicant for a driver's
license. This provision aids in the implementation of the Ana-
tomical Gift Act by enabling a person who desires to make
such a donation to include the relevant information on his or
her driver's license. 3
CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE
As a result of the abolition of sovereign immunity in cases
of contract and tort by article 12, section 10, of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974,1' numerous problems have arisen con-
9. 1978 La. Acts, No. 311, amending LA. R.S. 32:404 (1950), 32:409 (1950), 32:412
(Supp. 1970), 32:668(B) (Supp. 1968).
10. LA. R.S. 32:412(A) (Supp. 1970), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 311.
11. 1978 La. Acts, No. 311, amending LA. R.S. 32:404 (1950).
12. 1978 La. Acts, No. 122, adding LA. R.S. 32:410(7).
13. In other action, the legislature enacted Act 35 which eases the restrictions
on the length and weight of multiple axle trucks on Louisiana highways, thereby
benefiting the state's timber industry. 1978 La. Acts, No. 35, amending LA. R.S.
32:382(A), (B) (Supp. 1977), 32:386(I) (Supp. 1977), and adding LA. R.S. 32:386(E-I),
(K). Finally, acts were passed which: (1) define an established place of business as it
pertains to used car dealers, 1978 La. Acts, No. 170, amending LA. R.S. 32:719(B)(3)
(1950); (2) define a "habitual offender" under the motor vehicle habitual offender law,
1978 La. Acts, No. 310, amending LA. R.S. 32:1477(A)(2) (Supp. 1972); and (3) provide
for and expand the definition of "dealer" as used in the vehicle certificate of title law,
1978 La. Acts, No. 631, amending LA. R.S. 32:702(2) (1950).
14. LA. CONST. art. 12, § 10, provides:
(A) Neither the state, a state agency, nor a political subdivision shall be im-
mune from suit and liability in contract or for injury to person or property.
(B) The legislature may authorize other suits against the state, a state agency,
or a political subdivision. A measure authorizing suit shall waive immunity from
suit and liability.
(C) The legislature shall provide a procedure for suits against the state, a state
agency, or a political subdivision. It shall provide for the effect of a judgment,
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cerning who is the proper defendant in an action based on a tort
allegedly committed by a public officer or public employee.
The jurisprudence has been inconsistent in determining
whether the state, a political subdivision, or a particular public
officer is the party properly responsible for torts committed by
public officers and employees.' 5 Until now, the only safe way
but no public property or public funds shall be subject to seizure. No judgment
against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision shall be exigible,
payable, or paid, except from funds appropriated therefor by the legislature or
by the political subdivision against which the judgment is rendered.
15. The major source of trouble in this area lies in determining which employees are
working for which entity of state and local governments, and the supreme court has
done little to establish coherent guidelines.
In Honeycutt v. Town of Boyce, 327 So. 2d 154 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 341 So. 2d 327 (La. 1976), the court of appeals rejected the theory that the
town of Boyce could not be liable for the actions of its town marshall because he was
an elected official over whose actions the town had no control, and the supreme court
agreed that the marshall had been performing a duty incident to his employment with
the town when he committed the alleged tort. 341 So. 2d at 330. However, in Cosenza
v. Aetna Insurance Co., 341 So. 2d 1304 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), the same circuit held
that the judge of a city court was a state officer and that therefore neither the city nor
the parish was liable for the alleged tortious conduct of the judge-appointed clerk. One
of the factors which the court pointed to was the lack of authority in the city and parish
to interfere with or direct the activities of the court. The theory that the city's lack of
authority over the officer prevented the city from being liable was purportedly rejected
in Honeycutt; but the clear implication of Cosenza is that only the state would be liable
for the actions of the clerk, since the clerk was appointed by a state officer.
After Honeycutt and Cosenza, in Foster v. Hampton, 352 So. 2d 197 (La. 1977),
the supreme court held that a deputy sheriff was an employee of the state and hinted
that the doctrine of respondeat superior would be available to hold the state liable for
his actions. In Foster, the plaintiff was injured by a deputy sheriff in an automobile
accident. The court stated that Foster had a remedy against the deputy sheriff and
might further be able to recover from the state, the proper party to sue as employer of
Hampton, the deputy. Id. at 202. The liability of a sheriff for the acts of a deputy was
limited by LA. R.S. 33:1433 (Supp. 1968) to the amount of the liability bond provided
by the deputy unless the tort was committed "in compliance with a direct order of,
and in the personal presence of, the said sheriff .... " The court noted the well-
settled rule that a sheriff is not liable for the acts of his deputies under the doctrine of
respondeat superior because the relationship between the sheriff and his deputy is
"official" and not "private." Hence, a sheriff could be held liable only if the deputy's
act was an "official" one, and driving a car had previously been held not to constitute
an official act in Gray v. De Bretton, 192 La. 628, 188 So. 722 (1939). Moreover, the
court stated that the sheriff would not be liable even if the act were an official one
unless the requirements of LA. R.S. 33:1433 (Supp. 1968) were met. 352 So. 2d at 201.
The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that section 1433 granted immunity
to the sheriff in violation of LA. CONST. art. 12, § 10, stating that the statute merely
provided a restriction on the sheriff's liability to acts over which he had direct control,
and that this restriction had never been based on any theory of governmental immun-
ity. Id. at 202. Finally, the supreme court rejected the contention that the parish was
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to sue a public officer or employee has been to join as a
defendant every entity which could conceivably be held liable,
including the state, any relevant political subdivision, the tort-
feasor, and any public officer in charge of the tortfeasor. In an
effort to clarify some of the confusion resulting from recent
judicial decisions, the legislature enacted Act 318.16
The thrust of Act 318 is twofold: first, it attempts to elimi-
nate the possibility of state liability for the torts of certain
public officers and employees;17 second, it removes the former
limit on the liability of sheriffs for the acts of their deputies.,8
The intent of the Act is to place the potential for liability on
those political subdivisions or public officers most closely re-
lated to the tortfeasor, but the Act does not give any guidelines
for determining which public officer or political subdivision is
to be liable in a particular case. Hence, it will still be up to the
courts to determine which parties should properly be liable for
the torts of a particular officer or employee.
Act 318 makes it clear that the state will not assume liabil-
ity for the acts of every public officer and employee in the state.
The reasons for shifting responsibility away from the state are
vicariously liable, adopting the opinion of the court of appeals which had pointed to
the lack of control of the parish over the activities of the sheriff and his deputies.
These cases do not provide any definite answer to the problem of which govern-
mental entity is liable for the torts of public employees. In Honeycutt, the supreme
court found a town marshall to be a town employee; yet in Foster, the court found that
a deputy sheriff was not an employee of the parish, or at least not of the Sheriff's Office,
but instead was an employee of the state. Moreover, the language of the court in Foster
seemed to indicate that a deputy sheriff might not be considered an employee of the
state under all circumstances. Finally, the ability to control the actions of the tortfea-
sor, while seemingly dispositive in relieving the parishes in Cosenza and Foster, would
hardly provide a rational basis for placing the ultimate liability on the state, which
has even less control over the activities of the tortfeasor.
16. 1978 La. Acts, No. 318, amending LA. R.S. 33:1433(A) (Supp. 1968), and
adding LA. R.S. 42:1441.
17. 1978 La. Acts, No. 318, adding LA. R.S. 42:1441 provides in part:
A. The state of Louisiana shall not be liable for any damage caused by a
district attorney, coroner, assessor, sheriff, clerk of court, or public officer of a
political subdivision within the course and scope of his official duties, or damage
caused by an employee of a district attorney, coroner, assessor, sheriff, clerk of
court, or public officer of a political subdivision.
18. 1978 La. Acts, No. 318, amending LA. R.S. 33:1433(A) (Supp. 1968). Under
the former provisions, a sheriff was not liable for the acts of his deputies beyond the
bond or insurance policy limit required to be furnished by each deputy, unless the act
was in compliance with a direct order of, and in the presence of, the sheriff. This
limitation on liability was eliminated by Act 318.
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readily apparent. The state is in no position to oversee every
public officer and employee, whereas the local political subdi-
visions and public officers may be, and it is more equitable to
put the burden on the locality involved. The local populace,
through the election process, has more control over its public
officers and employees and therefore is in a better position not
only to prevent a tort's occurrence, but also to remedy the
situation when the tortious act has already been committed.
While at first glance it might seem to be more equitable to
spread the costs over the entire state, thus reducing the burden
which befalls the individual taxpayer, this approach does not
address the problem of preventing these torts, because the
voters in one part of the state have no voice in the election
of local public officers-who in turn select their employees-in
another part of the state.
Several problems remain to be solved by the courts.
Though it is now clear that the state will not be liable for the
acts of the enumerated officers and employees, there is no indi-
cation of which other entity should be held liable. In many
cases, political subdivisions lack the power to direct the activi-
ties of the tortfeasor involved, especially where the tortfeasor
is an employee of a public officer. On the other hand, many
public officers lack the financial resources necessary to assume
liability for the torts of the officer's employees. It may well be
that the legislature has attempted to thwart the constitutional
waiver of immunity from liability in tort by placing the
ultimate responsibility on public officers that do not have the
funds necessary to satisfy the immense potential liability. If so,
then unless the courts are able to place the liability on those
who have-the ability to pay, the Act may violate the spirit of
the provisions of the new constitution.
The state's liability for the acts of public employees is also
the subject of Act 611,20 which places a $500,000 limit on the
19. See note 14, supra. In the context of the liability of sheriffs in particular, the
new provisions may prove totally futile. Though the statutory limit on liability has
been removed, the doctrine of "official duty" remains and was in fact used by the
supreme court in Foster. See note 15, supra. Thus, there still remains a barrier to
imposing liability on a sheriff for the torts of his deputy, and many plaintiffs may be
denied proper redress for their injury.
20. !W78 La. Acts, No. 611, amending LA. R.S. 40:1299.39 (Supp. 1976). In the
Special Session of 1977, the legislature adopted a resolution which suspended the
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state's liability for the injury or death of any patient caused
through the negligence of any state health care provider and
provides for indemnification of health care providers working
for or on behalf of the state.2 The Act also instructs the Attor-
ney General to provide an attorney experienced in medical
malpractice claims to act as legal counsel to the Division of
Administration in defense of the claim" and gives the Division
of Administration the right to compromise any claim with the
approval of both the legal counsel and the court.2
One question which immediately arises is whether this
limit on state liability is constitutionally permissible.2 ' The
effect of the limitation is simply to immunize the state from
liability for any amount in excess of $500,000. The clear lan-
guage of the constitution does not call for a partial waiver of
immunity which would allow the state's liability to be limited.
On the other hand, the Act does no more than provide the same
ceiling on liability available to private health care workers
under the Medical Malpractice Act. 5 The constitutional
validity of this act also remains open to question, however, as
operation of LA. R.S. 30:1299.39 (Supp. 1976). LA. H.R. No. 49, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978).
The resolution additionally provided that the state could seek indemnification from
any health care provider for whom the state was adjudged liable, but that such a suit
could not be instituted until the judgment rendered against the state had become
definitive. In addition, a prescriptive period of one year from the date the judgment
became definitive was provided.
21. LA. R.S. 40:1299.39(B) (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 611.
Indemnification with respect to the health care provider is mandated where he was
"acting within the course and scope of his employment" for any alleged act of medical
malpractice, which is defined by the Act as "any unintentional tort or any breach of
contract based on health care or professional services rendered, or which should have
been rendered, by a health care provider to a patient." LA. R.S. 40:1299.39(A)(5)
(Supp. 1978), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 611.
22. LA. R.S. 40:1299.39(E) (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 611.
The Division of Administration is charged with investigating the claim, assembling all
relevant data, and coordinating a defense to the claim with legal counsel. LA. R.S.
40:1299.39(D) (Supp. 1978), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 611.
23. LA. R.S. 40:1299.39(E) (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 611.
The compromise is of course subject to the $500,000 limit on liability, and the proce-
dure for such a compromise is outlined in the statute. If the claim is compromised or
results in a judgment for less than $25,000, the procedure may be disregarded. 1978
La. Acts, No. 611, amending LA. R.S. 40:1299.39(F) (Supp. 1976).
24. See note 14, supra.
25. LA. R.S. 40:1299.41-1299.48 (Supp. 1975). For an excellent discussion of the
provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act, see Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256
(La. 1978).
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the Louisiana Supreme Court has not been faced with deciding
the issue."6 It is certain that the limitations of both Act 611 and
the Medical Malpractice Act will eventually be tested to deter-
mine whether the two provisions meet constitutional stan-
dards.
The legislature passed two other noteworthy acts in the
area of claims against the state. The first was Act 136,27 which
prevents personal judgments rendered against present or for-
mer public officers and employees of the state from becoming
executory until the legislature has had the opportunity to ap-
propriate funds to pay them."8 The Act is interesting in that the
state is under no obligation to pay a personal judgment ren-
dered against such an officer or employee,2" as its liability is
predicated only upon being cast in judgment in a suit wherein
the state is a defendant. Perhaps the Act indicates a desire to
indemnify state officers and employees for torts committed
during the course of their public service, 0 but the effect of the
statute is to force a judgment creditor to wait for money which
may never be appropriated and possibly force him to look again
to the actual tortfeasor for satisfaction.
Under the present provisions, judgment creditors are at
the mercy of the state and its political subdivisions. Absent
appropriation of the necessary funds, judgment creditors have
no recourse, because public funds and public property are not
26. In Everett, the court expressly stated that it offered no opinion as to the
constitutional validity of the maximum recovery provisions of the Medical Malpractice
Act, 359 So. 2d at 1262 n.4, perhaps indicating doubts in the minds of some of the
justices as to the constitutionality of such a provision.
27. 1978 La. Acts, No. 136, adding LA. R.S. 42:261.3.
28. 1978 La. Acts, No. 136, adding LA. R.S. 42:261.3, which provides in part:
Personal judgments for sums of money rendered against present or former public
officers or employees of the state or their estates for acts or omissions in the
course of public employment shall not become executory until ninety days after
the close of the next regular session following the time such judgments become
final, or until such time as the Legislature appropriates funds therefor, which-
ever occurs first . ...
29. This statement is subject to one exception. The state must indemnify where
the action is one under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 (1977), the federal civil rights actions,
and the tort was not intentional or grossly negligent. LA. R.S. 13:5108.1 (Supp. 1975).
Senate Bill 896, which would have provided a general indemnification for all negligent
torts committed during the course and scope of employment, failed to pass.
30. The failure of Senate Bill 896 to pass would seem to counter this argument.
See note 29, supra.
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subject to seizure." If the Act were addressed to judgments
rendered against the state per se, it would do nothing more
than confirm what is already true: judgment creditors must
await the legislative appropriation. However, the Act prevents
a successful plaintiff from executing a judgment rendered
against a person who may be perfectly capable opaying it,
with no guarantee that the plaintiff will not be forcetd, as much
as a year later, to look to that same person for satisfaction.
While the policy of indemnifying state officers and employees
is commendable, the effect of the Act is harsh as to the plaintiff
who must now await legislative action.
Act 1492 also bears on judgments, but this Act concerns
judgments rendered by default against the state or one of its
instrumentalities. The Act amends the Code of Civil Procedure
by adding article 1704, which gives the state added protection
against a default judgment by extending from two days to fif-
teen the necessary time between entry of the preliminary de-
fault and confirmation in suits against the state.s The addition
to the Code is a wise one, as it is easy for a large office which
handles so many legal affairs as does the Attorney General's
Office to allow a pending trial date to slip by undetected. The
new law should not work any undue hardship on a plaintifff,
for it merely helps to assure that the state will have the oppor-
tunity to present its defense.
PRISONS AND PRISONERS
Several problems facing the legislature this session con-
cerned the recent controversies resulting from the overcrowded
conditions of Angola State Penitentiary.3' The first of these
problems emerged from attempts to build new prison facilities
31. LA. CONST. art. 12, § 10. For the text of this provision, see note 14, supra.
See also Foreman v. Vermillion Parish Police Jury, 336 So. 2d 986 (La. 1976).
32. 1978 La. Acts, No. 149, adding LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1704.
33. Act 149 also requires that notice of the entry of the default judgment be
mailed by the plaintiff to the Attorney General or that the sheriff personally serve the
Attorney General or his first assistant. 1978 La. Acts, No. 149, adding LA. COD. Crv.
P. art. 1704.
34. For an interesting discussion of the prison controversy and attempts to pre-
vent the establishment of new prisons through zoning laws, see Miller, Zoning and the
State's Primary Police Power to Use Its Property in Performing Governmental
Functions. 3 S.U.L. Rav. 133 (1977).
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in other parts of the state; the result of these attempts was a
clamor of protest from residents of the proposed locations. In
answer to this outcry, the legislature passed Act 696 3 1vhich
prohibits the location, establishment, enlargement, construc-
tion or change in character of any prison within two miles of
any residential area36 unless certain procedures are followed.
The Act requires the Department of Corrections to give notice
of any proposal in the official journal of the parish involved at
least once a week for two consecutive weeks"7 and to hold a
public hearing in the parish or municipality of the proposed
site. The Department must consider the information presented
at the hearing for a period of at least thirty days before render-
ing its final decision.
Although the Act requires the Department of Corrections
to follow the procedures outlined above, it does not specify any
considerations or factors to guide the Department in reaching
its decision. In fact, the Department does not appear to be
bound by any of the information received. There are no re-
quired findings of fact, nor is it mandated that the decision
have any specified basis; the Department is only required to
consider the information. Hence, even though at first glance
the Act purports to be a device for preventing the location of
an unwanted prison facility in an area, it does little more than
provide a forum for those who wish to object. Perhaps the pro-
cedure will encourage the Department to locate any new correc-
tional facilities outside of "residential areas" as that term is
defined in the Act, for there is no requirement of notice and
hearing unless such an area is involved.3 1 If so, it seems likely
35. 1978 La. Acts, No. 696, adding LA. R.S. 15:891.
36. "An area shall be considered a residential area if it has been zoned or desig-
nated as such by the appropriate local governing authority or if within an area of one-
quarter square mile or larger there is a population density of two thousand or more
persons per square mile." LA. R.S. 15:891(A) (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts,
No. 696.
37. The notice must contain the following information: (1) the precise location
of the proposed site; (2) the exact type of criminal to be incarcerated in the facility;
(3) the general degree of security and the type of construction planned; and (4) 'the
date, time, and location of the public hearing. LA. R.S. 15:891(B) (Supp. 1978), added
by 1978 La. Acts, No. 696.
38. Even this will be difficult, however, for the local governing authority can
classify the area as residential as soon as it learns of the Department's proposal to build
in the area. An earlier version of the Act, House Bill 361, would have required the
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that future prison facilities will be created in the Angola
mold-isolated and hidden from the view of the general public.
A second controversy which has recently arisen concerns
inmate furloughs and the use of inmate labor. There were no
uniform rules concerning these matters, and in the last session
the legislature undertook the task of clarifying the law by set-
ting out guidelines. 9 Under the new law, the Department of
Corrections must give final approval to any actions involving
prisoners by state agencies which have contracted for the use
of inmate labor. Also, inmates transferred to a sheriff's custody
through a maintenance agreement shall not be eligible for the
sheriff's work release program unless they meet the standards
for work release maintained by the Department of Correc-
tions. 0
Finally, the legislature increased the amount of money
which the Department of Corrections must pay to each sheriff
for the costs of holding in parish prisons inmates who would
otherwise go to the state penitentiary but cannot be placed
there due to either a lack of facilities at Angola or a pending
appeal." This problem has become particularly acute because
zoning classification to have been residential at least six months prior to the Depart-
ment's decision to locate there.
39. LA. R.S. 15:832 (Supp. 1968), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 770. The
new law provides guidelines for any agency, board, commission, or department con-
tracting for inmate labor with the Department of Corrections. Primarily, it becomes
the contracting authority's responsibility to provide for housing and all costs associated
with the care and custody of the prisoner; to notify the Department prior to granting
any pass, furlough or emergency leave; to permit the inmate to perform only the work
for which he was contracted; and to obtain prior approval from the Department before
transferring the prisoner to a work release program. LA. R.S. 15:833 (Supp. 1972), as
amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 770, requires any prisoner requesting a furlough to
submit a furlough plan which must be approved by the Secretary of the Department
of Corrections. A responsible member of the inmate's family or some other approved
person must sign a responsibility agreement. In addition, persons convicted of particu-
larly serious offenses are ineligible for release except in cases of serious illness or death
in the inmate's family or for the purpose of attending an interview with a prospective
employer; release under these circumstances may only be with a security escort. See
also LA. R.S. 48:261 (Supp. 1968), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 485, setting forth
guidelines for the Department of Transportation and Development in the hiring of
inmate labor.
40. LA. R.S. 15:711 (Supp. 1968), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 440. Under
the old law, each sheriff determined the standards for his own work release progrims.
41. LA. R.S. 15:824 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 568; LA. R.S.
15:566 (1950), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 569.
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more and more prisoners sentenced to Angola are being held in
parish prisons due to the state penitentiary's lack of space.
The above changes do work toward easing the prison'prob-
lenms now facing Louisiana, but more action is needed in this
area. The overcrowding problem worsens as the parish facilities
themselves become filled beyond their respective capacities.
One major obstacle to be overcome is local resistance to the
location of new facilities in populated areas. Angola, however,
has proven that there are many problems associated with iso-
lated facilities, particularly those of finding trained personnel
willing to work so far away from any city.
PUBLIC RECORDS
The legislature also enacted some major changes in the
Louisiana Public Records Law,4" one of which extends the right
of inspection of public records to all persons over the age of
majority. 3 Under prior law, this right was limited to electors,
state taxpayers, and their agents." Additionally, under the new
statute the procedure for enforcing the public records provi-
sions has been amended and clarified. Now, any person who
feels he has been wrongfully denied access to the public rec-
ords may institute a suit for the issuance of a writ of mandamus
or injunctive or declaratory relief. 5 The most significant
change from the old law is that attorney's fees and costs are
now available to the party prevailing in such an action." Fur-
thermore, if the court finds that the custodian of the records
in question acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable
manner, it may award any actual damages proven by the per-
son requesting the records. 7 The burden of proof is placed on
42. Title 44 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950.
43. 1978 La. Acts, No. 686, amending LA. R.S. 44:31 (1950).
44. LA. R.S. 44:31 (1950) (as it appeared prior to Act 686 of 1978).
45. The old law merely provided that any suit to enforce the provisions of the
Public Records Law must be tried by preference and in a summary manner. Any
appeal was required to be disposed of by the appellate court within ten days. LA. R.S.
44:35 (1950) (as it appeared prior to Act 686 of 1978).
46. LA. R.S. 44:35 (1950), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 686.
47. The new law provides that "[tihe custodian shall be personally liable for
the payment of any such damages and shall be liable in solido with the public body
for the payment of the requester's attorney's fees and other costs of litigation, except
where the custodian has withheld or denied production of the requested record or
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the custodian to justify a denial of access to the records.
These changes are clearly in the public interest. First, by
extending the right of inspection to all persons over eighteen,
the legislature has provided the opportunity to many who
might truly need the information but were not, until now, qual-
ified to obtain it. Second, the new enforcement provisions will
insure that people are not denied access to particular records
on an unreasonable basis, and the provisions allowing the court
to award attorney's fees, costs, and damages will serve to en-
courage many people who might not otherwise have pressed
their valid claims.
UNEMPLOYMENT
The legislature was quite active in the unemployment
area, and several important new laws were passed. Two signifi-
cant acts were signed into law by the Governor. The first, Act
162, 49 prohibits age discrimination by employers, employment
agencies, and labor unions except "where age is a bona fide
occupational qualification . . . ."50 Enforcement of the provi-
sions is accomplished through a civil action which may be
brought by any person who feels he has been treated discrimi-
natorily in violation of the Act's provisions." The Act's provi-
sions are limited, however, to persons at least forty but less
than seventy years of age. Admittedly, persons in this age
bracket may need more protection than those in a younger age
group, but it is submitted that it would have been wiser not to
have stipulated a threshold to the Act's application, for there
is always the possibility of age discrimination against persons
records on advice of the legal counsel representing the public body .... " LA. R.S.
44:35(E) (1950), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 686. In addition, where the cus-
todian has retained private counsel for his defense, the court may award attorney's fees
to the custodian. Id.
48. LA. R.S. 44:35(B) (1950), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 686.
49. 1978 La. Acts, No. 162, adding LA. R.S. 23:971-76.
50. LA. R.S. 23:972(F)(1) (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 162. In
addition to the prohibition against discrimination because of age, the Act prohibits
discrimination against any employee or potential employee who has taken advantage
of the rights conferred by the new law. Moreover, employers, labor unions, and employ-
ment agencies are prohibited from conducting advertising for prospective employees
that contains any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on age.
51. LA. R.S. 23:973 (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 162.
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who have not reached the age of forty. 2 Thus it would seem
that the Act, while purporting to prohibit age discrimination,
is itself discriminatory with respect to those persons who do not
meet the minimum age requisite to the Act's application.
In a second measure bearing on fair employment practices,
the legislature passed Act 341,11 which defines the effect of a
criminal conviction on eligibility for a license, permit, or certif-
icate where it is necessary to engage in any trade, profession,
or occupation. Under the Act, a person can not be disqualified
solely because of a prior criminal record "except in cases in
which the applicant has been convicted of a felony, and such
conviction directly relates to the position of employment
sought, or to the specific occupation, trade or profession." 4 The
Act serves the exemplary purpose of preventing examining
boards from denying licenses and permits on the basis of petty
offenses and crimes which have no relevance to the applicant's
qualifications for the particular job, trade, occupation, or pro-
fession. Hopefully, the Act will aid those convicted of minor
crimes to find meaningful employment and prevent them from
returning to a livelihood of crime.
Work Opportunity Program
Following the lead of other states, the Louisiana legisla-
ture enacted Act 512,11 creating a Work Opportunity Program
to be administered in conjunction with unemployment and
welfare services. According to the Act, the legislative intent is
to "increase employment opportunities and incentives and to
52. The Act was undoubtedly modeled after the federal provisions which provide
a threshold age of forty. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1978). Admittedly, providing no minimum
age would raise problems with minors complaining of age discrimination, but it would
seem wiser to restrict the Act's application to all persons over the age of majority,
rather than to those over forty.
53. 1978 La. Acts, No. 341, adding LA. R.S. 37:2750.
54. Id. Under the Act, any refusal to grant a permit, license, or certificate which
is based in whole or in part on the conviction of any crime must explicitly state in
writing the reasons for the decision. Id. The Act exempts the following groups from its
provisions: any law enforcement agency, the Louisiana State Board of Medical
Examiners, The Louisiana State Board of Nursing, the Louisiana State Board of
Practical Nurse Examiners, the State Racing Commission, the State Athletic Com-
mission, the Louisiana State Bar Association, and the Office of Alcoholic Beverage
Control of the Department of Public Safety.
55. 1978 La. Acts, No. 512, adding LA. R.S. 23:1801-09.
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upgrade employment skills in order to open the way to perma-
nent self-support. . . ."" Undoubtedly, the legislature wants
to remove from the welfare and unemployment rolls those per-
sons who should not be receiving benefits and hopes to train
those who have not been able to find jobs because of a genuine
lack of skill.
Under Act 512, the Office of Employment Security is des-
ignated as the exclusive agency for administering the program.
Any person receiving unemployment benefits must register and
participate in the Work Opportunity Program as a condition to
future eligibility for benefits.57 The Office of Family Services
determines the eligibility of welfare recipients for the program
and turns nonexempted persons over to the Office of Employ-
ment Security. Enforcement of the program is relatively sim-
ple: any person receiving unemployment benefits who fails
without good cause to participate in the program will be dis-
qualified from receiving further benefits until such time as he
decides to take part.58 Welfare benefits will be terminated in a
similar fashion, but the procedure relative to notice and hear-
ing is a little more complex.5
The Act is a commendable attempt to reduce the number
of people on the unemployment and welfare rolls. First, it will
aid those who have marketable skills to obtain employment
through a job placement program. Second, it will help to teach
a trade to those who cannot acquire jobs with the skills they
already possess. Finally, through the threat of termination of
benefits, the program will force recalcitrant recipients of bene-
fits to become dependent upon themselves for an income. Nat-
urally, whether the plan will work will depend upon the ability
56. LA. R.S. 23:1801 (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 512.
57. Under Act 512, several programs are to be administered by the Office of
Employment Security: (1) a job placement and employment training program; (2) an
institutional and work experience training program; and (3) a public service employ-
ment program. The Office is in charge of placing participants in one of the above
programs. Any participant determined to have marketable skills will immediately be
placed in job referral and job placement programs. It is also within the authority of
the Office to contract with state vocational-technical schools and trade schools to
utilize these facilities for the purpose of completing the new programs.
58. LA. R.S. 23:1806 (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 512. Determina-
tions of disqualifications can be made only after the participant is afforded an oppor-
tunity for a fair hearing.
59. LA. R.S. 23:1807 (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 512.
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of the Office of Employment Security to implement and main-
tain the program, but the new law is at least a step in the right
direction.
Act 512 was not the only piece of legislation directed at
reducing the number of persons receiving unemployment. In
Act 5170 the legislature amended the law relative -to eligibility
for unemployment compensation by requiring the unemployed
individual to conduct an active search for work."' Thus,
through the combined effect of the Work Opportunity Program
and the requirement that unemployment compensation recipi-
ents actively seek employment, the legislature hopes to combat
the ever-growing cost of unemployment. It is now up to the
Office of Employment Security to see that the legislative intent
is effectuated by implementing the program and rigidly enforc-
ing the new provisions.
60. 1978 La. Acts, No. 517, amending LA. R.S. 23:1600 (Supp. 1977).
61. LA. R.S. 23:1600 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 517. Section
1600 used to require that an individual be both able to work and available for work in
order to be eligible for unemployment benefits. LA. R.S. 23:1600 (Supp. 1977). Now,
in addition, the individual must actively seek employment under a reemployment
assistance plan approved by the assistant secretary for the Office of Employment
Security. The plan must take into account the claimant's qualifications for work, the
distance of his residence from employment establishments, his prior work history, and
current labor market conditions related to his normal and customary occupation.
For union members, an active search for work is satisfied when the member has a
reemployment plan and continues to be available to his union for job referrals. To
reflect his availability, the individual must report to the hiring hall of his union at least
once a week and maintain evidence of having done so by securing the signature of a
union official on his unemployment booklet. If the member lives more than ten miles
from the union hall, he may fulfill the above requirements by making weekly telephone
calls.
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EXPROPRIATION
Under Louisiana's new constitution, the state must com-
pensate landowners for lands expropriated for levees and levee
drainage facilities.' In Act 314,2 the legislature endeavored to
define the measure of compensation due for land expropriated
for such purposes. The Act provides that the measure of the
landowner's loss is to be determined by two separate evalua-
tions, one for property actually taken or destroyed and a second
for any change in value to the land remaining. Under the new
Act, improvements resulting from the levee work are balanced
against the damage caused by that work in order to determine
the owner's actual losses. This balancing is accomplished by
determining the value of the land immediately before the work
and then again immediately after. If the property not actually
taken or destroyed has suffered no decrease in value due to the
levee work, then there has been no loss as to that portion of the
property, and therefore the landowner will only be entitled to
compensation for the value of any land that he actually loses.
However, as to any land actually taken there can be no
consideration of any possible increase in value resulting from
the construction of levees or levee drainage facilities simply
because any benefit realized by this portion of the property will
not inure to the landowner. Thus, while improvements on any
part of the property may be considered inasmuch as they affect
the value of the property not taken or destroyed by the levee
project, these improvements may not be considered in the ulti-
mate determination of the value of the land which is taken or
rendered unusable. This new procedure is within the mandate
of the new constitution, which merely provides that the owner
must be compensated as provided by law,3 and the standard is
more than equitable to the landowner who may even receive a
windfall where the value of his land remaining is enhanced
beyond the amount of any damages caused.
1. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 42, provides in part: "Notwithstanding any contrary
provision of this constitution, lands and improvements thereon hereafter actually used
or destroyed for levees or levee drainage purposes shall be paid for as provided by law."
2. 1978 La. Acts, No. 314, amending LA. R.S. 38:281 (Supp. 1977).
3. See note 1, supra.
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STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SALARIES
The 1978 regular legislative session was significantly in-
volved in supplementing the salaries of various locally elected
officials. Legislation to increase the pay of judges began with a
measure mandating a six percent increase annually. This an-
nual six percent increase was later deleted, but a joint confer-
ence committee eventually established an eight percent in-
crease for the 1978-1979 fiscal year.' Act 208 increases the an-
nual salaries of the justices of the supreme court from $50,000
to $54,000, increases the annual salaries of the courts of appeal
judges from $47,500 to $51,300, and increases the annual sala-
ries of the district judges from judicial districts having a single
parish with a population of 225,000 or more from $45,000 to
$48,000. 3 The annual salaries of the rest of the district judges
were increased from $42,500 to $45,900.'
Legislation supplementing the salaries of parish coroners
was passed for the first time during the 1978 regular legislative
session. Act 1041 provides that any coroner who is presently
paid either a salary or a salary plus fees will also be paid $500
per month by the state. Any coroner who is paid only fees will
now be paid $500 per month by the state and may be paid an
1. Baton Rouge Sunday Advocate, July 16, 1978, § A, at 14.
2. 1978 La. Acts, No. 208, amending LA. R.S. 13:102 (1950), 13:311 (1950),
13:691(A), (B) (Supp. 1975).
3. Included in the measure supplementing the salaries of the district judges are
the civil district court judges and the criminal district court judges of the parish of
Orleans, the magistrate of the criminal district court for the parish of Orleans, the
judges of the juvenile courts for the parishes of Orleans, Caddo, and Jefferson, and the
judges of the family court of East Baton Rouge Parish.
4. 1978 La. Acts, No. 640, amending LA. R.S. 13:1875 (1950), 13:2152(A) (1950),
provides that the judges of the city court of Monroe shall be paid $1,080 monthly by
the city of Monroe and $432 monthly by the parish of Ouachita, in addition to their
state salary of $14,600 per annum. The Act further provides that the salary of the
judges of the First City Court of the city of New Orleans shall be $41,500 per annum,
of which $14,600 shall be paid by the state and $26,900 shall be payable out of the
Judicial Expense Fund of the Parish of Orleans. 1978 La. Acts, No. 107, adding LA.
R.S. 13:1875(12), also increases the annual salary of the city court judgeof Alexandria.
5. 1978 La. Acts, No. 104, adding LA. R.S. 33:1558.1, and amending LA. R.S.
33:1621 (1950).
[Vol. 39
LEGISLATIVE SYMPOSIUM
additional $500 per month by the parish. The Act excludes
those coroners who are presently paid $25,000 a year or more.
The Act also eliminates the ceiling on the salary of the Orleans
Parish coroner and provides that he will receive a minimum
salary of $12,000 per annum.
Act 204 raises the salaries of the sheriffs of the various
parishes by $4,000 per annum and continues to permit them to
use the hefty expense allowances that they receive in addition
to their salaries in any manner that they choose, without hav-
ing to document expenditures. The Act sets each sheriff's sal-
ary in accordance with the population of the particular parish
he serves, with the pay scale ranging from $29,675 to $42,435.
The amount granted to sheriffs as an expense allowance in
addition to their salaries is equal to ten percent of their regular
pay.' House members had added language to the sheriffs' pay
raise bills to limit their expense allowances either to "official
use" or to those expenditures meeting the approval of the Leg-
islative Auditor,' but the Senate deleted the "official use" limi-
tation and the bill was finally passed in that form. It is interest-
ing to note that a Sheriff's Salary Fund exists completely apart
from the ten percent expense allowance, and this fund can be
used to pay for clerical expenses, salaries of the sheriff and his
deputies, reasonable attorney fees for legal services, premiums
on bonds required by sheriffs and deputies, undercover opera-
tional duties, membership dues for various sheriffs' associa-
tions, and uniforms and clothing.'0 The sheriffs may also use
ten percent of the fund to promote youth or junior deputy
programs. It should be noted, however, that the use of the
salary fund is not restricted to those expenses listed, and it
seems likely that this fund is adequate to pay for most, if not
all, of the expenses incurred in performing the duties of a sher-
iff. Therefore, by allowing the sheriffs to keep the ten percent
expense allowance which need not be limited to "official use,"
the legislature only obscures the total amount of the salary
which is actually received.
6. 1978 LA. ACTS, No. 204, amending LA. R.S. 33:1421(A) (1950), and adding LA.
R.S. 33:1321(E).
7. LA. R.S. 33:1421(B) (1950 & Supp. 1976).
8. La. H.B. 725, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978).
9. Baton Rouge State Times, June 21, 1978, § A, at 18.
10. LA. R.S. 33:1422 (1950 & Supp. 1968).
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Clerks of the district courts of the various parishes, Orle-
ans excepted, also received an increase in their annual salaries.
Act 57711 provides that each clerk of court will receive an in-
crease in salary of $4,000 per annum and, in addition, will be
allowed to continue to keep an expense allowance equal to five
percent of his salary.'" The salaries of the various clerks will be
based on the populations of the parishes they serve. Pursuant
to Act 323,'1 the clerks and deputy clerks of each court of appeal
will also receive an increase in annual salary; the clerks will
now receive $25,500 per annum while the deputy clerks will
receive an annual salary of $21,500.
Act 3111 relates to an increase in the salaries of various tax
assessors in the state and provides for increases ranging from
$4,400 to $5,800 per year. The tax assessors will now be paid
annual salaries varying from $26,640 to $34,602, depending
upon the population of the parish served.
Act 22011 continues to give school board members the op-
tion of receiving compensation either through an expense al-
lowance or on a per diem basis. The per diem rate remains at
$50 per day, but the maximum number of meetings allowed in
one year has been raised from 100 to 144. Under the prior law,'6
school board members could collect $350 per month plus per
diem for one board committee meeting per month, in lieu of
straight per diem, and compensation of up to $550 per month
was permitted in parishes with a population of more than
275,000 persons. Act 220 now permits school board members to
receive an expense allowance not to exceed $600 per month,
with $700 allocated for the school board presidents. The Act
requires any school board to advertise its intent to vote on
whether the board will be paid per diem or by expense allow-
ance, and a two-thirds vote of a school board is required before
any increase in compensation can be approved. In addition to
11. 1978 La. Acts, No. 577, adding LA. R.S. 13:782(J), (K). ,
12. This expense allowance of five percent of the clerk's salary is provided for in
LA. R.S. 13:782(H) (Supp. 1974).
13. 1978 La. Acts, No. 323, amending LA. R.S. 13:351(A), (B) (1950).
14. 1978 La. Acts, No. 31, amending 47:1907(B) (1950), 47:1911(A), (B) (1950),
and adding LA. R.S. 47:1907.1.
15. 1978 La. Acts, No. 220, amending LA. R.S. 17:56(A) (1950), and adding LA.
R.S. 17:56(D).
16. LA. R.S. 17:58(A) (1950 & Supp. 1976).
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the per diem or expense allowance, a school board member is
eligible to collect mileage expenses at the rate of sixteen cents
per mile.
RETIREMENT
Substantial changes in the law governing the state retire-
ment system were made during the 1978 regular legislative
session. Act 34717 provides for a cost-of-living increase in retire-
ment benefits for persons in the State Teacher's Retirement
System, and the Act gives the board of trustees of the retire-
ment system the option of granting a three percent increase in
benefits, up to a maximum of $900 annually. The amount re-
ceived will be based in part on the salary collected while the
individual was publicly employed, and any supplemental ad-
justments in benefits are to reflect fluctuations between the
annual Consumer Price Indexes of the two preceding years. It
is significant that this act removes an existing provision which
restricted cost-of-living increases to those retiring before 1975.
Act 7481s appropriated the sum of $1,600,000 out of the
state's General Fund for the teachers' retirement system to
provide funds for a one and one-half percent cost-of-living in-
crease, but the system itself will have to support the other half
of the cost-of-living increase. It should be noted that the system
now has a $1 billion unfunded liability. Furthermore, last year
the system paid out $80 million in retirement benefits, but
earned only $60 million, and had to make up the difference
from the contributions of teachers who are still working. Thus,
the expenditure for the cost-of-living increase could add to the
financial instability of the teachers' retirement system.
Act 64319 provides for the transfer of LSU faculty into the
State Teachers' Retirement System and transfers all other
LSU employees into State Employment Retirement System,
thus eliminating the existing LSU Retirement System. All new
memberships covered by the Act will be determined in accord-
17. 1978 La. Acts, No. 347, adding LA. R.S. 17:635.7.
18. 1978 La. Acts, No. 748.
19. 1978 La. Acts, No. 643, abolishing the Louisiana State University Retirement
System, as established by LA. R.S. 17:1611-44 (Supp. 1971), and adding LA. R.S.
17:700.2.
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ance with the existing guidelines of the two systems. The ra-
tionale behind the transfer seems to be that because the LSU
Retirement System was tied to the Social Security System, and
because Social Security costs are constantly increasing, it
would cost the state more to continue to fund the LSU system
than to transfer these individuals into the other two systems.
The 1978 legislative session also changed the compulsory
retirement age of public employees. Act 16020 provides for the
compulsory retirement at age seventy of all public employees
except elected officials and department heads appointed by the
governor. However, the Act also provides for continuance in
service beyond age seventy for one-year intervals upon certifi-
cation by the employee's appointing authority that such con-
tinued employment would be advantageous to the public.
One of the most significant bills affecting Louisiana's re-
tirement system was Senate Bill 18,21 which was primarily in-
troduced to stop the practice of "double dipping," whereby a
state employee works for the state for twenty years, retires, and
then secures other employment while drawing retirement bene-
fits from the state. The bill would have raised the retirement
requirements to thirty-five years of employment or sixty-two
years of age and hopefully would have helped reduce the $2
billion in unfunded accrued liability which the state now owes
state workers in future retirement benefits. The bill passed the
Senate but was not acted upon in the House.
ELECTIONS
Act 3822 was enacted this session in an attempt to correct
some of the problems with the 1976 Election Code.23 One of the
most important changes is the establishment of separate provi-
sions for filling a vacancy in the office of judge.24 The amend-
20. 1978 La. Acts, No. 160, amending LA. R.S. 42:691 (Supp. 1950), and repealing
LA. R.S. 16:1042(6) (Supp. 1956), 17:634 (Supp. 1976), 17:912 (1950), 17:1262(6) (Supp.
1976), 17:1623(B) (Supp. 1972), 18:1732(6) (Supp. 1974), 33:6172(D) (Supp. 1958),
33:7272(7) (Supp. 1965), 42:572 (1950). This new provision relative to compulsory
retirement age is in accord with the "Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1978,"
29 U.S.C. § 631 (1978).
21. La. S.B. 16, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978).
22. 1978 La. Acts, No. 38, amending La. R.S. tit. 18 (Supp. 1976).
23. Title 18 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes as amended in 1976.
24. Under the old law, the office of judge was subject to the same rules as
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ment places the authority to call a special election to fill such
a vacancy in the hands of the governor 2 and, more importantly,
gives the governor some discretion in fixing the dates for the
special elections.26 Apparently, the purpose of this legislation
is to provide a more expedient procedure for filling judicial
vacancies, which is a necessary change in view of the already
overcrowded dockets of the Louisiana courts.
Act 38 also contains an addition to the Louisiana Election
Code providing a uniform resignation procedure for all elected
officials except members of the legislature and Congress.Y
Under the Act, a resignation must be filed with the Secretary
of State,28 who must immediately send notice of the vacancy
virtually all other elective offices. LA. R.S. 18:402 (Supp. 1977). Act 38 provides a new
procedure which mandates that within twenty-four hours of learning of the vacancy,
the supreme court shall give written notice to the Governor. Within ten days of this
notice, the Governor shall determine the dates of the qualifying period and the dates
on which the special elections shall be held and shall issue a proclamation ordering
the elections. LA. R.S. 18:402 (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 38.
25. Prior to its amendment in 1978 by Act 38, LA. R.S. 18:402 (Supp. 1976)
merely provided for the "appropriate authority" to issue the proclamation calling the
election.
26. LA. R.S. 18:621 (A) (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 38, provides
in part: "In determining the dates on which the special elections are to be held, to the
extent feasible the governor shall call the elections in accordance with the provisions
of R.S. 18:402." (Emphasis supplied.) This language allowing dates differing from
those mandated by section 402 is found in no other provision requiring special elections
to fill vacancies.
27. 1978 La. Acts, No. 38, adding LA. R.S. 18:651-54. In McKenzie v. Edwards,
361 So. 2d 880 (La. 1978), it was alleged that Act 38 violated the Louisiana Constitu-
tion by allowing a special election to be called based upon an anticipated vacancy in
a city court judgeship. The supreme court found Act 38 to be inapplicable to the case,
however, because it had not yet been approved by a three-judge federal court or the
Department of Justice as required by the Federal Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1971-
74(e) (1976). The court, basing its decision on the Louisiana Constitution, found that
there was no prohibition against the calling of a special election on the basis of an
anticipated judicial vacancy. The court noted that article 10, section 28, of the consti-
tution provides that a vacancy occurs in the event of a resignation and the Governor
is empowered to call a special election to fill a judicial vacancy when it occurs. The
fact that the resignation in question was prospectively effective did not prevent the
vacancy from occurring on the date the resignation became irrevocable, for upon that
date the vacancy was certain to occur. The court stated that allowing vacancies to be
filled in this manner assured continuity in office. While the decision was not based on
Act 38, it is-now clear that the provisions allowing special elections based upon antici-
pated vacancies do not violate the Louisiana Constitution.
28. The filing may be in person or by certified mail. LA. R.S. 18:652, added by
1978 La. Acts, No. 38. In addition, the resignation must be in .writing, dated, and
signed by the resigning official before an officer authorized to administer oaths. Id.
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to the authorities charged with making a temporary appoint-
ment and calling a special election." The resignation thus sub-
mitted becomes irrevocable three days after the Secretary's
notice is sent3 0
Also related to elections is Act 5803' which presents an
interesting change in the law. Under the former law," the poll-
ing place of a precinct had to be within that precinct. Under
the change provided by Act 580, however, a polling place may
be located outside of a precinct when "after the exercise of due
diligence, the governing authority . . .is unable to secure a
location for a polling place within the precinct. 3 3 The change
was undoubtedly prompted by Charbonnet v. Braden 4 in
which an election was contested on the ground that one of the
polling places had been moved outside the boundaries of the
precinct it served and notice of the move was only posted the
day before the election. The court of appeal found that the
troublesome problem was not that the polling place was outside
of the precinct, but rather that notice of the move was inade-
quate. However, the court held that the plaintiff had failed to
establish that the move had been prejudicial to him.35
The legislature addressed the problem by providing a pro-
cedure by which a polling place may be located outside of the
precinct. The change thus recognizes a recurrent problem
which is particularly acute in New Orleans-the inability of
local authorities to secure adequate polling facilities in each
precinct. In Charbonnet it was noted that other polling places
had been located out of their respective precincts, but that
these had not been contested." Under Act 580 the local authori-
ties may now secure polling places outside of the precinct with-
out violating the Election Code.
Further, the resignation may specify a prospective date upon which the resignation will
be effective. Id.
29. LA. R.S. 18:653 (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 38.
30. LA. R.S. 18:654 (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 38.
31. 1978 La. Acts, No. 580, amending LA. R.S. 18:533 (B) (Supp. 1977), and
adding LA. R.S. 18:536.
32. LA. R.S. 18:533 (B) (Supp. 1977).
33. LA. R.S. 18:533 (B) (Supp. 1977), as amended by LA. ACTS, No. 580.
34. 358 So. 2d 360 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 560 (La. 1978).
35. Id. at 362-63.
36. Id. at 361.
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Presidential Elections
In a close vote, the House of Representatives defeated Sen-
ate Bill 11 which would have provided for presidential primar-
ies in Louisiana: According to its proponents, the bill would
have permitted greater public participation in the selection of
presidential candidates by establishing a primary system for
the election of delegates to the national conventions of the
respective political parties. 7 Opponents of the bill, however,
argued that the costs involved in holding these primaries would
be too high.
Under the proposed measure, districts would have been
created paralleling either Senatorial or Congressional districts,
depending on the number of delegates allowed to the state.
Persons who ran as delegates committed to a particular candi-
date would have been required to vote for that candidate on the
first ballot of the nominating convention. No delegate would
have been allowed to subvert the election process by running
as one committed to a particular candidate and then voting for
another candidate once he reached the convention. After the
first ballot, however, each delegate would have been free to
vote for the candidate of his choice and would not have been
forced to continue to vote for a candidate whose chances of
nomination appeared hopeless after the first ballot.
This bill would have allowed earlier voter participation in
the selection of a president by allowing the voters to pick dele-
gates to the nominating conventions based on the particular
delegate's commitment to a candidate. It is unfortunate that
the measure, or some compromise version thereof, failed to
pass the legislature, but hopefully, future attempts will be
37. In the past, the procedure for electing delegates to the nominating conven-
tions has been left to the discretion of the parties. Each of the state central committees
submits a plan to the respective national party committees for approval. In the last
presidential race, the Republican Party used a procedure whereby caucuses were held
in each congressional district. Persons were elected to attend the state convention at
which three delegates and three alternates were elected from each district to attend
the national convention. The Democratic party, on the other hand, provided for elec-
tions within each congressional district and four delegates from each district were
chosen. A state convention was later held and at-large delegates were selected. In
addition, the Democratic party had several ex-officio members, including the Governor
and the state party chairman.
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more successful and Louisiana will join the large number of
states presently holding presidential primaries.
THE JUDICIARY
Act 393 of the 1978 legislative session will greatly aid the
administration of justice in Louisiana by creating additional
district judgeships in ten Judicial Districts" and by adding a
new commissioner in the magistrates section of the criminal
district court for Orleans Parish. With this expansion of the
judicial system, the legislature hopes to reduce the problem of
overcrowded court dockets.
In another measure, Act 571,1" the provisions of the 1921
Constitution relative to the retirement of judges4' were
amended and reenacted as a part of the Revised Statutes." The
new provisions reduce the mandatory retirement age for judges
from seventy-five years to seventy, except in the case of judges
already over seventy. These judges may continue to serve until
they have completed twenty years of service or until they reach
the age of eighty, whichever occurs first."
38. 1978 La. Acts, No. 39.
39. 1978 La. Acts, No. 39. The districts are the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh,
Ninth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-second, Twenty-fourth, Twenty-ninth, and
Thirty-eighth Judicial Districts. The Thirty-eighth Judicial District was created by
1978 La. Acts, No. 14.
40. 1978 La. Acts, No. 571, adding LA. R.S. 13:30.
41. LA. CONST. of 1921, arts. 7, 8, 13. These provisions were continued as statutes
by La. Const. arts. 14, 16 (A)(5).
42. 1978 La. Acts, No. 571, adding LA. R.S. 13:30. These provisions of the 1921
constitution, see note 40, supra, became LA. R.S. 13:30 (Supp. 1978).
43. LA. R.S. 13:30 (B) (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 571. It should
be pointed out that Act 571 creates a windfall for judges who are now over the age of
seventy. Under the old provisions, those judges would face mandatory retirement at
the age of seventy-five. However, by virtue of the change intended to lower the manda-
tory retirement age for judges, those judges now over the age of seventy may serve until
the age of eighty, unless of course they attain twenty years of service first. Other
measures bearing on retirement include the following: 1978 La. Acts, Nos. 67, 344
(State Employees' Retirement System); 1978 La. Acts, Nos. 347, 390, 648 (Teachers
Retirement System); 1978 La. Acts, No. 532 (State Police Pension and Retirement
System); 1978 La. Acts, No. 533 (Judges and Court Officers); 1978 La. Acts, No. 579
(Assessors' Retirement Fund); 1978 La. Acts, No. 643 (Abolition of Louisiana State
University Retirement System); 1978 La. Acts, Nos. 727, 787 (Uniform Procedure for
Disability Retirement in Public Retirement Systems); and 1978 La. Acts, No. 788
(Municipal Employees' Retirement System).
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GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY
The new Louisiana Constitution requires the legislature to
enact a Code of Ethics for all public employees and officials."
The task proved' to be too controversial for this year's session,
however, and when the legislature adjourned, none of the pro-
posed ethics provisions had survived.45 The House of Repre-
sentatives, frustrated by Senate amendments which for the
second straight session virtually destroyed the House's version
of the ethics bill, adopted a resolution urging the legislature to
at least adopt a Code of Ethics for itself in the next session."1
Hence, the controversy is far from over, for the constitutional
mandate remains to be met, and one of the highlights of the
next legislative session necessarily will be the topic of govern-
mental ethics.
Although the legislature could not agree on the provisions
of a new Code of Ethics, it did manage to pass legislation in
other areas of governmental accountability. One of these provi-
sions was Act 45641 which prohibits public boards, bodies and
agencies" from utilizing any manner of proxy voting proce-
dure."1 The Act is to be applauded as one that prevents an
individual who has been placed in a position of public trust
from shirking his responsibilities simply by sending in a substi-
tute. While there are instances where public officials can not,
for good reason, attend a particular meeting, the potential for
abuse of a proxy voting procedure is tremendous.
44. LA. CONST. art. 10, § 21.
45. House Bill 334, as originally passed by the House, would have created two
ethics commissions, one for elected officials and another for public employees. How-
ever, the bill was completely rewritten in Senate committee and as a result of the
committee's changes, two ethics commissions would have been required for every
parish in the state. The House was not willing to accept this change, nor was the Senate
willing to accept the original House version, and the bill was never passed.
46. La. H. R. Con. Res. No. 29, 4th Reg. Sess. 1978.
47. 1978 La. Acts, No. 456, amending LA. R.S. 42:5 (Supp. 1976).
48. The Act's application extends to governing boards and bodies holding meet-
ings that are required to be open to the public by LA. R.S. 42:5(A) (Supp. 1976) and
to state agencies that are defined as boards and commissions subject to the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act, LA. R.S. 49:951-68 (Supp. 1966).
49. The Act also provides for a penalty of either a fine of not more than $500, or
imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, for any member of a governing
board, body, or state agency violating the provisions.
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LOBBYING
One area which incited much heated debate this year con-
cerned the regulation of lobbying and lobbyists. Though much
reform legislation was proposed, little managed to survive the
legislative process. One comprehensive bill on lobbying never
got out of committee in its house of origin.5" A second bill,
Senate Bill 871, fared better, but proponents could not muster
enough support for final passage. The Senate Bill would have
required lobbyists to make financial disclosures for all expendi-
tures made for lobbying purposes in a "quarterly lobbyist ac-
tivity report." One of the asserted purposes of the bill was to
increase public awareness of the magnitude of lobby efforts.
The bill was extremely controversial, and a similar measure is
certain to be proposed in the next legislative session.
EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION
In continuing the implementation of the executive reor-
ganization mandated by the new Louisiana Constitution,5 the
legislature passed two Acts. The first, act 350,12 provides that
the newly created Joint Committee on Legislative Oversight
shall be the successor to the Joint Legislative Committee on
Reorganization of the Executive Branch. Further, the Act pro-
vides that all executive departments shall be subject to the
reporting requirements set forth in sections 956-58 of title 36 of
the Louisiana Revised Statutes.53
In Act 357,5" the legislature created the Joint Committee
on Legislative Oversight and set forth its composition," pur-
50. LA. H.B. 1553, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978).
51. LA. CONST. art. 14 § 6. The first stage of executive reorganization culminated
in 1975 La. Acts, No. 720, which enacted title 36 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes.
This title was amended and reenacted a second time by 1976 La. Acts, No. 513, and a
third time by 1977 La. Acts, No. 83.
52. 1978 La. Acts, No. 350, adding LA. R.S. 36:959.1-59.2.
53. 1978 La. Acts, No. 350. Sections 956-58 provide for the filing, with the com-
mittee, of reports that provide the goals of the department; information relative to the
budget request to be made by the department for the next fiscal year; and information
relative to continued reorganization and improved and more efficient operation and
management of the department. Prior to the addition, only the departments set forth
in LA. R.S. 36:951-57 (Supp. 1977) were required to make such reports.
54. 1978 La. Acts, No. 357, adding LA. R.S. 36: 671-711.
55. The Committee is composed of four senators, four representatives, the
Speaker of the House, and the President of the Senate. LA. R.S. 36: 672 (Supp. 1978),
added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 357.
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poses, and duties. In essence, the primary responsibility of the
Committee is to conduct studies and propose legislation neces-
sary for the continued reorganization of the Executive
Branch." The (ommittee has been given wide investigatory
powers, enforceable through the contempt power, to carry out
its duties.17 Additionally, the Committee is charged with re-
porting its findings and recommendations, together with a
draft of proposed legislation, to the legislature 8 and is empow-
ered to conduct "program reviews"" of particular programs at
the request of any legislator, legislative committee, elected
state official, or state department or agency head. Further, the
Committee is charged with coordinating and assisting in the
implementation of the Sunset Law60 and any subsequent legis-
lation relative to the termination of statutory agencies. Under
the Sunset Law, each state agency basically must justify its
existence or face possible termination or absorption into an-
other entity.
Act 357 also continues the Joint Legislative Audit Advi-
sory Council and provides for its composition and duties. The
Council's primary function is to aid the Legislative Auditor in
preparing each annual budget." The Council is given broad
investigatory powers with which to carry out its responsibili-
ties. 2
With these acts the legislature has provided for a continu-
ing program of reorganization in an effort to provide a more
streamlined government. Although one unfortunate by-
product of these annual reports and reorganizations is a degree
56. LA. R.S. 36:672(C) (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 357.
57. LA. R.S. 36:674 (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No.,357.
58. LA. R.S. 36:676 (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 357.
59. A "program review" is defined as a "concentrated, in-depth study and evalu-
ation of a particular program of state government to determine: 1) whether it accom-
plishes its intended purposes; 2) whether it is conducted as effectively and efficiently
as possible in terms of services rendered, benefits achieved, and purposes accomplished
and in terms of economic costs; 3) whether the program should be modified or elimi-
nated; or 4) what specific changes should be made in the program." LA. R.S. 36:691(B)
(Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 357.
60. 1976 La. Acts, No. 277.
61. LA. R.S. 36:552-53 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 357.
62. LA. R.S. 36:554 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 357. In
addition to its power to investigate, the Council may punish for contempt. LA. R.S.
36:555-56 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 357.
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of confusion and uncertainty among the various state agencies,
it is hoped that in the long run these efforts will produce better
service with greater efficiency and lower costs. With growing
taxpayer dissatisfaction with the present levels of government
spending, the need for more efficiency has clearly arisen.
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STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
"FIRST-USE" TAX
Perhaps the most important piece of legislation produced,
by the 1978 legislative session was Act 294, the so-called "first-
use" tax on natural gas.' This tax will be levied on natural gas
which is produced from the federally-controlled outer continen-
tal shelf and piped through Louisiana on its way to consumers
in other states. The tax will be paid by the companies that own
the gas, who are then expected to pass the cost on to out-of-
state customers. First-use tax credits have been designed to
protect Louisiana producers and consumers from the impact of
the tax.' The tax will become effective this year and is expected
to generate revenues of approximately $170 million per year.3
However, the tax is presently under constitutional attack' and
until the litigation comes to an end, the state has agreed to
place all proceeds from the tax into a special escrow account.
Should the state lose the case, all proceeds would be returned
to the taxpayers. 5
1. 1978 La. Acts, No. 294, adding LA. R.S. '47:1301-07. This Act provides for the
levy and collection of a tax upon the first use of natural gas produced outside the
territorial limits of the state. Act 294 defines "use" as:
the sale; the transportation in the state to the point of delivery at the inlet of
any processing plant; the transportation in the state of unprocessed natural gas
to the point of delivery at the inlet of any measurement or storage facility;
transfer of possession or relinquishment of control at a delivery point in the
state; processing for the extraction of liquifiable component products or waste
materials; use in manufacturing; treatment; or other ascertainable action at a
point within the state.
2. See The Proposed First-Use Tax on Natural Resources: Hearings On H.B. 768
Before The Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Comm. of the Louisiana Senate, 4th Reg. Sess.
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Use Tax Hearings] (Statement of A. C. Gardner, Jr.,
Southeastern Production Division Manager, Exxon Co., June 26, 1978).
3. Louisiana presently levies a tax of seven cents per thousand cubic feet on
natural gas at the point it is "severed" from the ground. Louisiana receives almost $500
million a year in revenues from severance taxes on oil and natural gas. The first-use
tax will be levied at a similar rate of seven cents per thousand cubic feet. Estimates
are that the tax will produce revenues of approximately $170 million a year. Thus, the
tax could extinguish the existing state debt of $1.7 billion in ten to fifteen years. Baton
Rouge Morning Advocate, June 7, 1978, § B, at 1.
4. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. McNamara, No. 78-384 (M.D. La.
1978).
5. Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, June 7, 1978, § B, at 1.
19781
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Act 2936 provides for the dedication of the revenues from
the tax by dividing the monies into two primary funds.
Twenty-five percent of the revenues will go into the Barrier
Islands Conservation Account and will be used exclusively to
conserve and maintain Louisiana's eroding coastline.7 The
remaining seventy-five percent of the revenues will be depos-
ited into the Initial Proceeds Account and the Debt Retirement
and Redemption Account. The Initial Proceeds Account will
receive the first $500 million of the tax proceeds. This sum
must be maintained in the account at all times and may be
used only for investment purposes. All monies in excess of the
first $500 million will be placed in the Debt Retirement and
Redemption Account and, except for investment purposes,
may be used solely to pay interest on current state debt, to
retire outstanding state debt, or to purchase state bonds in
advance of maturity. In the event the Debt Retirement and
Redemption Account is not funded or for any reason is de-
pleted, any portion of the Initial Proceeds Account's invest-
ment earnings that are not necessary to provide the required
$500 million balance may be used for any purpose for which the
Debt Retirement and Redemption Account may be used.
Act 7971 proposed an amendment to article IX of the state
constitution which would create the First Use Tax Fund in the
state treasury and establish the procedure for distribution of
the proceeds of the trust fund. The proposed amendment was
overwhelmingly approved by the voters of Louisiana last No-
vember, which means that seventy-five percent of the funds
generated by the first-use tax may be spent only for the purpose
of reducing the state's bonded indebtedness. Passage of the
amendment also insures that the established procedure for dis-
tribution of the proceeds will be insulated from any future
legislative alteration.
6. 1978 La. Acts, No. 293, adding LA. R.S. 47:1351.
7. In The Tidelands Case, 394 U.S. 11 (1969), the United States Supreme Court
held that the state's three-mile limit is "ambulatory," and therefore it is subject to
change as the state loses its coastline through erosion. The Barrier Islands Conserva-
tion Account will serve to protect against erosion and the resulting change in the three-
mile limit.
8. 1978 La. Acts, No. 797. This act proposed the addition of a ninth section to
article IX of the 1974 constitution. It should be noted that Act 797 represented the first
proposed amendment to the 1974 constitution submitted to Louisiana voters for ap-
proval or rejection.
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Proponents of the first-use tax offer two justifications for
the tax. First, they argue that the state is due compensation
from out-of-state consumers for damage to Louisiana's coastal
regions caused by the activities accompanying the production
of the natural gas.' Secondly, proponents argue that because
untaxed federal gas competes in the same markets as state gas,
which is taxed at seven cents per thousand cubic feet, sellers
of federal gas gain an unfair competitive advantage.
Opponents of the tax contend that because it exempts gas
produced within this state (intrastate gas) and also interstate
gas upon which severance taxes have been paid to other states,
it is discriminatory in nature. Opponents also contend that the
"pass-through" provision, 0 which passes the cost of the tax on
to consumers in other states, amounts to an abrogation of exist-
ing contracts between producers and pipeline companies. Fur-
thermore, opponents contend that the tax is in violation of the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act;" is neither fairly appor-
tioned between interstate and intrastate commerce, nor fairly
related to any benefit provided to the taxpayer; and is in viola-
tion of federal constitutional prohibitions against individual
9. Baton Rouge State Times, June 13, 1978, § B, at 1.
10. One of the key features of the tax is a "pass-through" provision which, if
approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, will allow pipelines to pass
the tax cost on to the consumer. The Commission presently allows pipeline companies
to make at least a ten percent profit, and the redactors of the first-use tax hope that
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission will allow the tax to be added to the price
that pipeline companies charge their customers. If, however, the Commission does not
allow the "pass-through" of the tax, some producers fear that the pipeline companies
will seek to recover the cost of the tax through contract arrangements with the produ-
cers whereby the producer agrees to assume all the costs of processing natural gas
liquids (methane, butane, propane) in exchange for the right to recover these liquids
from the gas when it comes ashore. Act 294 seeks to prevent this passback of the tax
from the pipeline company to the producer by declaring that any contract or agreement
by which an "owner" (i. e. a pipeline company) claims a right of reimbursement of such
taxes from any other party in interest, is against public policy and unenforceable. 1978
La. Acts, No. 294, adding LA. R.S. 47:1303(C). While proponents of the tax call this
restriction a "contract modification," opponents claim this attempts to make a con-
tractual provision unenforceable and, as such, amounts to an unconstitutional abroga-
tion of contract. See Use Tax Hearings, supra note 2; see also The Proposed First Use
Tax on Natural Resources: Hearings on H.B. 768 Before the Comm. on Ways and
Means of the Louisiana House of Representatives, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on H.B. 768] (Statement of M. Truman Woodward, Jr., Esq., June
6, 1978).
11. 43 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (1954).
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states taxing or interfering with interstate commerce. '2
In this writer's opinion, the first-use tax performs the same
function as does a conventional retail use tax by enabling in-
trastate sales to compete fairly with interstate sales. Presently,
all methane gas produced and processed in Louisiana is sub-
jected to a severance tax of seven cents per thousand cubic feet
as part of the cost to the state of affording protection to the gas
while processing is conducted. Conversely, the identical gas
processed in Louisiana plants and coming across the same
Louisiana shorelines, but from the outer continental shelf,
presently goes to market in and from Louisiana without bear-
ing its fair share of the state costs incident to affording protec-
tion and repairing damage caused by activities such as process-
ing and separation, which occur within the state. Through im-
position of a similar seven cents per thousand cubic feet tax on
gas produced on the outer continental shelf, the first-use tax
insures that all methane gas processed in Louisiana and con-
sumed either in or out of the state bears its fair share of the
incidental state costs. The result is that the use tax enables gas
that is produced and processed in Louisiana to compete fairly
with gas produced out-of-state but processed in Louisiana.
Consequently, the use tax should not be viewed as discrimina-
tory. On the contrary, it seems to remedy a discrimination
which has heretofore existed.
The purpose of the first-use tax is to insure that interstate
customers bear their fair share of the tax burden which would
otherwise be borne by citizens of Louisiana. Mere contribution
of a "fair share" should not be considered a burden on inter-
state commerce. As the Court said in Western Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue:" "It was not the purpose of the commerce
clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from
their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the
cost of doing business." Furthermore, it seems evident that any
possible impairment of contracts caused by this exercise of
state power is justified by the need for an equitable apportion-
ment of the tax burden on all methane gas separated and pre-
pared for marketing in Louisiana. The "uses" or activities
12. See Use Tax Hearings, supra note 2; see also Hearings on H.B. 768, supra
note 10.
13. 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
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taxed seem to have a substantial connection with the state in
that the transportation of the gas occurs solely within the
boundaries and over the shorelines of the state. The tax seems
fairly apportioned between interstate and intrastate commerce
in that it is levied upon all methane gas processed in Louisiana
which has not been previously taxed, whatever the ultimate
destination of the gas. Moreover, because the taxed activities
have the benefit of state protection while they are being con-
ducted, and because such activities often result in damage to
the Barrier Islands and the shoreline, the tax seems fairly re-
lated to a benefit to the taxpayer. Finally, since the tax is
justifiable as a legitimate and reasonable exercise of the state's
police power, it should be considered permissible under the due
process clause. There can be no deprivation of due process
when only the ultimate consumers of the gas bear the tax bur-
den."
AD VALOREM TAXES
The 1978 regular legislative session produced several
changes in the area of ad valorem taxation. Act 55715 amends
the statutes relative to redemption from and annulment of tax
sales and the procedure for quieting tax title. The Act provides
that nothing in these statutes shall affect the principle that
prescription does not begin to run against a tax debtor in pos-
session, or in favor of the tax ,title purchaser, until the tax
debtor/owner has first been dispossessed. The Act seems to
state, in general terms, that the peremptive period of five years
from the date of recordation of a tax deed does not run if the
property sold at the tax sale has been subject to open, actual,
14. A recent study conducted by the Library of Congress adds support to Loui-
siana's attempt to levy the first-use tax. The study noted the following points:
States are allowed to tax products in interstate commerce when work is
performed on them within the state's borders. The first use tax would apply to
natural gas that is processed, sold, treated and stored within Louisiana.
The federal gas would be taxed at the same rate that intrastate gas is taxed.
The area falling under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act cannot be
taxed, but the study said it is the gas that's to be taxed not the land.
The sites from which the gas is drawn are part of the United States, so the
gas cannot be considered an import. A state cannot tax imports without ap-
proval from Congress.
Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Sept. 5, 1978, § A, at 8.
15. 1978 La. Acts, No. 557, amending LA. R.S. 47:2221, 14:2228 (1950).
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and corporeal possession by the tax debtor or his successors."
The Act fails, however, to point out that the tax purchaser is
not always required to take corporeal possession of the property
in order to dispossess the tax debtor/owner. When dealing with
undeveloped land, it is sufficient for the purchaser to record his
tax deed and be afforded the protection of the five-year per-
emption by thus acquiring civil or constructive possession. 7
Act 530's provides for an additional requirement for tax
debtors paying ad valorem taxes on immovable property lo-
cated in Louisiana.' In addition to returning the notice with a
remittance of the tax due on such property, the tax debtor now
must also designate on the notice the country of which he is a
citizen. If the tax debtor is a citizen of one or more countries,
or a resident alien of one or more countries, .each country and
the-status of the tax debtor in that country must be designated
on the notice.
Act 530 further provides that if the tax debtor is a corpora-
tion, it shall designate the country 6r countries of citizenship
of any individuals who are not American citizens and own or
control a majority of the voting stock."0 The reporting of indi-
vidual stockholders shall begin with the largest stockholder
and proceed toward the smallest until 51% of the stock is
listed.2 Failure to supply the ownership designation or the
16. See, e.g., Lesseigne v. Clement, 311 So. 2d 600 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 313 So. 2d 846 (La. 1975).
17. Id. at 602.
18. 1978 La. Acts, No. 530, adding LA. R.S. 47:2101.1.
19. LA. R.S. 47:2101 (1950) requires that immediately following the filing of the
tax roll by the assessor in each calendar year, the tax collector with whom such tax
roll is filed shall mail a notice, by post card or letter, to each tax debtor listed on the
tax roll. The notice must disclose the amount of taxes due by the tax debtor for the
current year, the ward in which the property taxed is located, and the number of the
assessment. The tax debtor is required to return the notice to the tax collector with a
remittance.
20. A corporation or real estate investment trust which is subject to the provi-
sions of Act 530, and which is listed on the American Stock Exchange or the New York
Stock Exchange, may state the exchange on which the corporation is listed in lieu of
designating the citizenship of the major stockholders.
21. Act 530 also provides for the method of designating citizenship on the tax
notice where the tax debtor is owned or controlled by or is a subsidiary of one or more
corporations or holding companies. See 1978 La. Acts, No. 530, adding LA. R.S.
47:2101(C)(2), (3). Act 530 further provides that if the tax debtor is a partnership,
business association, or other unincorporated business entity, it must list the country
or countries of which each of the partners, associates, or members is a citizen or
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making of any false statement in connection therewith will be
punishable by a fine of not less than fifty dollars or more than
ten thousand dollars for each violation. It appears very likely
that the motive behind this requirement of designation of citi-
zenship on tax notices is to provide a method of determining
the extent of investment by foreign oil-producing nations in
immovable property. Many states have passed similar legisla-
tion in response to fears concerning the degree of control and
influence which countries among the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries might gain as their investments in-
crease. However, it seems questionable whether the legislation
will really accomplish anything, unless a record is kept of the
immovable property owned primarily by foreign investors.
Senate Bill 519,2 which failed to pass, was introduced pri-
marily to provide a tax break for farmers who sell their farm
lands for another use. Under existing law, if property assessed
as agricultural land is sold for other purposes, the farmer must
pay the equivalent of the deferred tax for the current year and
the preceding four tax years, based on the proposed new use of
the property. Senate Bill 519 would have deleted this deferred
tax disadvantage from the state's tax laws. However, it is argu-
able that such a tax break would have resulted in windfall
profits for real estate developers who have kept property that
is prime for residential development classified as agricultural
land, thus being able to take advantage of the lower value
assessments that are provided for agricultural land.13 Had the
resident alien, and the percentage or participation of each partner, associate, or mem-
ber. If a partnership member is a corporation, that corporation is required to designate
the citizenship of its stockholders in accordance with the above described procedures.
If the tax debtor is a trust, the tax debtor must designate the countries of which each
of the beneficiaries, whether an individual, a partnership, an association, a corpora-
tion, or any other entity, is a citizen or resident alien, and the percentage of each
beneficiary's participation.
22. La. S.B. 519, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978).
23. LA. R.S. 47:2303 (Supp. 1976) provides that in order for property to be classi-
fied as bona fide agricultural land and assessed as such: (1) it must be at least ten
acres in size or have produced an average gross annual income of at least $2,000 in one
or more of the designated uses (agricultural, horticultural, marsh, or timber land) for
the four preceding years; and (2) the landowner must have signed an agreement that
the land will be devoted to one or more of the designated uses as defined by LA. R.S.
47:2302 (Supp. 1976). Thus, a landowner may make his property eligible for the more
favorable agricultural use value assessment if his property consists of more than 10
acres, and the landowner signs the necessary agreement and shows some indicia of
agricultural use.
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proposed legislation passed, a real estate developer would have
been able to convert agricultural land into residential or com-
mercial property without having to pay any deferred taxes.
LEGISLATIVE SYMPOSIUM
CRIMINAL LAW
HOMICIDE
In State v. Kennedy' and State v. Moore,2 the Louisiana
courts applied the common law rule that a killing does not
constitute the crime of murder if more than a year and a day
intervenes between the injury and the death of the victim.'
This "year and a day" rule was expressly included in article 29
of the Criminal Code,' but has been criticized as being unnec-
essary in light of the technical advances in medical science. 5
Act 393, however, eliminates the requirement that death occur
within one year in order for there to be a homicide.' Criminal
actions may now be prosecuted in cases where death occurs
more than a year after the initial act, procurement, or culpable
omission of the perpetrator, as long as the prosecution can
satisfactorily meet its burden of proving that the defendant's
conduct was in fact the proximate cause of the victim's de-
mise.7
SECOND DEGREE MURDER
Act 657 of 1976 amended the second degree murder stat-
ute, redefining the crime of second degree murder to include
only felony murder.8 Act 121 of 1977 added a second definition:
"the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific
intent to kill," provided that there are no aggravating circum-
1. 8 Rob. 590 (La. 1845).
2. 196 La. 617, 199 So. 661 (1940).
3. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 266 (1972):
Several centuries ago, when doctors knew very little about medicine, the judges
created an absolute rule of law: one cannot be guilty of murder if the victim lives
a year and a day after the blow. The difficulty in proving that the blow caused
the death after so long an interval was obviously the basis of the rule.
4. LA. R.S. 14:29 (1950 & Supp. 1973).
5. See Rault, On Louisiana's New Homicide Statutes: Purpose, Constitution-
ality and Problems of Interpretation, 19 Loy. L. REv. 570-71 (1973); Morrow, The
Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942-Opportunities Lost and Challenges Yet
Unanswered, 17 TUL. L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1942).
6. 1978 La. Acts, No. 393, amending LA. R.S. 14:29 (1950 & Supp. 1973).
7. See State v. Holmes, 258 La. 221, 245 So. 2d 707 (1971).
8. 1976 La. Acts, No. 657, amending LA. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1975).
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stances.' This provision was duplicative since killing with a
specific intent to kill, but without aggravating circumstances, 0
was already defined as a species of first degree murder in Re-
vised Statutes 14:30 and article 905.3 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure." The new definition was criticized as establishing
two different penalties for the same crime without any stand-
ard for determining which would be appropriate. 2 Act 796 of
1978 eliminates this superfluous definition of second degree
murder and also increases the penalty for second degree mur-
der to prohibit entirely any possibility of probation or suspen-
sion of sentence. 3
ASSAULT AND BATTERY
Upon the recommendation of the Louisiana State Law In-
stitute, the legislature has revised the Criminal Code provi-
sions on assault, battery, and related offenses as part of an
effort to remove specialized statutes from the Criminal Code. 4
Prior to the 1978 legislation, the definition of simple battery
required that the battery be committed "without a dangerous
weapon."" As such, it was arguable that the burden was on the
9. 1977 La. Acts, No. 121, amending LA. R. S. 14:30.1(B) (Supp. 1976).
10. The aggravating circumstances referred to by LA. R.S. 14:30.1(B) (Supp.
1977) (as it appeared prior to Act 796 of 1978) can be found in LA. CODE CaM. P. art.
905.4.
11. LA. R.S. 14:30 (Supp. 1976) provides:
First degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has
a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
Whoever commits the crime of first degree murder shall be punished by
death or life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation,
or suspension of sentence in accordance with the recommendation of the jury.
See LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 905.3 which provides:
A sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury finds beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists and, after
consideration of any mitigating circumstances, recommends that the sentence
of death be imposed. The jury shall be furnished with a copy of the statutory
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
12. See The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1977 Regular Ses-
sion-Criminal Law, 38 LA. L. Rav. 125, 126 (1977).
13. 1978 La. Acts, No. 796, amending LA. R.S. 14:30.1 (1950 & Supp. 1977).
14. Subpart B of Part II of Chapter 1 of the Criminal Code was revised by 1978
La. Acts, No. 394, amending LA. R.S. 14:33 (1950), 14:33.1 (Supp. 1972), 14:34 (1950),
14:34.1 (Supp. 1960), 14:35 (Supp. 1968), 14:35.1 (Supp. 1970), 14:36 (1950), 14:37
(Supp. 1968), 14:38 (1950), 14:39 (Supp. 1968), 14:40 (1950).
15. LA. R.S. 14:35 (1950 & Supp. 1968) (as it appeared prior to Act 394 of 1978).
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prosecution to prove as an element of the offense that the de-
fendant was unarmed. Act 394 of 1978 eliminates this require-
ment" and thus allows prosecution for simple battery even if a
dangerous weapon was used. 7
In addition to aggravated battery and simple battery, a
new category of battery has been created. Second degree bat-
tery is one committed without the consent of the victim, when
the offender "intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury.' 1 8 Se-
rious bodily injury is defined as "bodily injury" which involves
"unconsciousness, extreme physical pain or protracted and
obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or a
substantial risk of death."' 9 It should be noted that "serious
bodily injury" requires a greater degree of harm than mere
"bodily injury." This variance is in accord with the provisions
of the statute's source articles.20 Unlike aggravated battery and
simple battery, this statute will apparently place the burden
on the prosecution to introduce evidence of the extent of the
victim's injuries.2
16. 1978 La. Acts, No. 394, amending LA. R.S. 14:35 (1950 & Supp. 1968).
17. LA. R.S. 14:35 (1950 & Supp. 1968), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 394,
provides in part: "Simple battery is a battery committed without the consent of the
victim."
18. 1978 La. Acts, No. 394, amending LA. R.S. 14:34.1 (Supp. 1960).
19. LA. R.S. 14:34.1 (Supp. 1960), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 394.
20. Compare section 109 of the proposed FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE with article 210
of the MODEL PENAL CODE. Section 109 of the proposed FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE pro-
vides:
(b) "bodily injury" means any impairment of physical condition, including
physical pain.
(aj) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a substantial
risk of death or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, unconsciousness,
extreme pain, or permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily member or organ.
Proposed Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on Title 18, United States
Code Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 163 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Reform
of the Federal Criminal Laws]. Article 210 of the MODEL PENAL CODE provides:
§210.0(2) "bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of
physical condition.
§210.0(3) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a substan-
tial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or pro-
tracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.
21. The requirement that the victim suffer "serious bodily injury" may raise
interesting questions regarding appellate review of the jury's findings on this issue. See
State v. Jones, 298 So. 2d 774 (La. 1974).
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Under the former law, persons who acted without a dan-
gerous weapon, and yet inflicted crippling injuries upon the
victim, could only be prosecuted for the crime of simplb bat-
tery. Consequently, the possible penalty for the perpetrator
was disproportionately lenient in relation to the harm suffered
by the victim. As a result of the new law, persons convicted of
second degree battery may now receive a more appropriate
penalty.
Act 69722 of 1978 repealed article 35.1, which set forth the
crime of battery in particular circumstances. The only effect of
this act was to eliminate the crime of throwing missiles at
parades,21 because the second part of article 35.1, the crime of
mingling harmful substances, was reenacted by Act 394 as arti-
cle 38.1.21
TERRORIZING
Another addition to this 'section of the Criminal Code is
the crime of terrorizing.2 A person is guilty of terrorizing if he
intentionally communicates certain information which he
knows to be false. The proscribed information must claim that
the commission of a violent crime is imminent or in progress,
or that "a circumstance dangerous to human life exists or is
about to exist." The third element of the crime is that the
person's actions must either cause someone "to be in sustained
fear of his or another person's safety," cause "evacuation of a
building, a public structure, or a facility of transportation," or
cause other "serious disruption to the public."2 This article,
which is similar to Section 1614(b) of the proposed Federal
Criminal Code, will reach acts of public terrorism such as
bomb scares."
It should be noted that terrorizing as defined by Act 394
seems to encompass acts which were already proscribed under
22. 1978 La. Acts, No. 697, repealing LA. R.S. 14:35.1 (Supp. 1970).
23. LA. R.S. 14:35.1 (Supp. 1970) (as it appeared prior to its repeal by Act 697
of 1978). This provision was the result of an incident in New Orleans in which local
entertainer Al Hirt, while riding atop a Mardi Gras parade float, was struck by a brick
thrown from the crowd.
24. 1978 La. Acts, No. 394, adding LA. R.S. 14:38.1.
25. 1978 La. Acts, No. 394, adding LA. R.S. 14:40.1.
26. LA. R.S. 14:40.1 (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 394.
27. Proposed Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, supra note 20, at 332.
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Louisiana law. For instance, article 54.1 of the Criminal Code
makes it unlawful to convey false information concerning arson
or attempted arson, 8 while Act 394 is brdader and prohibits
communication of false information relative to any "crime of
violence." ' Since arson or attempted arson under article 52
includes "damaging by any explosive substance," acts such as
bomb scares may now be subject to two different penalties
without any standard for determining which is more appropri-
ate.3'
Although Act 394 reenacted the entire Criminal Code sec-
tion dealing with assault and battery, 3 no mention was made
of former article 34.1, which prohibited aggravated battery re-
sulting from breach of the peace. 33 Enacted as a result of the
civil rights "sit in" demonstrations in 1960, this seldom used
statute was of questionable constitutionality. Former article
34.1 provided stiff penalties for persons whose conduct caused
a breach of the peace or incited a riot, if another person was
maimed, killed, or injured as a result.rs
BURGLARY
Perhaps in response to the increasing problem of residen-
tial burglaries, Act 745 of 1978 creates the crime of simple
burglary of an inhabited dwelling.36 This article applies to the
unauthorized entry of any "inhabited dwelling, house, apart-
ment, or other structure used in whole or in part as a home or
place of abode by a person or persons" with the intent to com-
mit a felony or theft therein, other than as set forth in the
article dealing with aggravated burglary.37 Aggravated burglary
28. LA. R.S. 14:54.1 (Supp. 1970).
29. 1978 La. Acts, No. 394, adding LA. R.S. 14:40.1.
30. LA. R.S. 14:52 (1950 & Supp. 1977).
31. This disparity of possible sentences is by no means insignificant. The maxi-
mum possible sentence under article 54.1 is twenty years at hard labor, while the
maximum sentence for terrorizing under article 40.1 is six months and a five hundred
dollar fine.
32. See note 14, supra, and accompanying text.
33. LA. R.S. 14:34.1 (Supp. 1960) (as it appeared prior to its repeal by Act 394
of 1978).
34. See Wollet, Race Relations, 21 LA. L. Rzv. 85 (1960).
35. LA. R.S. 14:34.1 (Supp. 1960) (as it appeared prior to its repeal by Act 394
of 1978).
36. 1978 La. Acts, No. 745, adding LA. R.S. 14:62.2.
37. LA. R.S. 14:62.2 (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 745.
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already affords protection against unauthorized entry of vir-
tually every type of structure whenever the offender is armed,
arms himself, or commits a battery during the burglary.
Under the old law, if a residence was burglarized, but the of-
fender was neither armed nor committed a battery, then the
crime would only be a simple burglary.39 After Act 745, article
62.2 will apply to any burglary of a residence that is not an
aggravated burglary. 9
The sentencing provision for simple burglary of an inhab-
ited dwelling is written somewhat ambiguously. It provides
that "whoever commits the crime of simple burglary of an in-
habited dwelling shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less
than one year, without benefit of parole, probation or suspen-
sion of sentence, nor more than twelve years." 4' Thus, it is un-
clear whether the denial of the benefit of parole, probation, or
suspension of sentence was intended to apply to the minimum
one year sentence or to the entire term. Presumably, only the
first year must be without benefit of parole, probation, or sus-
pension of sentence. 2
THEFT
Act 222 lengthens the list of the types of livestock pro-
tected by article 67.1 of the Criminal Code. 3 Article 67.1 now
defines livestock to mean "any animal, hybrid, mixture, or
mutation of the species of horses, mules, donkeys, asses, cattle,
swine, sheep, goats, domesticated deer, buffalo, bison, beefalo,
or oxen."" The reference to "any animal" in the Act is some-
38. LA. R.S. 14:60 (1950).
39. See LA. R.S. 14:62, comment (1950 & Supp. 1977). "If any of the essentials
of one of the more serious types of burglary is lacking, the offender then commits the
crime of simple burglary with a lesser maximum penalty provided therefor."
40. 1978 La. Acts, No. 745, adding LA. R.S. 14:62.2.
41. LA. R.S. 14:62.2 (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 745.
42. Compare the sentence provision for simple battery of an inhabited dwelling
with the sentence provision for armed robbery, which mandates that the- entire sen-
tence imposed be without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. LA.
R.S. 14:64 (Supp. 1966) provides: "Whoever commits the crime of armed robbery shall
be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five years and for not more than ninety-
nine years, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence."
43. 1978 La. Acts, No. 222, amending LA. R.S. 14:67.1 (Supp. 1975).
44. 1978 La. Acts, No. 222, amending LA. R.S. 14:67.1 (Supp. 1975). Prior to the
1978 amendment, article 67.1 made it unlawful to take or misappropriate cattle,
horses, mules, sheep, hogs, or goats.
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what ambiguous, but a proper reading of the Act would restrict
its applicability to any animal of the species mentioned, the
listing of animals being considered exclusive.
In addition to broadening the definition of livestock, Act
222 proscribes the transportation of livestock to a slaughter-
house or an auction sale barn if the animals are then assigned
in the record book in a name other than that of the owner. An
intent to deprive the owner permanently of the funds derived
from the sale is essential;15 but in effect, the Act provides for a
presumption that the person who brings the animals to the
slaughterhouse and falsely registers them in the name of the
owner is the thief.
The presumption created by this statute is analogous to
that created by Revised Statutes 15:432, which states that the
law presumes that the person in the unexplained possession of
recently stolen property is the thief." To the extent that the
defendant is then required to testify to overcome the presump-
tion, there is possibly an infringement on his right not to tes-
tify. 7 However, a flexible standard has thus far been applied
in judging the reasonableness of this presumption; and, there-
fore, the presumption may be sustainable since there is a ra-
tional connection between the fact proved and the ultimate
fact presumed.8
It is unfortunate that the Louisiana Criminal Code is be-
coming more complicated by specialized theft provisions such
as article 67.1. Article 67 clearly and simply states the funda-
mental notion that it is criminally and socially wrong to take
the property of another, in any fashion whatsoever;" and Act
222 seems to be an unnecessary addition.
SEX OFFENSES
An effort is being made by the Louisiana legislature to
eliminate sexually discriminatory provisions from the Louisi-
45. Id.
46. LA. R.S. 15:432 (1950).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. V. But see State v. McQueen, 278 So. 2d 114 (La. 1973),
in which the court upheld the constitutionality of LA. R.S. 15:432 (1950).
48. See Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974, 35 LA. L. REv. 1, 52 (1974).
49. See LA. R.S. 14:67, comment (Supp. 1972).
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ana Criminal Code. Several bills were passed which endeavor
to extend the definitions of certain statutory crimes to include
both men and women, as well as to extend protection' from
sexual offenses to both sexes.
Prior to its 1978 amendment, article 80 of the Criminal
Code, dealing with carnal knowledge of a juvenile, made it
unlawful for "anyone" over the age of 17 to have sexual.inter-
course with any unmarried "female person" of the age of twelve
years or over, but under the age of seventeen years, when there
was an age difference of greater than two years between the two
persons."0 Act 757 of 1978 continues the traditional prohibition
of sexual intercourse between adult males and minor unmar-
ried females.5 However, article 80(2) now extends protection to
minor "person(s)" from "anal or oral sexual intercourse" with
a "person" over the age of seventeen." Both male and female
juveniles are granted protections under this act which were not
provided by the former article 80.11 However, this provision is
arguably unconstitutional due to the arbitrary classification
which makes adult-female/minor-unmarried-male anal or oral
intercourse subject to criminal penalties while placing no re-
striction on adult-female/minor-unmarried-male vaginal sex-
ual intercourse. Given the apparent legislative policy of ex-
tending statutory protections to the sexually unsophisticated of
both sexes, it would be difficult to justify the disparate treat-
ment of the different sexual acts. 4
Act 49 of 1977 amended the Criminal Code article on pros-
titution so as to prohibit acts of male prostitution.55 Prostitu-
tion had been defined as applying only to women prostitutes,
50. LA. R.S. 14:80 (1950 & Supp. 1977) (as it appeared prior to Act 757 of 1978).
51. 1978 La. Acts, No. 757, amending LA. R.S. 14:80 (1950 & Supp. 1977). Article
80(1) provides: "Carnal knowledge of a juvenile is committed when: (1) A male over
the age of seventeen has sexual intercourse, with consent, with any unmarried female
of the age of twelve years or more, but under the age of seventeen years, when there is
an age difference of greater than two years between the two persons ... .
52. 1978 La. Acts, No. 757, amending LA. R.S. 14:80 (1950 & Supp. 1977). Article
80(2) provides that carnal knowledge of a juvenile is committed when: "A person over
the age of seventeen has anal or oral sexual intercourse, with consent, with a person of
the age of twelve years or more, but under the age of seventeen years, when there is
an age difference of greater than two years between the two persons."
53. Id. Anal and oral sexual intercourse are now prohibited between either male
or female adults and male or female minors.
54. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
55. 1977 La. Acts, No. 49, amending LA. R.S. 14:82 (1950).
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but in 1977 its definition was extended to apply to any
"person."" Using a similar approach, Act 434 of 197811 broad-
ens the crime of enticing minors into prostitution to encompass
male prostitution by amending article 86 to protect "any per-
son."5
Prior to its amendment in 1978, article 84 of the Criminal
Code prohibited male pandering of female prostitutes. Act 219
of 1978 broadens article 84 to prohibit pandering by either
males or females with respect to prostitutes of either sex. 59 Also,
under the former provision receiving or accepting "as support
or maintenance" anything of value known to be from the earn-
ings of any female engaged in prostitution constituted pander-
ing." The substantive requirements of this aspect of the crime
have been amended to require that what is received or accepted
from the earnings of "any person" engaged in prostitution con-
stitute "a substantial part of' the support or maintenance of
the person receiving it."1
Act 612 of 1975 classified rape into two categories: hetero-
sexual rape, i.e., a male engaging in sexual intercourse with a
female without her consent; 2 and homosexual rape, i.e., a male
engaging in anal sexual intercourse with a male without his
consent." Act 239 of 197811 consolidates these classifications
into one provision. Rape is now defined as an act of "anal or
vaginal sexual intercourse" with a "male or female person"
who is not the "spouse" of the offender, committed without
that "person's" lawful consent. 5 As a result of this amend-
ment, the rape provision is now broad enough to cover circum-
stances to which the former article was not applicable, such as
male anal rape of a female or female vaginal rape of a male.
Additionally, Act 239 amended the Criminal Code provisions
dealing with aggravated rape,"6 forcible rape, 7 and simple
56. LA. R.S. 14:82 (1950 & Supp. 1977).
57. 1978 La. Acts, No. 434 amending LA. R.S. 14:86 (1950).
58. Id.
59. 1978 La. Acts, No. 219, amending LA. R.S. 14:84 (1950).
60. LA. R.S. 14:84 (1950) (as it appeared prior to Act 219 of 1978).
61. 1978 La. Acts, No. 219, amending LA. R.S. 14:84 (1950).
62. 1975 La. Acts, No. 612, amending LA. R.S. 14:41 (1950).
63. Id.
64. 1978 La. Acts, No. 239, amending LA. R.S. 14:41 (Supp. 1975).
65. LA. R.S. 14:41 (Supp. 1978), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 239.
66. 1978 La. Acts, No. 239, attending LA. R.S. 14:42 (1950 & Supp. 1977).
67. 1978 La. Acts, No. 239, amending LA. R.S. 14:43.1 (1975 & Supp. 1977).
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rape"8 to make them coincide with the new definition of rape.
A new addition to this section of the Criminal Code is the
crime of sexual battery. 9 Sexual battery is intentionally e~igag-
ing in a "sexual act" with another person who is not the of-
fender's spouse, where the offender compels the victim to sub-
mit by placing him or her in fear of receiving bodily harm.7 Act
239 defines "sexual act" as contact between the penis and the
vulva, the penis and the anus, the mouth or tongue and the
penis, or the mouth or tongue and the vulva.7' As a result of
this provision, prosecutors are extended greater latitude in pe-
nalizing sexual offenses which fall short of rape.72
68. 1978 La. Acts, No. 239, amending LA. R.S. 14:43 (Supp. 1975).
69. LA. R.S. 14:43.1 (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 239.
70. Id.
71. Id. See also Proposed Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, supra note 20,
at 344, 346.
72. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 14:89.1 (Supp. 1962) (aggravated crime against nature).
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HEALTH LEGISLATION
ABORTION GUIDELINES
With an eye to United States Supreme Court decisions,
the Louisiana legislature passed a very restricted, yet suspect,
abortion bill. Act 435 provides that no physician can perform
an abortion after the fetus is viable.' Viability is presumed if
more than twenty-four weeks have elapsed from the beginning
of the last menstrual period of the pregnant woman, but the
presumption can be overcome if the physician certifies in writ-
ing that the unborn child is not viable.' In addition, all abor-
tions after the first trimester must be performed in a hospital,3
and the physician must prepare a confidential report concern-
ing the abortion.'
Other provisions of the Act involve notice and consent
requirements. The physician must wait twenty-four hours after
the pregnant woman signs an informed written consent before
performing the abortion.5 Abortions cannot be performed on a
minor unless notice is given to one parent' and cannot be per-
formed on a woman under the age of fifteen years without one
parent's written consent, except by court order.'
In Roe v. Wade,' the United States Supreme Court held
that a prohibition of abortions before viability, the point at
which the fetus can live outside the mother's womb, was an
1. 1978 La. Acts, No. 435, adding LA. R.S. 40:1299.35.4. An abortion can be
performed after viability if it is necessary to protect the health of the mother, but the
physician must try to preserve the life of the unborn child if viability is presumed. Id.
2. Id. The physician must certify in writing that the particular unborn child is
not viable and must specify the precise medical findings upon which he bases that
judgment.
3. 1978 La. Acts, No. 435, adding LA. R.S. 40:1299.35.3.
4. 1978 La. Acts, No. 435, adding LA. R.S. 40:1299.35.10. This abortion report
must be submitted to the Department of Health and Human Resources which prepares
an annual statistical report based on such data.
5. 1978 La. Acts, No. 435, adding LA. R.S. 40:1299.35.7.
6. Twenty-four hour actual notice or seventy-two hour constructive notice must
be given to one of the parents or the legal guardian of the minor. 1978 La. Acts, No.
435, adding LA. R.S. 40:1299.35.5.
7. Id.
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy? However,
after the first trimester the state can regulate abortion proce-
dures to protect the health of the mother, 0 and the state can
completely proscribe abortion after viability unless the abor-
tion is necessary to preserve the health of the mother." In Doe
v. Bolton,"2 the Court held that a requirement that abortions
during the first trimester be performed in a hospital was uncon-
stitutional. 3 In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, ,4 the Court concluded that the legislature cannot fix
viability at a specific point in the gestation period, because
that is a matter for a physician's judgment. 5 The Court also
held that the requirement that parental consent be obtained
before an abortion is performed on a minor was unconstitu-
tional,I but upheld the requirement that a woman's prior writ-
ten consent to the abortion be obtained. 7 Reporting require-
ments which were concerned with maternal health and were
kept confidential were also found constitutional. 8
Act 435 was obviously passed to restrict abortions as much
as possible without offending any of the direct holdings of these
cases. Notwithstanding this attempt, some of the Act's provi-
sions are of questionable constitutionality. The United States
Supreme Court has said that it is not a legislative function to
determine viability, as this is a matter for a physician's judg-
ment, 9 and therefore, the new presumption of viability may be
exposed to valid constitutional objections. However, the Act's
presumption is not as restrictive as a legislative determination
of viability, because the physician can perform an abortion
9. Id. at 163.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 163-64.
12. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
13. Id. at 195.
14. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
15. Id. at 64. A United States District Court, in Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F.
Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974), held a statute fixing the point of viability unconstitu-
tional.
16. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
17. Id. at 67. Footnote 8 of Planned Parenthood's majority opinion states, "One
might well wonder, offhand, just what 'informed consent' of a patient is. . . . [W]e
are content to accept, as the meaning, the giving of information to the patient as to
just what would be done and as to its consequences." Id. at 67 n.8.
18. Id. at 81.
19. Id. at 64.
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even though viability is presumed by certifying in writing that
the unborn child is not viable. 0 This ability to overcome the
presumption may save the provision from invalidation.
The requirement that an abortion be performed in a hospi-
tal after the first trimester is constitutional if such a require-
ment is necessary to protect the health of the woman, because
this state interest is compelling during the second and third
trimesters.2 However, Act 435's abortion report provision may
not be constitutional, because it requires the report to include
information concerning the patient's race and educational
background." Reporting requirements that are reasonably di-
rected to the preservation of maternal health are permissible, 3
but information regarding race and educational background
bears no relation to the interest of maternal health. However,
it could be argued that the state has a compelling interest in
educating its citizens in the area of birth control and abortions,
and that information about race and educational background
could be used to identify which persons were most in need of
education about these matters.
The Supreme Court has upheld a requirement that a
woman's prior written consent to the abortion be obtained.24
The Court reasoned that the consent procedure is justified by
the need to insure that the decision be made with full knowl-
edge of its nature and consequences. 5 The Louisiana statute,
however, does more than provide the woman with full knowl-
edge; it requires the physician to tell the woman that "the
unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception"
and to describe in detail the anatomical and physiological
characteristics of the particular unborn child .2 This provision
seems to serve no other purpose than to increase the likelihood
20. See note 2, supra.
21. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
22. 1978 La. Acts, No. 435, adding LA. R.S. 40:1299.35.10.
23. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976). Recordkeeping and
reporting requirements must also properly respect a patient's confidentiality and pri-
vacy in order to be constitutional. Id. Act 435 does meet this requirement. 1978 La.
Acts, No. 435, adding LA. R.S. 40:1299.35.10.
24. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976). See text at note 17,
supra.
25. Id.
26. 1978 La. Acts, No. 435, adding LA. R.S. 40:1299.35.6. The woman must also
be told that the abortion can result in severe emotional disturbances.
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that a woman will forego the abortion, thereby protecting the
potentiality of human life. However, the Supreme Court has
held that the state's compelling interest to regulate abortions
only arises at the point of viability," and because these particu-
lar aspects of the informed consent requirement regulate all
abortions and not just those performed after viability, they are
likely to be an unconstitutional invasion of the woman's right
to privacy.
In Planned Parenthood, the Court held unconstitutional a
requirement that parental consent be obtained before the per-
forming of an abortion upon a woman under the age of eigh-
teen. 8 The majority opinion stated that the state's interest in
safeguarding the family unit and parental authority would not
be furthered by requiring such consent. 9 The Court also em-
phasized the fact that under the Missouri provision the parents
had a veto power over the minor's decision to have an abor-
tion,30 and the same is true under Act 435's requirement that
parental consent be obtained before an abortion is performed
on a minor under the age of fifteen. However, the Supreme
Court in Bellotti v. Baird3' indicated that at some point a
minor may not be able to give an informed consent, 2 and girls
27. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court stated: "With respect to the
State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point is at
viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful
life outside the mother's womb." Id. at 163.
28. 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
29. Id. at 75. The Court reasoned that providing parents with this veto power was
unlikely to strengthen the family unit. They also concluded, "Inleither is it likely that
such veto power will enhance parental authority or control where the minor and the
nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the
pregnancy already has fractured the family structure." Id.
30. Id. Justice Stewart's majority opinion stated: "The fault with [the provi-
sioni is that it imposes a special-consent provision, exercisable by a person other than
the woman and her physician, as a prerequisite to a minor's termination of her preg-
nancy and does so without a sufficient justification for the restriction." Id. In Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976), the Court refused to decide the constitutionality of a
similar Massachusetts statute involving parental consent because "the District Court
should have abstained [from deciding this issue] pending the construction of the
statute by the Massachusetts courts." 428 U.S. at 146. The Court in Bellotti once more
indicated that the question of an abortion statute's constitutionality depends on the
extent to which it burdens a woman's decision to have an abortion. See also Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-4 (1977).
31. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
32. The Court's opinion stated that "there were unquestionably greater risks of
inability to give an informed consent" when minors were involved. Id. at 147.
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under fifteen may be young enough to fit under Bellotti's rea-
soning. Also, Louisiana's new law is less burdensome than it
might be because it allows a minor under the age of fifteen to
obtain an abortion by court order if both parents refuse to
consent. The new requirement that parents of all minors be
notified of a pending abortion may also be unconstitutional,
unless a notice requirement can be said to further the state's
interest in safeguarding the family unit and parental authority
more than a consent requirement.
Despite its attempt to comply with the Supreme Court's
decision, the Act's future is in doubt. Several women's clinics
have filed suit in federal court to enjoin the enforcement of Act
435 on the ground that it is unconstitutional .3
A second act regarding abortions prohibits the use of pub-
lic funds for an abortion .3 This legislation was prompted by
Maher v. Roe, 36 which involved Connecticut's proscription of
the use of public funds for abortions. According to Maher, "the
right [to privacy] protects the woman from unduly burden-
some interference with her freedom to decide whether to termi-
nate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the authority
of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of
public funds. '3 7
INTERDICTION
Act 680 implements needed protection for the mentally
retarded by succinctly stating their rights and privileges. First,
the Act seeks to insure that no individual is involuntarily com-
mitted to an institution for the mentally retarded unless he is
in need of such a commitment. A judicial hearing must be
conducted 3 at which the mentally retarded individual has a
33. 1978 La. Acts, No. 435, adding LA. R.S. 40:1299.35.5.
34. Margaret S. v. Edwards, No. 79-2765 (E.D. La. 1978).
35. 1978 La. Acts, No. 704, adding LA. R.S. 40:1299.35.
36. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
37. Id. at 473-74.
38. 1978 La. Acts, No. 680, adding LA. R.S. 28:398. The court can commit an
individual to a mental retardation facility only when the evidence indicates that the
needs of the individual can be adequately met by care in that type of facility.
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right to an attorney,39 a right to be present at the hearing,"° and
a right to subpoena"' and cross examine witnesses."2 In addi-
tion, the court must order a diagnosis and evaluation by a
"diagnosis and evaluation team" before committing any per-
son.13 This comprehensive diagnosis and evaluation must also
be made before an individual can voluntarily commit himself
to an institution for the mentally retarded," unless an emer-
gency is involved" or special care for a brief period of time is
needed." In the latter two instances, substantial evidence that
the individual is retarded is still required.47
The new law also establishes a Bill of Rights for the men-
tally retarded person." Every mentally retarded person has the
right to live in the least restrictive setting appropriate to his
individual needs and abilities,49 to receive a prompt compre-
hensive diagnosis, 0 to contest the findings of the diagnostic
team,5' to receive periodic rediagnosis, 2 to obtain a written
individualized training and education program, 3 to withdraw
from voluntary services,5 and to be informed of his rights.5
Residents of retardation facilities have additional rights in-
cluding the right to communicate by uncensored mail,5" to re-
39. Id. If the mentally retarded person has no attorney, the court must appoint
one to represent him, and the attorney must be granted access to all of the mentally
retarded person's records.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 1978 La. Acts, No. 680, adding LA. R.S..28:394. The diagnosis and evaluation
must show that the services of the facility are appropriate to the needs of the individ-
ual.
45. 1978 La. Acts, No. 680, adding LA. R.S. 28:392. An emergency exists when
there is an immediate and compelling need for short-term training, treatment, or care.
Id.
46. 1978 La. Acts, No. 680, adding LA. R.S. 28:392, 28:396.
47. 1978 La. Acts, No. 680, adding LA. R.S. 28:395-96.
48. 1978 La. Acts, No. 680, adding LA. R.S. 28:390-91.
49. 1978 La. Acts, No. 680, adding LA. R.S. 28:390.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. No person shall be detained longer than 72 hours after requesting dis-
charge unless a commitment proceeding is instituted by the facility's director.
55. Id. If the person is unable to comprehend these rights,'notice to the parent
of a minor or to the tutor or curator is sufficient.
56. 1978 La. Acts, No. 680, adding LA. R.S. 28:391.
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ceive visitors,57 to have their own personal possessions,58 to re-
fuse specific modes of treatment,59 to communicate with their
physicians outside the facility or their spiritual advisors, 0 to
practice their religion,6" and to visit with their attorneys.2
In last year's session, the legislature adopted new proce-
dures for the commitment of mentally ill individuals. 3 Those
procedures provide that a mentally ill person or a person suffer-
ing from substance abuse can be admitted to a treatment facil-
ity under an emergency certificate for a period not to exceed
fifteen days. 4 A physician's certificate, based on an examina-
tion of the individual, is needed for such a detainment. A
person can also be judicially committed upon a finding by the
court, based on clear and convincing evidence, that he is dan-
gerous to himself or to others or is gravely disabled. Any per-
son can file a petition with the court to initiate a hearing to
consider having the individual committed. 7 Under these provi-
sions the coroner had no authority to examine individuals for
the purposes of issuing an emergency certificate unless they
consented. Act 782 adds a new provision to the commitment
laws, which allows any parish coroner or judge of a court of
competent jurisdiction to order a person taken into custody for
examination when a statement is executed under private signa-
ture specifying that, to the best of the affiant's knowledge, the
person is mentally ill or suffering from substance abuse. 8
COMPLAINTS OF NURSING HOME RESIDENTS
The legislature also sought to protect the interests of nurs-
57. Id. "This right shall only be abridged if it is essential in order to prevent
serious physical and mental harm to the resident or to maintain orderly administration
of the facility." Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 1977 La. Acts, No. 714, amending LA. R.S. 28:2, 28:50-57, 28:59, 28:61, 28:171
(1950 & Supp. 1976), and adding LA. R.S. 28:52.1-52.3, 28:63, 28:64.
64. LA. R.S. 28:53 (Supp. 1977).
65. Id.
66. LA. R.S. 28:54 (Supp. 1977).
67. Id.
68. 1978 La. Acts, No. 782, adding LA. R.S. 28:53.2.
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ing home residents by passing Act 687, which provides a
method of complaint for any person having knowledge of the
abuse of a patient or of the violation of any state or federal law
or regulation. 9 The Department of Health and Human Re-
sources must investigate if there are reasonable grounds for the
complaint. 0 If a violation is found to exist, the Department
must issue a correction order to the nursing home," and any
complainant or nursing home that is dissatisfied with the De-
partment's determination can request a hearing within the
Department."
Act 687 provides that a complainant's identity cannot be
revealed to the home without his consent, 3 and if disclosure of
his identity is essential to the investigation, the complainant
must be given the opportunity to withdraw the complaint. 4
These provisions were apparently designed to remove the ele-
ment of fear involved in the reporting of nursing home abuse
by the home's residents. The Act does provide.criminal penal-
ties for any retaliatory action taken against a complainant, 5
but unless these criminal penalties are strictly applied, the fear
of reprisal may not be eliminated.
DISABILITY BENEFITS-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Act 750 was passed in response to the controversy between
the state and the federal government over which entity was to
pay disability benefits. Federal law requires that federal Social
Security benefits be reduced to the extent that an individual
receives state workmen's compensation disability benefits."
69. 1978 La. Acts, No. 687, adding LA. R.S. 40:2009.13. Any complaint is to be
submitted to the Department of Health and Human Resources either in writing, by
telephone, or by personal visit.
70. 1978 La. Acts, No. 687, adding LA. R.S. 40:2009.14. If the Department deter-
mines that grounds for an investigation do not exist, it must notify the complainant
within fifteen days after receipt of the complaint. If an investigation is conducted, a
report must be made to the complainant within 30 days after the complaint is received.
71. 1978 La. Acts, No. 687, adding LA. R.S. 40:2009.15. If the violation is detri-
mental to the health-of the residents, the time allowed for correction must not exceed
five days. In all other cases, the home has 90 days to make the correction.
72. 1978 La. Acts, No. 687, adding LA. R.S. 40:2009.16.
73. 1978 La. Acts, No. 687, adding LA. R.S. 40:2009.14.
74. Id.
75. 1978 La. Acts, No. 687, adding LA. R.S. 40:2009.17.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 424(a) (1976). The federal provison applies to federal old age,
survivor's, and disability insurance benefits. Any state workmen's compensation bene-
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The Louisiana legislature apparently decided that if an indi-
vidual is only going to receive a certain maximum number of
dollars under both the federal. and state programs, then the
state should pay~as little as possible. Act 750 requires that any
state permanent total disabilty benefits be reduced to the ex-
tent that those benefits would cause a reduction in federal
Social Security benefits." For example, if an individual is eligi-
ble for $300 in Social Security benefits and $100 in state disa-
bility benefits, then his Social Security benefits would be re-
duced to $200, except that the new Louisiana act now prevents
him from receiving the $100 in state benefits. Thus, his Social
Security benefits will not be reduced, and he will receive the
full $300 for which he is eligible under federal law.
Disabled persons whose state workmen's compensation
benefits are reduced as a result of Act 750 may have substantial
economic problems because the Social Security Act requires a
six month waiting period before an individual can receive the
Social Security benefits.7 8 Thus, disabled persons affected by
Act 750 could go six months before receiving any benefits.
In other health legislation, the legislature established a
program to assess the presence and causes of cancer within the
state.7" The Department of Health and Human Resources is to
direct the program, which involves a statewide system for gath-
ering the statistical data'" furnished by hospitals and pathology
labs."' The Act's passage will result in the state's receiving
federal funds for the study of cancer.82 The legislature also
legalized prescription use of marijuana for cancer chemother-
apy, and for glaucoma patients who are involved in life or sense
threatening situations and for whom conventional controlled
substances have either resulted in no response or caused severe
side effects . 3
fits for total or partial disability (whether permanent or not) are affected by the federal
reduction provision. The requirement only applies to any month prior to the month in
which the individual attains the age of 62.
77. 1978 La. Acts, No. 750, adding LA. R.S. 23:1225.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1972).
79. 1978 La. Acts, No. 653, adding LA. R.S. 40:1299.70-76.
80. 1978 La. Acts, No. 653, adding LA. R.S. 40:1299.71.
81. Each hospital and pathology laboratory in the state will have to participate
in the reporting program and keep these records in accordance with the regulations.
1978 La. Acts, No. 653, adding LA. R.S. 40:1299.74.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 286(b) (1977).
83. 1978 La. Acts, No. 725, adding LA. R.S. 40:1021-26.
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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT
Congress' concept of the federal government's role in the
area of environmental affairs is one of increasing federal deter-
mination of the substantive environmental quality standards,
with the implementation of these standards left up to the
states.' The federal substantive standards designed to encour-
age the protection and preservation of coastal areas' were en-
acted in 1973 in the Coastal Zone Management Act.3 The Act
provides coastal zone states4 with funds to assist them in devel-
oping a coastal zone management program which will meet the
requirements of the federal act.5 A state's development of a
federally approved program is not mandatory,' but it is a prere-
quisite to receiving federal funds for coastal zone manage-
ment.7 If a state's program meets further enumerated require-
ments, the state can receive additional funds for the manage-
ment of the program.'
The 1977 Louisiana legislature passed a Coastal Zone
1. Murchison, Waivers of Intergovernmental Immunity in Federal Environmen-
tal Statutes, 62 VA. L. Rav. 1177, 1177 (1976).
2. Coastal areas are defined as the coastal waters (including the lands therein
and thereunder) that are strongly influenced by each other and are in proximity to the
shorelines of the several coastal states, including islands, transitional and intertidal
areas, salt marshes, wetlands, and beaches. 16 U.S.C. § 1453(1) (1976).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1976). See Brewer, The Concept of State and Local
Relations Under CZMA, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 717 (1975).
4. A coastal state is any state in, or bordering on, the Atlantic, Pacific, or Arctic
Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, Long Island Sound, or one or more of the Great Lakes. 16
U.S.C. § 1453(3) (1976).
1 5. 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (1975). The management program for each coastal state must
include an identification of the coastal zone areas subject to the program; a definition
of permissible land and water uses within the zone; an inventory and designation of
areas of particular concern within the zone; the means by which the state proposes to
exert control over the land and water uses; broad guidelines on priorities of uses in such
areas; and a description of the organizational structure which will implement the
program.
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1451(h) (1976). The Act is designed to protect "the land and water
resources of the coastal zone" by encouraging "the states to exercise their full authority
over the lands and waters in the coastal zone." Id.
7. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454, 1455 (1976). See note 5, supra.
8. 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (1976).
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Management Act9 which failed to receive federal approval be-
cause it did not meet certain requirements of the federal act.'0
Act 361 of 1978, however, creates a coastal zone management
plan" which is e:pected to receive federal approval.'" The Sec-
retary of the Department of Transportation and Development
will be charged with the administration of the plan 3 and the
development of the guidelines to be followed in coastal zone
programs." These guidelines must further certain goals such as
achieving full use of coastal resources with a balance between
development and conservation." The Louisiana Act also cre-
ates a Coastal Commission 6 which will be composed of eleven
members representing interest groups," eleven members repre-
senting various coastal zone parishes, 8 and the Secretary of the
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries.'9 The Commission's pri-
mary purpose will be to hear appeals from decisions concerning
coastal zone plans. 0
Act 361 allows local governments to control a great deal of
the regulation of coastal land uses within their areas. Using a
state approved program, a local government can regulate uses
of local concern2' such as dredge and fill projects and private
9. 1977 La. Acts, No. 705, amending LA. R.S. 49:213.1-.6 (Supp. 1976), and
adding LA. R.S. 49:213.7-.12.
10. The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1977 Regular Ses-
sion-Environmental Law, 38 LA. L. REv. 141, 144 (1977). The Act failed because the
coastal zone inland boundary was inconsistent with the federal boundary. Id.
11. LA. R.S. 49:213.1-.21 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 361.
12. See Letter from Robert W. Knecht, Assistant Administrator for Coastal Zone
Management, Office of Coastal Zone Management (June 27, 1978).
13. LA. R.S. 49:213.6(A) (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 361.
14. A. R.S. 49:213.8 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 361.
15. Id.
16. LA. R.S. 49:213.7 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 361.
17. Id. The interest groups include the oil and gas industry, agriculture and
forestry, commercial fishing and trapping, sport fishing, hunting and outdoor recrea-
tion, ports, shipping and transportation, nature preservation and environmental pro-
tection, coastal landowners, municipalities, the utility industry, producers of solid
minerals, and industrial development.
18. Id. The parishes are Cameron, St. Tammany, Vermillion, Iberia, St. Mary,
Terrebonne, Lafourche, Jefferson, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and Orleans.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. LA. R.S. 49:213.9 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 361. Uses
of local concern are those which directly and significantly affect coastal waters, but
are not uses of state concern. LA. R.S. 49:213.5 (A)(2) (Supp. 1977), as amended by
1978 La. Acts, No. 361. Uses of state concern are uses which directly and significantly
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water control structures." The Department of Transportation
and Development will manage uses of state concern 3 and uses
in areas without local programs."
According to the new legislation, no one can begin a land
use in a coastal area without a permit from the state agency or
local government regulating that use." An agency or local gov-
ernment can hold a public hearing on a permit application, if
it so desires, 9 and all appeal hearings must be public.Y The
right to question any decision granting a permit is very broad,
and such a decision may be appealed by the applicant, the
secretary, any affected local government, any agency, or any
adversely affected person.28 These same parties, as well as the
Commission Administrator, can petition for a judicial review
of a Commission decision. 29 Additional protection is provided
for the applicant in that a "trial de novo" must be held if
requested by any party.'"
The Commission can reverse permit decisions if they are
unreasonable, arbitrary, or characterized by an abuse of discre-
tion.3 ' However, whether the Commission can review the merits
of decisions, i.e., review whether the best alternative was cho-
sen, remains unclear. Nevertheless, the Commission does have
affect coastal waters and which have an impact which goes beyond local significance
and significantly affects interests of regional, state, or national concern. LA. R.S.
49:213.5(A)(i) (Supp. 1977).
22. LA. R.S. 49:213.5(A)(2) (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 361.
Local governments can regulate private water control structures which cost less than
$15,000.
23. LA. R.S. 49:213.6 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 361. For
the definition of uses of state concern, see note 21, supra.
24. The Act retains the existing statutory authority of the Office of Conservation
to permit the location, drilling, exploration, and production of oil, gas, sulphur, and
other minerals and the existing authority of the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries
over oyster fishing operations. LA. R.S. 49:213.12 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978
La. Acts, No. 361. Activities conducted pursuant to a permit granted by one of these
agencies must be consistent with the coastal zone guidelines, the state program, and
any affected local program. Id.
25. LA. R.S. 49:213.11 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 361.
26. Id.
27. LA. R.S. 49:213.16 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 361.
28. LA. R.S. 49:213.11 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 361.
29. LA. R.S. 49:213.16 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 361.
30. Id.
31. Id. The Commission can also reverse permit decisions if the decision either
represents an unreasonable interpretation of the state program, or is clearly contrary
to the Act or to the evidence presented. Id.
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the power to review the merits of permit decisions to the extent
that they place an onerous and inequitable burden on the ap-
plicant by preventing actions which would result in only mini-
mal and inconsqquential variances from the objectives of the
Act.
Several provisions of the Act may create interpretation
and implementation problems. For instance, the seaward
boundary definition is potentially inconsistent with the federal
act. The Louisiana Coastal Zone Act's seaward boundary is the
seaward boundary of Louisiana" (three miles distant from its
coastline as defined in the Federal Submerged Lands Act)."
However, the Federal Coastal Zone Act's seaward boundary is
the territorial sea of the United States, which is presently also
recognized as being three miles distant from the United States
coastline.35 If the definition of the seaward boundary of the
state or the United States is changed such that the United
States seaward boundary is further distant from the coastline
than the Louisiana seaward boundary, the Federal Coastal
Zone Act will cover an area that is unregulated by the Loui-
siana Coastal Zone Act. On the other hand, if any defini-
tional change results in the state's seaward boundary being
further distant from the coastline than the United States', then
the Louisiana Coastal Zone Act will regulate an area over
which the state has no authority.
The Act also can be criticized for forbidding the public
acquisition of privately owned property without the owner's
consent,3" thus providing a possible method for hampering nec-
essary public works. Moreover, the Act provides little or no
guidance in distinguishing state uses from local uses,37 thereby
32. LA. R.S. 49:213.4 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 361.
33. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1970).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1453(1) (1976).
35. See Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122 (1923). The three-mile limit
has not been established by any federal statute, but it is the clearly recognized policy
of the United States government. Many countries claim a more extensive territorial
sea breadth, and the international trend is towards acceptance of a twelve-mile limit.
See Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/Wp. 10 (July 15,
1977), art. 3. However, despite this international trend, the United States may retain
its present three-mile limit and not ratify any new treaty on the subject. See Steven-
son, International Law and the Oceans, 62 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 339, 340-41 (1970).
36. LA. R.S. 49:213.19 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 361.
37. See note 21, supra.
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necessitating the development of a process for designating such
uses. Other examples of problem areas include different start-
ing dates for different aspects of the program, 31 a lack of Liv-
ingston Parish representation on the Coastal Commission, 3
and the issue of whether the "trial de novo" will be a public
hearing.'0
HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL
Federal law also prompted the passage of Act 334, the
Louisiana Hazardous Waste Control Act." The Federal Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act of 197642 gives the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) the authority to regulate
hazardous wastes in any state that has not developed an EPA-
approved hazardous waste control program,4 3 and it orders the
EPA Administrator to promulgate regulations applicable to
facilities which contribute to the hazardous waste problem."
In order to receive federal approval, a state plan must be
at least as strict as the guidelines promulgated by the EPA,4"
and the Louisiana Hazardous Waste Law closely follows the
language of the federal act. Act 334 was designed to give the
38. The Act will become effective on January 1, 1979, except that the coastal use
permit program will not commence until 30 days after the adoption of the guidelines
in section 213.8. LA. R.S. 49:213.20 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No.
361. The Secretary has 120 days after the effective date to adopt guidelines for deci-
sionmaking regarding coastal use permits that are consistent with section 213.8. LA.
R.S. 49:213.11 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 361. Within 180 days
of enactment, the Secretary is to adopt a fully delineated inland boundary. LA. R.S.
49:213.4 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 361.
39. LA. R.S. 49:213.4 (Supp. 1977), 49:213.7 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978
La. Acts, No. 361.
40. LA. R.S. 49:213.16 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 361. The
Act simply states that a "trial de novo" shall be held upon the request of any party.
41. 1978 La. Acts, No. 334, adding LA. R.S. 30:1101-16.
42. Pub. L. No. 94-580, §§ 3001-11, 90 Stat. 2806 (1976). Various other federal
pollution control laws presently regulate hazardous wastes, including the Federal
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1977), and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1977). Success in controlling air and water pollution has contributed
to the problem of land-polluting hazardous wastes, because discards that were once
dumped into the air and water are now being placed on land. These wastes often find
their way back into surface or ground waters or into the ocean, and the purpose of the
hazardous waste management laws is to prevent such abuses and provide a more
sensible network of pollution regulation. [1977] 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (Oct. 7).
43. Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 3006, 90 Stat. 2806 (1976).
44. Id. at §§ 3001-05.
45. Id. at § 3006(b).
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Department of Natural Resources the authority and discretion
necessary to develop a program capable, of attaining federal
approval, because if the Louisiana plan is approved, the state
will receive, federal funds to assist in the implementation of its
program."
Act 334 defines hazardous wastes as wastes which may (1)
cause an increase in mortality or serious illness or (2) pose a
substantial hazard to human health or the environment if im-
properly managed." The Act gives the Department of Natural
Resources jurisdiction over the regulation of the generation,
transportation, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes, and
the Department must develop criteria for identifying the char-
acteristics of hazardous wastes and for listing those hazardous
wastes subject to regulation."
The Department of Natural Resources must also promul-
gate standards applicable to facilities which generate, trans-
port, dispose, store, or treat hazardous wastes." Transporters
and treatment, storage, and disposal facilities cannot operate
without a permit issued by the Natural Resources Depart-
46. The Environmental Protection Agency is authorized to appropriate
$25,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 1978 and 1979 to be used for state grants. Id. at
§ 3011(a). Amounts appropriated will be allocated among the states on the basis of
regulations promulgated by the EPA Administrator, which will take into account the
extent to which hazardous waste is generated, transported, treated, stored, and dis-
posed of within any particular state. Id. at § 3011(b).
47. 1978 La. Acts, No. 334, adding LA. R.S. 30:1102(3). The Act states:
'Hazardous waste' means any waste, or combination of wastes, which because
of its quantity, concentration, physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics
may (1) cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an in-
crease in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness or (2) pose a
substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment
when improperly treated, stored, transported, disposed of, or otherwise man-
aged.
One of the Department of Natural Resources' major tasks will be determining which
wastes are hazardous wastes.
48. 1978 La. Acts, No. 334, adding LA. R.S. 30:1105. Radioactive wastes are
exempted from regulation because they are controlled by the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 5842 (1974).
49. Generators must follow standards regarding recordkeeping, labeling prac-
tices, use of containers, and furnishing of information to transporters. 1978 La. Acts,
No. 334, adding LA. R.S. 30:1106(A). Standards are required for transporters respect-
ing recordkeeping and transportation equipment, and for treatment, storage, and dis-
posal facilities respecting recordkeeping and the design, construction, and operation
of the facilities. 1978 La. Acts, No. 334, adding LA. R.S. 30:1197(B), 30:1108(B).
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ment, 0 and generators may only utilize transporters and dis-
posal facilities which have obtained valid permits.'
The Department must also establish a manifest system for
the orderly tracking of hazardous wastes from the generation
site to the site of treatment, storage, or disposal.5" The system
should provide information as to the quantity, composition,
origin, routing, and destination of all hazardous wastes in the
state.13
The power to make inspections and investigations will
enable the Natural Resources Department to discover viola-
tions,54 and the Department has the power to bring a civil ac-
tion to recover any damages resulting from violations"' as well
as the power to issue compliance orders to any violators. 8 The
refusal to obey a compliance order will result in a civil penalty
of not more than $25,000 for each day of non-compliance and
a possible suspension or revocation of any permit or license. 7
In addition to civil liabilities, any person who knowingly vio-
lates a regulation can, upon conviction, be fined up to $25,000
for each day of violation, or be imprisoned for up to one year,
or both. 8
Act 334 provides the Department of Natural Resources
with the discretion to develop as stringent standards as are
necessary, and they will have to be at least as strict as those
promulgated by the EPA. Whether the dangers posed by haz-
ardous wastes will be controlled by Act 334 will depend upon
how the EPA and the Natural Resources Department use the
authority given them by the Federal Hazardous Waste Control
Act and its Louisiana counterpart.
50. 1978 La. Acts, No. 334, adding LA. R.S. 30:1107-08.
51. 1978 La. Acts, No. 334, adding LA. R.S. 30:1106(B).
52. 1978 La. Acts, No. 334, adding LA. R.S. 30:1109.
53. Id.
54. 1978 La. Acts, No. 334, adding LA. R.S. 30:1110(A).
55. 1978 La. Acts, No. 334, adding LA. R.S. 30:1113(B). The measure of damages
will be the cost of restoring the affected area to its condition prior to the violation, plus
the cost of all reasonable and necessary investigations made by the state. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES
Act 327 prohibits the transportation of high level radioac-
tive wastes into Louisiana for disposal or storage in this state
or elsewhere. 9 There is, however, some question as to whether
the Act is constitutional, because federal legislation in the area
of the disposal of nuclear wastes is so pervasive. Federal legisla-
tion heavily regulating an area of concern evidences a Congres-
sional intent that only federal law affect that area. " The fed-
eral action is said to preempt the field, and thus any state laws
attempting to regulate the subject may violate the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution." Under the Atomic
Energy Act," the Atomic Energy Commission is given broad
authority to regulate nuclear wastes"2 and is required to retain
the authority to regulate the disposal of waste by-products. 3
Consequently, Louisiana may be constitutionally precluded
from legislating on this subject.
SURFACE MINING REGULATION
The Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 19774 gave the Department of Interior the authority to
establish a nationwide program for the regulation of surface
coal mining and reclamation.65 Any state may assume juris-
diction over the mining operations within its boundaries by
obtaining the Secretary of the Interior's approval of the state's
program of regulation."6 The state must demonstrate that it
has the capacity to achieve the purposes of the federal act, 7
which include the protection of the environment from the ad-
verse effects of surface coal mining and the protection of sur-
face landowners' rights. 8 In response to the federal program,
the Louisiana legislature passed Act 406 which will enable
59. 1978 La. Acts, No. 327, adding LA. R.S. 51:1072.
60. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
61. Id. at 236. See also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-296 (1946).
63. Id. at § 2021(b).
64. Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (1977).
65. Id.
66. Id. at § 503.
67. Id.
68. Id. at § 102.
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Louisiana to undertake the regulation of its own surface coal
mining. 9
According to Act 406, no person can engage in surface coal
mining operations without a permit from the Office of Conser-
vation,7 and these permits will require mining operations to
meet certain performance standards.7' Each permit applicant
must also submit an approved reclamation plan,7" the faithful
performance of which will be assured by a performance bond.7 :
A noteworthy provision of the Act is one which, like many
federal environmental laws,7 allows any citizen who may be
adversely affected by surface mining to commence a civil ac-
tion to compel compliance with the Act.7" Citizen suits are
important if the purposes of the Act are to be accomplished and
the destruction of the land prevented. Landowners are more
likely to be aware of what is taking place on their land than a
state agency, and therefore, citizen suits should promote more
effective enforcement.
SOLAR ENERGY
The legislature also showed an interest in encouraging the
use of solar energy. Act 591 exempts from ad valorem taxation
any owner-occupied residential building or residential swim-
ming pool that uses solar energy.7" Other legislation requires
the Department of Natural Resources to develop a program for
the research and development of solar energy77 and to adopt
69. 1978 La. Acts, No. 406, amending LA. R.S. 30:902, 30:904-14 (1950), and
adding LA. R.S. 30:915-32.
70. 1978 La. Acts, No. 406, amending LA. R.S. 30:906(A) (1950).
71. 1978 La. Acts, No. 406, adding LA. R.S. 30:915. Mining operations will be
required to "maximize the utilization and conservation of the solid fuel resource being
recovered so that reaffecting the land in the future through surface coal mining can
be minimized." Id.
72. 1978 La. Acts, No. 406, amending LA. R.S. 30:906, 30:908 (1950).
73. 1978 La. Acts, No. 406, amending LA. R.S. 30:909 (1950).
74. See, e.g., Federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1977).
75. 1978 La. Acts, No. 406, adding LA. R.S. 30:920.
76. 1978 La. Acts, No. 591, adding LA. R.S. 47:1706.
77. 1978 La. Acts, No. 542, adding LA. R.S. 30:1102.
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regulations governing solar devices78 which will encourage the
development and use of solar energy.79
OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS
One significant environmental measure which failed to
pass the 1978 legislature was House Bill 1396,80 which would
have established an Office of Environmental Affairs within the
Department of Natural Resources." This office was to have
jurisdiction over all matters affecting the regulation of the en-
vironment within the state, including but not limited to the
regulation of air quality, water quality, solid and hazardous
waste disposal, radiation control, and noise levels. 2 The new
Office of Environmental Affairs would have eliminated the
present duplication of functions in various agencies and thus
would have promoted the more efficient regulation of environ-
mental matters.
78. 1978 La. Acts, No. 542, adding LA. R.S. 30:1104. For example, the Depart-
ment must develop standards for testing, inspection, certification, and installation of
solar devices.
79. Id.
80. La. H.B. 1396, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978).
81. La. H.B. 1396, § 1071(A), 4th Reg. Sess. (1978).
82. Id.
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PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
SEIZURES
Code of Civil Procedure article 323 provides exceptions to
the general rule that a sheriff shall not execute any writ, man-
date, order, or judgment of a court in a civil case on a legal
holiday.' Under article 323, neither a writ of attachment, a writ
of sequestration, nor an injunction are prohibited from being
executed on holidays.2 Act 169 of 1978 amends article 323 to
additionally permit a writ of fieri facias and a writ of seizure
and sale under executory process to be executed on a legal
holiday.'
Act 408 of 1978 adds a new provision to title 13 of the
Louisiana Revised Statutes regarding the seizure of property.4
According to the revision, when the sheriff to whom a writ is
directed cannot find or identify the subject movable property,
he may call upon the seizing creditor to point out any property
to which the creditor may have a claim, or any other property
belonging to the debtor which the creditor wants seized.5 This
statute authorizes a practice previously not officially recog-
nized, but common in some areas of the state.
DEFAULT JUDGMENTS AGAINST THE STATE
When a defendant in a principal or incidental demand
fails to answer within the time prescribed by law, a judgment
of default may be entered against him.' Formerly, this default
could be confirmed after two days, exclusive of holidays, from
1. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 323 (as it appeared prior to Act 169 of 1978).
2. Id.
3. 1978 La. Acts, No. 169, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 323.
4. 1978 La. Acts, No. 408, adding LA. R.S. 13:3884.
5. Id.
6. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1701 states:
If a defendant in the principal ,or incidental demand fails to answer within the
time prescribed by law, judgment of default may be entered against him. The
judgment may be obtained by oral motion in open court or by written motion,
either of which shall be entered in the minutes of the court, but the judgment
shall consist merely of an entry in the minutes.
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the entry of the preliminary default in the minutes of the
court.7 Act 149 of 1978 provides a different procedure for liti-
gants who seek to confirm a judgment of default against the
state or any of its departments, offices, boards, commissions,
agencies, or instrumentalities.8 Now, before such a default can
be confirmed, a certified copy of the minute entry reflecting the
preliminary default and a certified copy of the petition or other
demand must be delivered to the Attorney General either by
registered mail, by certified mail, or by personal service."
If this notice is sent by mail, the person mailing such items
must execute and file in the record an affidavit stating that
these items have been enclosed in an envelope properly ad-
dressed to the Attorney General with sufficient postage affixed,
and stating the date on which the envelope was deposited in
the United States mails. In addition, the return receipt must
be attached to the affidavit which has been filed in the record. 0
Under Act 149, the state is entitled to an additional fifteen
days following the receipt of the above described notice in
which to file an answer. If no answer is filed during this time
period, the plaintiff may then confirm his default judgment by
the proof required in Code of Civil Procedure article 1702.11
MOTION TO DIsMISS
In 1977, the legislature added Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 1810 in order to allow directed verdicts in
7. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1702 states in part: "A judgment of default must be
confirmed by proof of the demand sufficient to establish a prima facie case. If no
answer is filed timely, this confirmation may be made after two days, exclusive of
holidays, from the entry of the judgment of default."
8. 1978 La. Acts, No. 149, adding LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 1704. The reference in
the Act to "the state or any of its ... instrumentalities" raises the interesting question
of the extent to which article 1704 will also apply to parishes or municipal corporations.
In Niette v. Natchitoches Police Jury, 348 So. 2d 162, 165 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 So. 2d 160 (La. 1977), the court stated that parishes and municipal corpo-
rations were creatures of the state and were only vested with such powers as were
delegated to them by the constitution or the legislature. Therefore, it can be argued
that parishes and municipal corporations should be considered as instrumentalities of
the state, and as such, entitled to the benefit of article 149.
9. 1978 La. Acts, No. 149, adding LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1704. Personal service
may be made upon the Attorney General or the First Assistant Attorney General at
the office of the Attorney General. Id
10. Id. Although the Act does not so state, it presupposes that a notice sent by
certified or registered mail must request a return receipt.
11. Id. See also LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1702.
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Louisiana civil jury trials.'" In a jury trial, the motion for a
directed verdict is made by either party at the close of the
evidence offered by his opponent, and, if granted, it in bffect
usurps the power of the jury to decide the case. In a non-jury
trial, the motion to dismiss is somewhat analogous to the di-
rected verdict, but it was not previously provided for under
Louisiana law. Act 156 of 1978 amended article 1810 to allow a
motion to dismiss, but the motion can be made only upon the
completion of the plaintiff's evidence and only by a party
seeking a dismissal of the action against himself.'"
This device should promote judicial efficiency by relieving
a party from the burden of conducting a defense when the
plaintiff's evidence is insufficient to support any claim for re-
lief. However, in light of Louisiana's system of appellate review
of fact, litigants should be aware of the possible consequences
of an incomplete record on appeal. In circumstances where the
motion to dismiss is granted at mid-trial and later reversed on
appeal, the court of appeal will have to remand the case to the
district court in order for the moving party to complete his
presentation of evidence. Consequently, the motion to dismiss,
although designed to promote judicial efficiency, could ulti-
mately result in piecemeal litigation.
CODE OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE
Practitioners participating in juvenile proceedings should
take cognizance of the legislature's adoption of a Code of Juve-
nile Procedure.'4 While a thorough review of the new Code is
beyond the scope of this symposium, it should be noted that
this comprehensive work consolidates and revises the laws
applicable to courts exercising juvenile jurisdiction and pro-
vides procedures for practicing before these courts.'5
12. 1977 La. Acts, No. 699, adding LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1810. This act adopted
verbatim the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a).
13. 1978 La. Acts, No. 156, amending LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1810. Compare FED.
R. Civ. P. 41(b) with LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1810, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No.
156.
14. 1978 La. Acts, No. 172, adding LOUISIANA CODE OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE.
15. Id. See also 1978 La. Acts, No. 460, amending LA. R.S. 13:1571.1 (Supp.
1974), relative to the transfer of prosecutions from juvenile court to the appropriate
court exercising adult criminal jurisdiction.
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LEGAL HOLIDAYS
In computing the period of time allowed or prescribed for
various actions by law or by order of a court, it is important to
make the necessary allowances for legal holidays. According to
article 5059 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a legal holiday is
to be included in the computation of a period of time allowed
or prescribed except when it is expressly excluded, when it
would otherwise be the last day of the period, or when the
period is less than seven days. " Revised Statutes 1:55 generally
designates which days are days of public rest, legal holidays,
and half-holidays. 7 However, due to the legislature's generos-
ity in decreeing holidays, it has become increasingly difficult
for practitioners to keep track of every legal holiday which
would affect the computation of the time for legal delays. To
alleviate this problem, Act 163 of 1978 amends Revised Stat-
utes 1:55(E) to limit legal holidays for the purposes of article
5059 to Saturdays, Sundays, and those holidays listed therein. "
CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT
Central to Louisiana's executory proceeding is the require-
ment of an authentic act importing a confession of judgment. 9
In the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, confessions of judgment
were prohibited except when made for the purposes of execu-
tory process.2 " However, this prohibition was not included in
the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,2l and since then, confes-
sions of judgment have been technically permissible for any
purpose. Act 518 of 1978 fills this void by providing that confes-
sions of judgment, although generally prohibited prior to the
maturity of the obligation sued upon, are permissible for the
purposes of executory process.2
16. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 5059.
17. LA. R.S. 1:55 (Supp. 1977 & 1978).
18. 1978 La. Acts, No. 163, amending LA. R.S. 1:55 (Supp. 1977).
19. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2631.
20. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. VII, § 44, provided: "Service of citation shall not be
waived, nor judgment confessed, prior to the maturity of the obligation sued on, except
for the purposes of executory process .
21. See Disposition Table, LA. CONST. of 1974.
22. 1978 La. Acts, No. 518, adding LA. R.S. 9:3590.
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DELAYS FOR APPLICATION FOR REHEARING OR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Act 179 of 1977 amended article 2166 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to increase to thirty days the delay for applying to
the court of appeal for a rehearing or to the supreme court for
a writ of certiorari.2 3 Act 179 provided that it would be effective
on January 1, 1978, and would apply to all appeals in which
the 'order of appeal had been granted on or after the Act's
effective date.24 However, in Whitener v. Clark25 the Second
Circuit held that Supreme Court Rule 29,1" which had been
amended to conform to Act 179, controlled applications for
rehearing to the appellate courts. 7 The court stated that ac-
cording to rule 29, article 2166 as amended would be applicable
to all judgments rendered by an appellate court on or after
January 1, 1978, regardless of the date on which the appeal was
ordered. 8
In Act 363 of 1978,29 the legislature attempted to conform
Act 179 of 1977 to Whitener and rule 29. Act 179 was amended
so that it only provides for an effective date of January 1, 1978,
and makes no mention of which appeals will be affected
thereby.30 With the deletion of Act 179's reference to when an
appeal was ordered, there is nothing to conflict with Whitener's
holding that article 2166 applies to all judgments rendered
after the Act's effective date.
However, section 2 of Act 363 of 1978 states that "the
provisions of Article 2166 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Proce-
dure shall apply to all cases in which a judgment is rendered
by a court of appeal on or after the effective date hereof."3' The
effective date of Act 363 is July 12, 1978, the date on which it
was approved by the Governor, and it is possible that Act 363,
23. 1977 La. Acts, No. 179, amending LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2166.
24. Id.
25. 356 So. 2d 1094 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 538 (La. 1978).
26. "Section 2. The provisions of this rule are applicable to all decisions of the
courts of appeal rendered on January 1, 1978 and thereafter." LA. SuP. CT. R. 29(2).
27. Whitener v. Clark, 356 So. 2d 1094, 1099 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358
So. 2d 638 (La. 1978).
28. Id.
29. 1978 La. Acts, No. 363, amending 1977 La. Acts, No. 179, which amended
LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2166.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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read literally, makes this same date the effective date of article
2166. However, such an interpretation would cause great confu-
sion, and it seems more proper to read the phrase "effective
date hereof" in section 2 of Act 363 as referring to January 1,
1978. Thus read, article 2166 as amended by Act 179 of 1977
would be applicable to all cases in which a judgment was ren-
dered by a court of appeal on or after January 1, 1978. In this
way, needless uncertainty would be avoided and the legislative
purpose realized.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
SEVERANCE OF OFFENSES
In 1975 the Louisiana legislature amended the Code of
Criminal Procedure articles relative to joinder of offenses in an
indictment or information.' Article 493,2 dealing with the join-
der of offenses, was derived from the language of Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 8(a).1 However, the Louisiana legisla-
ture did not at that time adopt the companion provision rela-
tive to relief from prejudicial joinder embodied in Federal Rule
14.4 Rather, a rule paralleling the American Bar Association's
recommendation on severance of offenses was enacted.5 Act 466
1. 1975 La. Acts, No. 528, amending LA. CODE CraM. P. arts. 493-95, adding art.
495.1, and repealing arts. 491-92.
2. LA. CODE CmM. P. art. 493 provides:
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information
in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or
misdemeanors, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same
act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan; provided that the offenses
joined must be triable by the same mode of trial.
3. FED. R. CmM. P. 8(a) provides:
Joinder of Offenses. Two or more offenses may be charged in the same
indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses
charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar
character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or
plan.
4. FED. R. CiuM. P. 14 provides:
Relief from Prejudicial Joinder. If it appears that a defendant or the govern-
ment is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or
information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election
or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever
other relief justice requires ....
5. LA. CODE CPIM. P. art. 495.1 (as it appeared prior to Act 466 of 1978), states:
The court, on application of the prosecuting attorney, or on application of
the defendant shall grant a severance of offenses whenever:
(a) if before trial, it is deemed appropriate to promote a fair determination
of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense; or
(b) if during the trial upon consent of the defendant, it is deemed neces-
sary to achieve a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each
offense. The Court shall consider whether, in view of the number of offenses
charged and the complexity of the evidence to be offered, the trier of fact will
be able to distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently as to each
offense.
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of 1978 departs from the ABA standard by amending article
495.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to conform to the
corresponding federal provision. As amended, article 495.1 now
gives the trial court the discretion to grant relief whenever it
appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder
of offenses in an indictment, information, or trial.'
Under the former severance provision, the sole relief avail-
able from prejudicial joinder was a severance of offenses.7 How-
ever, article 495.1 as amended gives the court discretion either
to order separate trials, to grant severance of offenses, or to
provide whatever other relief justice requires."
In determining whether a severance should have been
granted under the former statute, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has held that the admissibility of the evidence of the
respective joined offenses almost always' determines the pro-
priety of severance. 0 That is, if evidence of one of the joined
offenses would have been admissible at a separate trial of the
other offense as "res gestae"" or as an "other crime,"'" evidence
relating to each crime will be equally permissible if they are
tried together. " The federal jurisprudence interpreting Federal
Rule 14 follows much the same standard.' Therefore, if the
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
STANDARDS RELATING TO JOINDER AND SEVERANCE § 2.2(b) (1968), which states:
The court, on application of the prosecuting attorney, or on application of
the defendant . . . should grant a severance of offenses whenever: (i) if before
trial, it is deemed appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defendant's
guilt or innocence of each offense; or (ii) if during trial upon consent of the
defendant, it is deemed necessary to achieve a fair determination of the defen-
dant's guilt or innocence of each offense. The court should consider whether, in
view of the number of offenses charged and the complexity of the evidence to
be offered, the trier of fact will be able to distinguish the evidence and apply
the law intelligently as to each offense.
6. 1978 La. Acts, No. 466, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 495.1.
7. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 495.1 (as it appeared prior to Act 466 of 1978). See note
5, supra, for the text of this article.
8. LA. CODE CaIM. P. art. 495.1, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 466.
9. In State v. Carter, 352 So. 2d 607, 614 (La. 1977), the court declined to set
out absolute rules for joinder and severance of offenses due to possible situations in
which compelling reasons might require severance even though evidence of the offenses
was admissible.
10. State v. Carter, 352 So. 2d 607, 614 (La. 1977).
11. LA. R.S. 15:447-48 (1950).
12. LA. R.S. 15:446 (1950). See State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
13. 352 So. 2d at 614.
14. Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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Louisiana courts follow the federal courts' interpretation of this
severance provision, Act 466 may not effect a change in the law.
However, the federal courts have also found no prejudicial ef-
fect from joinder when the evidence of each crime is simple and
distinct, reasoning that in this situation the jury can easily
keep the evidence separate in their deliberations as to the re-
spective crimes. 5 If this aspect of the federal jurisprudence is
followed, then Act 466 will narrow the extent to which sever-
ance will be available to the accused.
CRIMINAL FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY
Act 730 of 197810 amends Revised Statutes 40:989, which
generally provided for the forfeiture of: (1) controlled danger-
ous substances; (2) contraband related to their production,
manufacture, and distribution; and (3) the conveyances used
to transport such items. 7 The purpose of the amendment is to
meet the requirements set forth in State v. 1971 Green GMC
Van, '5 in which the Louisiana Supreme Court held that section
989 A(4), dealing specifically with the forfeiture of a convey-
ance, was unconstitutional.
In Green GMC Van, the court held that section 989 A(4)
offended the due process clauses of the federal and state consti-
tutions because it allowed the forfeiture of a person's vehicle
without proof of conviction of the subject drug offense, without
proof of the legality of the search and seizure, and without
proof that the vehicle owner himself knew of, should have
known of, or was involved in the criminal offense." The court
also held that the forfeiture statute unlawfully impinged upon
the right to property guaranteed by the Louisiana Constitution
because the forfeiture of an automobile, boat, or plane would
be too harsh a penalty for a crime such as the knowing posses-
sion of small amounts of marijuana. 0 As a result of this case,
Act 730 requires that before a vehicle seized by the state may
15. Id. at 91.
16. 1978 La. Acts, No. 730, amending LA. R.S. 40:989 (1950).
17. IA. R.S. 40:989 (1950) (as it appeared prior to Act 730 of 1978).
18. 354 So. 2d 479 (La. 1977).
19. State v. 1971 Green GMC Van, 354 So. 2d 479, 486 (La. 1977). See U.S.
CONST. amends. V, XIV; LA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
20. 354 So. 2d at 487.
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be forfeited, the district attorney must show that a conviction
resulted from the violation under which the seizure was author-
ized, that the seizure was constitutionally valid, that the owner
of the seized conveyance was privy to the subject violation, and
that the contraband was in excess of five hundred dollars or
was intended for commercial sale."
However, despite Act 730 there may still be some constitu-
tional problems. In arguing for the validity of the statute in
Green GMC Van, the prosecution also contended that the de-
fendant automobiles were "derivative contraband. 2 2 As such,
it was argued that these vehicles were subject to seizure be-
cause of the contraband exception to article I, section 4, of the
Louisiana Constitution, which provides that "personal effects,
other than contraband, shall never be taken. 123 In rejecting this
position, the court noted that the "vehicles are not contraband
but are personal effects, the ownership of which is protected by
Article I, section 4 of the Constitution."" Thus, the argument
can be made that the Louisiana Constitution extends an abso-
lute protection to personal vehicles, and that therefore, despite
the new procedures provided by Act 730, section 989 A(4) re-
mains unconstitutional.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Act 746 of 1978 amends in two respects Code of Criminal
Procedure article 703 dealing with the motion to suppress evi-
dence. 5 First, article 703 is broadened to allow a defendant to
move to suppress both written and oral confessions or inculpa-
tory statements,26 rather than only written evidence as under
the former article.27
Act 746 also defines the scope of cross examination to
21. 1978 La. Acts, No. 730, amending LA. R.S. 40:989 (1950).
22. 354 So. 2d at 486-87.
23. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
24. 354 So. 2d at 487.
25. 1978 La. Acts, No. 746, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 703.
26. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 703, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 746.
27. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 703 (B) (as it appeared prior to Act 746 of 1978).
According to State v. Daniels, 262 La. 475, 483, 263 So. 2d 859, 862 (1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 944 (1973), "Oral confessions and exculpatory statements are not subject to
a motion to suppress. Such a motion may be directed only to written confessions or
written exculpatory statements."
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which a defendant is subject upon becoming a witness at trial
to testify concerning the circumstances surrounding a confes-
sion or inculpatory statement. In State v. Lovett,28 the Loui-
siana Supreme Court held as a matter of statutory interpre-
tation that an accused must be permitted to testify at the trial
on the merits for the limited purpose of contesting the volun-
tariness of a confession. The court decided that since the defen-
dant could take the stand at the preliminary hearing for this
limited purpose under article 794 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, he should be accorded the same privilege at trial. Thus,
the defendant's testimony could be given to the jury contem-
poraneously with the state's presentation of its predicate de-
signed to establish the voluntariness of the confession. The
defendant testifying for this limited purpose would not, under
the Lovett rationale, be subject to cross examination on the
case as a whole, but only on the validity of the confession and
on his credibility, including impeachment on the basis of prior
convictions.2'
The court expressly avoided basing its decision on any
constitutional objection to the pre-Lovett procedure, whereby
the accused was required to waive his rights against self-
incrimination when he took the stand to testify as to a limited
issue.30 Thus, the door was left open for the legislature to statu-
torily overrule State v. Lovett, which it did via Act 746 of 1978.
Section B of article 703 now provides that "if a defendant be-
comes a witness at the trial on the merits, he shall be subject
to cross examination on the whole case."3'
IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT IN CONvIcrION RECORD
Act 302 provides that whenever someone is convicted of a
felony, the judge must attach the defendant's fingerprints to
the indictment or bill of information. 32 In addition, the judge
must certify that the fingerprints are actually those of the de-
fendant.33 In effect, Act 302 protects defendants against the
28. 345 So. 2d 1139 (La. 1977).
29. Id. at 1143.
30. Id. See also The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971
Term-Evidence, 32 LA. L. REv. 345, 346 (1972).
31. LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 703 (B), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 746.
32. 1978 La. Acts, No. 302, amending LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 871.
33. Id.
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possibility that another person's conviction could be used
against the defendant for purposes of impeachment or multiple
offender sentencing in circumstances where two or more per-
sons have substantially similar names.
PRETRIAL MOTIONS
Upon the recommendation of the Louisiana State Law In-
stitute, the Code of Criminal Procedure has been amended by
Act 735 of 1978 in an effort to standardize as much as possible
the time for the filing of pretrial motions.' Central to this effort
is the addition of article 521, which provides that, generally,
pretrial motions shall be made or filed within thirty days after
arraignment, unless a different time is provided by law or fixed
by the court at arraignment. 35 Article 521 further provides that
the court shall allow additional time for filing pretrial motions
at any time upon written motion and upon a showing of good
cause. 3 As a result of Act 735, article 521 generally regulates
the time for the filing of a motion for a bill of particulars,37 a
motion to quash, 38 a motion for a change of venue, 39 a motion
34. 1978 La. Acts, No. 735, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 484, 535, 621, 681,
707, 729 and adding art. 521.
35. LA. CODE CriM P. art. 521, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 735.
36. Id.
37. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 484, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No.735.
Prior to the 1978 amendment, article 484 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
granted a defendant the right to file a bill of particulars either before trial or within
ten days after arraignment, whichever was earlier. After the expiration of the ten day
period, but prior to trial, permission to file this motion was within the court's discre-
tion. LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 484 (as it appeared prior to Act 735 of 1978). As amended
by Act 735, article 484 provides that the time for filing a bill of particulars is governed
by LA. CODE CrUM. P. art. 521.
38. LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 535, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 735. Under
article 535, the time for filing a motion to quash depends upon the grounds on which
the motion is based. Prior to the 1978 amendment, a defendant was required to file
the motion at least three judicial days before the commencement of trial, or at any
time prior to trial with the court's permission, if the motion was based either on the
expiration of the time limitation for the commencement of trial, or upon objections to
the petit or grand jury venire. LA. CODE CIUM. P. art. 535 (B) (as it appeared prior to
Act 735 of 1978). Act 735 amends section B of article 535 to provide that a motion to
quash on the ground that the time limitation for commencement of trial has expired
"may be filed at any time before commencement of trial." 1978 La. Acts, No. 735,
amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 535 (B). This provision seems to give the trial court
discretion to allow the defendant to file this motion, because (A) uses different lan-
guage and states that when a motion to quash is based upon the reasons listed therein,
the motion "may be filed of right at any time before commencement of the trial." LA.
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to recuse the district attorney, 0 a motion for a continuance,"
and a motion for discovery by a defendant.2
CODE CalM. P. art. 535 (A) (emphasis added). Presumably, had the legislature not
intended a different treatment for motions filed on the ground that the time limit for
commencement of trial has expired, these motions would have been included with
those listed in section A of article 535.
Under former article 535(C), a motion to quash based upon any ground other than
those stated in paragraphs A or B could be filed of right within ten days after arraign-
ment or before commencement of the trial, whichever was earlier. After expiration of
the ten day period, but prior to the commencement of trial, the motion could be filed
only with the permission of the court. LA. CODE CaM. P. art. 535 (C) (as it appeared
prior to Act 735 of 1978). As amended by Act 735, these motions to quash must now
be filed in accordance with article 521. 1978 La. Acts, No. 735, amending LA. CODE
CrIM. P. art 535(C).
One motion now coming under section C is the motion to quash based on objec-
tions to the petit or grand jury venires, since this motion is no longer included under
article 535(B) as amended. LA. CODE CrIM. P. art. 535(B), as amended by 1978 La.
Acts, No. 735. Consequently, the time for filing motions based upon grounds other than
those stated in paragraphs A or B will now be controlled by article 535 (C). LA. CODE
CraM. P. art. 535 (C), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 735.
39. LA. CODE CaM. P. art. 621, as amoended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 735. Formerly,
a motion for a change of venue was required to be made at least five days prior to the
date then fixed for commencement of trial. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 621 (as it appeared
prior to Act 735 of 1978). As amended by Act 735, article 621 provides that this motion
shall be filed in accordance with article 521. Subsequent to the first 30 days after
arraignment, it is within the court's discretion to allow a motion for a change of venue
any time before the first witness is sworn in at the trial on the merits. LA. CODE CRIM.
P. art. 621, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 735.
40. 1978 La. Acts, No. 735, amending LA. CODE CrIM. P. art. 681. Under former
article 681, the motion to recuse the district attorney was required to be filed and tried
contradictorily prior to the commencement of trial. LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 681 (as it
appeared prior to Act 735 of 1978). Act 735 amends this provision and mandates that
this motion be filed in accordance with article 521. 1978 La. Acts, No. 735, amending
LA. CODE CaIM. P. art. 681.
41. 1978 La. Acts, No. 735, amending LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 707. Act 735 amends
article 707 to provide that a motion for a continuance may be filed at any time prior
to the commencement of trial.
42. 1978 La. Acts, No. 735, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 729. Prior to amend-
ment, article 729 provided that this motion was to be filed "not later than ten days
before trial or within such reasonable time as the court may permit." LA. CODE CraM.
P. art. 729 (as it appeared prior to Act 735 of 1978). Act 735 of 1978 now provides that
a motion for discovery by a defendant may be filed in accordance with article 521 or
within such reasonable time as the court may permit. 1978 La. Acts, No. 735,
amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 729.
